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ABSTRACT 
This is the first history of the Qwathi to appear.
It relates all the events which have shaped the
historical consciousness of the Qwathi people.	The
first chapter deals with the foundation of the Qwathi
chiefdom by	Mtshutshumbe and	his followers who
emigrated from EmaXesibeni to Thembuland before 1700.
It also covers the development of the various Qwathi
clans.
The reign of Fubu which is discussed in Chapter Two
was characterised by warfare. The most important of
these wars was the Qwathi-Thembu war of the beginning
of the nineteenth century. Its importance lies in
the fact that although the Qwathi were a small
chiefdom, they were able to goad the Thembu nation
into war, the results of which were indecisive, hence,
in subsequent years, the Thembu were always cautious
in their dealings with the Qwathi.	Fubu's other
wars, including	those of the Mfecane, are also
discussed.
Chapter Three deals mainly with the Qwathi-Thembu
relations during the reign of Dalasile, Fubu's son.
These were at first cordial but they became strained
when Ngangelizwe took over as Thembu king in 1863.
Dalasile refused to involve the Qwathi people in
Thembu conflicts with their enemies and he desired to
pursue an independent line.	In 1875, when Ngange-
lizwe accepted colonial control, Dalasile stood out
against it but, under pressure from the agents of
colonialism, he gave in.
The period from 1875 to 1880 was one of passive
resistence to colonial control. This erupted into
Dalasile's rebellion against the colony from 1880 to
1881.	Chapter Six deals	with the surrender,
relocation and the introduction of a new system of
control called the "Ward System". The ruling house
was replaced by appointed headmen most of whom were
drawn from non-Qwathi communities.
Chapter Seven deals with the rise and Fall of the
Qwathi peasantry.	The fall of the peasantry
facilitated labour migracy which contributed to
further deterioration of the Qwathi both economically
and physically.
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PREFACE 
Though not a Qwathi by birth, but a Thembu born and
bred in Qwathiland, I became interested in the stories
of the deeds of the Qwathi and also sympathised with
the Qwathi people whom various government officials
from the colonial period up to the days of Transkeian
independence have regarded as savages, thieves,
troublemakers, ungovernable and anti-government.
have been prompted by the desire to exonerate the
Qwathi from some of these false accusations and
generalisations.
Second, of all chiefdoms in Transkei, the Qwathi
chiefdom has been sadly neglected by writers and
researchers in spite of their heroic deeds in the past
and their attempts to keep the anti-colonial spirit
alive in the last thirty years of the nineteenth
century. I have felt that an attempt to write an
account of the history of the Qwathi would be a
valuable contribution not only for the Qwathi people
but also for the entire African community as well.
This thesis is an attempt to reconstruct a history of
the Qwathi people from earliest times to 1910. But
before I embark on this, I want to put the readers on
guard not to expect a history of the whole of the
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Qwathi community.	The thesis mainly deals about the
Qwathi of Engcobo. It completely excludes the Qwathi
of Hinana found in the district of Herschel and only
touches on Stokwe Ndlela of Western Thembuland
inasmuch as he is related to the main branch of the
Qwathi of Engcobo and inasmuch as he was often
involved in planning strategies with Dalasile, the
chief of the Qwathi of Engcobo, during the conflicts
with the Colonial government between 1877 and 1881.
Readers are also put on guard not to expect a full and
comprehensive account of the Qwathi history in this
thesis because	of certain limitations beyond my
control.	Such limitations are the number of pages
required for an M.A. Thesis, lack of source material
especially in the social and economic	fields.
Missionary sources are sadly superficial and at times
deceitful.	They do not deal with all the social
problems resulting from the interaction between the
missionaries and the Qwathi. They merely highlight
the achievements of the missionaries some of which are
exaggerations.
Documents from Government Archives in Cape Town, Cory
Library in Grahamstown have been used but even these
display a lot of the bias and prejudice of government
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officials against the Qwathi.	However, with the use
of oral and secondary sources which are also scanty,
this problem of bias has been partially overcome.
The problems of oral sources lie in the informants'
insistence on the literal truth of their narratives,
their lack of coherence	and their	attempts at
exaggeration.
I also expect readers to disagree with the views
expressed in this thesis wholly or partially.
expect some to say it is completely different from
what we heard from our fathers.	Others will,
perhaps, say it is completely or partly biassed.
This is so because no historical account can recons-
truct the past as it actually was.	It can only
record the impressions of a particular observer.
This is so because a historian deals with a series of
vanished events which is differently imagined in each
succeeding generation. Our imagined picture of the
actual event is always determined by two things:
First, by the actual event itself in so far as we can
know something about it, second by	our present
purposes, desires, prepossessions and prejudices all
of which enter into the process of knowing it. The
actual event contributes something to the imagined
picture but the mind that holds the imagined picture
xalways contributes something too.	It is a fact that
the present influences our idea of the past and our
idea of the past influences the present. We are
accustomed to say "the present is the product of the
past", and that is what is ordinarily meant by the
historian's doctrine of "historical continuity".	But
it is only a half truth.	It is equally true and no
mere paradox that the past (our imagined picture of
it) is the product of the present.	We build our
conceptions of history partly out of present needs and
purposes.	The past is a kind of screen upon which we
project our vision of the future.
During my period of research I have also observed that
research work is not the work of an individual working
independently of other people. It involves many
people without whose assistance research work is
impossible.	Out of many people who have helped me in
one way or another the following deserve a special
word of thanks: I would like to thank Dr Jeffrey
Peires, my supervisor, for having encouraged me to
undertake research work on any area in Transkei, for
his patience in guiding me throughout the period of
research and his assistance in getting a study leave
for the purpose of research without which this work
would not have been possible.	A special word of
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thanks goes to the Department of Education which made
it possible for me to get a study leave with full pay
working together with the Department of Finance.
can assure these two departments that they made a wise
decision not for my benefit alone but also for benefit
of the people of Transkei at large.	To both depart-
ments, on behalf of the Qwathi people and myself, I am
deeply grateful.
The staff of the Cory Library, Grahamstown also
deserve a special word of thanks for their keen
interest in my work, for their patience in getting me
the available sources and their preparedness to get me
even those not available, as did the staffs of Cape
Archives, South African Library in Cape Town, the
Research Library in the University of Cape Town and
the Africana. Research Library and Bureau of Research
in the University of Transkei.
I would also like to thank the Qwathi sages who
encouraged me to put into writing their history jo.er.
their patience and willingness to impart to me the
information which many old people regard as their
individual possession, a heritage from his forefather.
The following are the Qwathi old men without whose
assistance I could have scarcely started with my
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research:- D.B.Mxutu of Nyanga location, T.Somdaka of
Silo's location, Reverend A.Titus and D.Mazwembe of
Tshapile's location and M.Xundu of Manzana location,
all in the district of Engcobo. I cannot forget the
work of the typist Miss Nozibele Bikitsha who has
typed successive drafts of the manuscript and my
friend and colleague, Mr A.M.Makaula who has helped me
with discussions, suggestions and encouragement during
times of despair.
This thesis is dedicated to my wife, whose patience,
encouragement and moral support, throughout the period
of research, have been a constant source of inspira-
tion.
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CHAPTER 1 
EARLY HISTORY OF THE QWATHI 
(a) From EmaXesibeni to Thembuland 
Although the	Qwathi are found in the heart of
Thembuland, in the district of Engcobo, they are not
Thembu	but are more related to the Xesibe of Mt
Ayliff and Mqanduli districts.	Their place of origin
is EmaXesibeni in the present district of Mt Ayliff.
Both oral	and written	sources acknowledge this
origin.1
The first known great chief from whom the Xesibe
reputedly came was Sibiside from whom Dlemini came and
from Dlemini came Njanya.	From Njanya came Xesibe in
the Qadi House.	Xesibe's son was Ntozabantu from
whom Ndzuza came and Ndzuza begot Miyana.	From
1.
	
	C.R. Leadley-Brown, "A history of All Saints
Parish" (All Saints, 1929), p.1-2.
D.B. Mxutu, Interview with,	13/6/87, All Saints,
Engcobo.
PR 3664, 1 of 4, E.G. Sihele, "Ngobani abaThembu
bevelaphi?"
Cory Library Rhodes University p.10.
J.H. Soga, The South	Eastern Bantu (Johan-
nesburg, 1930), p.349.
E.J.C. Wagenaar, "A forgotten Frontier zone"
Archives Year Book for South African History, 
1982, p.73.
M.	Xundu,	Interview	with, 2/7/87, Manzana
location Engcobo.
2Miyana came Bimbi and from him Nondzaba.	From the
Qadi House of Nondzaba came Hlabe whose son was
Mthetho.	It was from Mthetho that the Qwathi came,
through his son Mtshutshumbe. 2 (See geneology).
According to D.B. Mxutu, Mtshutshumbe was a brave
young man whose acts of bravery reached the Thembu
chief, Hlanga,across the Mbashe river, near the Ludwesa
Forest along the coast of the present Willowvale
district.	This Thembu chief invited Mtshutshumbe to
come to his assistance	against	his enemies.
According to Mxutu it was in response to this
invitation that Mtshutshumbe and his ibutho (group of
followers) left EmaXesibeni.3
Leadley-Brown gives two traditions which seek to
explain the reason for the departure from EmaXesibeni,
The first is that the leader of this ibutho, whom he
mistakenly identifies as Noni, in a fit of anger
killed his father's sacred ox and then fled with a few
followers. Another is that the leader and his
followers, on a hunting expedition were guilty of
breaking the hunting law, and afraid to return, they
2. Mxutu Interview, 13/6/87.
3. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
3settled in a country inhabited by the San.4
J.H.Soga's account that the Qwathi left EmaXesibeni
for Mpondoland and from Mpondoland to Thembuland
because of the Mfecane 5 can easily be ruled out on the
ground that by the time the Mfecane wars broke out,
the Qwathi had long been established in Thembuland.
Leadley-Brown and M. Xundu are mistaken with regard to
the chief who led the Qwathi into Thembuland.
Leadley-Brown says it was Noni and Xundu says it was
Mndwane, son of Mtshutshumbe.	The correct version is
that of Mxutu as is proved by the Qwathi praise which
goes:6
Inkomo	zika Mtshutshumbe, ogqaz'indlel'-
ebhek'ebuNguni.
The cattle of Mtshutshumbe who paved the way to
Nguniland.
This without doubt points to Mtshutshumbe as the one
who led his followers out of EmaXesibeni to Them-
buland.
Insofar as the reasons for the departure from
4. Leadley-Brown, "History of All Saints" pp.1-2.
5. Soga, South Eastern Bantu,p.349.
6. Mxutu, 13/6/1987.
4EmaXesibeni it seems as if the invitation by Hlanga,
the Thembu chief,' was at a later stage than Mxutu
puts it, because the Thembu chief in question was
Hlanga after his defeat by his brother, Dlomo, at the
battle of Msana. According to E.J.C. Wagenaar, this
battle took place in 1680, 8 by which date the Qwathi
were already in Thembuland.	But Mxutu's assertion
that the Thembu King at the time of the arrival of the
Qwathi	was	Mnguti, Hlanga's grandfather, seems
acceptable. 9 For the departure from EmaXesibeni
either of the reasons put forward by Leadley-Brown
seems convincing. 10
This nation derived its name not from the name of a
person who led them out of Emaxesibeni but from the
name of Mtshutshumbe's white ox which was given to him
after circumcision. When Mtshutshumbe left with his
followers, he took with him his ox, named Qwathi, on
which they carried their provisions.	There must have
been, of course, quite a reasonable number of cattle
in their possession.''
7. Ibid
8. Wagenaar "A Forgotten Frontier Zone", p.73.
9. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
10. Leadley-Brown, "History of All Saints," pp.1-2.
11. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
5As they had no definite place to which they were
travelling, the movement was slow. They occupied
themselves along the way to Mthatha mouth by hunting.
They took the route along the coast of what is now
Western Pondoland until they reached Nomadolo, along
the coast of the present district of Ngqeleni in the
vicinity of Mthatha Mouth. That is where they camped
for the first time after they had left EmaXesibeni.
When asked by the people of the area to which chiefdom
they belonged, they informed them that they belonged
to the Qwathi chiefdom, naming the chiefdom after
this ox.	Since then they became known as the
Qwathi.12
After a period of sojourn at Nomadolo, they crossed
the Mthatha river and camped in the vicinity of Coffee
Bay in the present district of Mqanduli in Thembuland
which was under King Mnguti.	This must have been
about 1650.	Mnguti, the Thembu king, welcomed them
and gave them permission to settle in the area.	The
Qwathi were grateful to the Thembu king and they
began, pastoral farming on a large scale.	That is
where Mtshutshumbe got married and his great son
Mndwane was born.	Mnguti did not live long after the
12.	Ibid.
6arrival of the Qwathi.	On his death he was succeeded
by his son Nxego."
In about 1670 Mtshutshumbe died and was succeeded by
his son Mndwane. It so happened that in about 1680
the two sons of Nxego, Dlomo and Hlanga, became
involved in a war of succession against each other.
Hlanga was defeated.	He fled across the Mbashe to
the Ludwesa coast. Knowing the Xesibe to be skillful
in war and in the art of making weapons, he invited
the Qwathi to come to his assistance.	They left the
place with the intention of joining Hlanga but turned
away before crossing the Mbashe river. It is not
known what made them change their minds, but it is
suspected that they were prevented from crossing the
Mbashe by the Bomvana.14
Led by Mndwane they turned towards the Mthatha river,
moved along it in the direction of the Baziya
mountains and camped at Mbolompo for a short time.
They then moved on but when they reached Mgudu they
13. T.	Somdaka,	Interview	with,	13/6/87, Silo
Location, Engcobo.
14. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
7turned towards Ngcebengwana or Tshebengwana Valley in
the Gqaga Valley.1
It was from this area that they began to spread to
Ndlunkulu and to Noni's hill, a hill overlooking
Clarkebury, where Noni, one of the most important
Qwathi chiefs, was born.	Others began to spread
westwards up to the Qumanco Valley. In the north
they spread as far as the western side of the upper
Mbashe and Maxongo's Hoek which is now part of the
Elliot district.16
Apart from the San this whole area between the Mbashe
and Qumanco rivers was uninhabited before the arrival
of the Qwathi.	It lay, however, within the area of
jurisdiction then claimed by the Thembu kings. The
Thembu king at this time was Dlomo, Mnguti's grandson
whose capital was at Nyhwarha in the present district
of Idutywa.	On the eastern side of the Mbashe
between Tabase and Baziya was a Thembu chief, Sebeni,
one of Mnguti's sons, who reported the arrival of the
Qwathi in the neighbourhood to king Dlomo.17
15. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
Xundu, 2/7/87.
16. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
17. Ibid.
8Dlomo nursed some fears about the choice of the place
of occupation and warned them that the place they had
chosen had dense forests infested with wild animals
and inhabited by brave, mischievous and dangerous San.
But the Qwathi impressed by the beauty of the land
with forests and grazing lands insisted on getting the
land. They replied that they were not afraid of wild
animals, after all they were hunters who were living
on the meat of wild animals.	They also showed no
fear for the San.18
Dlomo accepted them and was happy to have them between
the Thembu and the Mpondomise as they would serve as a
buffer. In return the Qwathi were also thankful for
having received the land and promised to give to the
Thembu kings one hundred head of cattle annually.
Although they occupied the land within the area of
jurisdiction claimed by the Thembu kings, there was no
attempt by the Thembu at assimilation and absorption.
They enjoyed a large measure of independence.	The
Thembu merely took them as allies because they were
powerful and proved to be of great help to the Thembu
during the Mfecane.19
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
9Ever since then, that is, the end of the seventeenth
century the Qwathi people have been in occupation of
the area between the Mbashe and Qumanco rivers.
These boundaries have never changed except after the
1880 Rebellion, when the Western boundary was changed
from Qumanco to the Mgwali river and the area between
the Slang river and the sources of Mbashe river which
is now part of the Elliot district was given to whitefarmers.20
Average summer temperatures vary between 18c and 22c
and winter temperatures are between 10c and 7c. In
winter the Gulandoda and Drakensburg ranges are often
covered with snow.	Rain falls in summer.	The
average annual rain fall varies between 25 inches and
40 inches. This rainfall also feeds the four rivers
of Qwathiland, namely Mbashe, Xuka, Mgwali and Qumanco
and their tributaries.21
The country tends to be well wooded and mountainous
with most of the indigenous forests	and bushes
covering the hills and their slopes. An article in
20. Ibid.
21. Transkei Department of Information and Foreign
Affairs, Transkei, Johannesburg 1976, pp.12-15.
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the Cape Monthly Magazine of 1874-75 describes this as
follows:22
A belt of hills formed almost a semi circle
from North to West with a dark covering of
thick bush.
Gardens, tended mostly by women, were usually carved
out between the huts rivers and roads. These were
shut off from animals by stones, mimosa and aloe
trees.	The rest of the land was given over to
pasturage and hunting grounds. The main agricultural
products are maize, kaffir corn, sorghum, tobacco and
pumpkins but the land is better suited for stock
farming.23
Pasturage is suitable for both cattle, sheep and
goats.	The whole of Qwathiland falls almost within
the belt of sweetveld with few patches of sourveld
here and there especially in the low lying areas. In
summer, cattle graze on the low-lying areas but in
winter on the bushy mountainous areas where the grass
is comparatively palatable because of moisture from
22. A.M. Robinson (ed.), Selected Articles (Cape
Monthly Magazine), VRS New Series (1870-1876)
Cape Town 1876.
23. G12-77	W.E. Stanford to Major Elliot (CMT)
4/1/77, p.86.
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the mist which always covers the mountains and from
the melting snow.24
Some traces of coal were discovered by white settlers
on the Gulandoda and Drakensberg ranges but mining of
it was never developed because it was of a low grade
and expensive to mine.25
(a) Ntswayibana loses chieftainship 
When Mndwane, the chief of the Qwathi, who led them
into Qwathiland, died, he was succeeded by Ncobe and
Ncobe was succeeded by his great son Nkovane.	The
reigns of	the abovenamed chiefs must have been
uneventful as nothing is known about them. According
to D.B. Mxutu and T. Somdaka Ntswayibana was the great
son of Nkovane and Noni was his younger brother 26 but
according to D. Mazwembe and W.D. Cingo it was Dikela
who was the great son of Nkovane and his sons were
Ntswayibana and Noni. 27	Mxutu disputes this convin-
cingly arguing that the descendants of Noni are not
24. Somdaka, 13/6/87.
25. G12-77 Stanford to Elliot 4/1/77, p.86.
26. Mxutu, 13/6/87; Somdaka, 13/6/87.
27. W.D.	Cingo,	Ibali	LabaThembu, Emfundisweni
Mission 1927, p.12.
Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
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Dikela's, it is only the descendants of Ntswayibana
who are of the Dikela clan and that when the Dikela
are praised they are often referred to as "Dikela of
Ntswayibana". 28
All oral informants agree that when Ntswayibana became
the chief he always referred all cases to Noni,
saying,29
Attend to them my younger brother, I am still
attending to the gardens.
He never presided over a single case.	It was always
Noni who did so on his behalf.3°
When Noni had established himself in his own home-
stead, he referred those who brought cases to him
back to Ntswayibana who in reply said31
Preside over them my younger brother, your
homestead is still mine.
The excuse of always attending to the gardens earned
him and his descendants the name amaNdima, indima is a
28. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
29. Mazwembe, 16/7/87
• Mxutu, 13/6/87
• Somdaka, 13/6/87
• Titus, 12/7/87
Xundu, 2/7/87
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
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•
piece of ploughed land.	It is a noun derived from
the verb stem "-lima" to plough. In this way Noni
got experience in the responsibilities of a chief and
many people looked upon him as the real chief.32
What puzzles one in the above story is what made
Ntswayibana to be always attending to agricultural
farming usually a female	occupation, instead of
pastoral farming, hunting or court cases. D.B.
Mxutu is of the opinion that the term endimeni-
attending to the gardens - was being used by Ntswayi-
bana as an euphemistic term for attending to beer
drinking. 33 Another version which is more acceptable
and positive is that despite the division of labour
which assigned to men pastoral farming, there was
nothing preventing them from giving help to women in
tilling the soil. As Ntswayibana was a diligent man,
he felt more at home when doing some physical work
rather than mere theoretical and mental work. He
always felt that his services were needed more in the
gardens than in the court yard as some of the gardens
32. Ibid.
33. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
14
were in rugged areas - izigxa, which needed stronger
people to till than women.34
Diligence on the part of some Qwathi men and their
readiness to help the women in agricultural farming
were also observed by Reverend Gordon of All Saints
Mission who commented in his report of December
1860.35
There is one thing I appreciate with the
Qwathi men and this is that it is not the
women alone who work but also the men bear
a helping hand during the planting season.
The second reason for the reins of the government
passing over to Noni was the failure of Ntswayibana to
come to the assistane of Noni against Mphosiwe Sebeni,
the grandson of Mnguti whose son had married Noni's
daughter.	All arrangements having been made, Noni
instructed the bridal party leader not to give any
gifts or presents should the brideprice fall short.
When indeed the brideprice fell short the bridal party
refused to give the gifts and Mphosiwe in anger
insulted Noni in the hearing of his people, saying36
34. Titus, 12/7/87
35. Mic 172,	9623/3,	Reel 2	p.167,	Reverend
J.Gordon's Report, 31/12/1860. Cory Library.
36. Mazwembe, 16/7/87; Mxutu, 13/6/87; Somdaka,
13/6/87;	Titus, 12/7/87 and Xundu, 2/7/87.
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This blind man is silly and selfish, I can-
not take instructions from a blind man.
This was a mocking allusion to Noni's squint.
On their arrival at home the bridal party reported the
matter to Noni who took exception to the insult and
reported the matter to his brother, Ntswayibana.
But, in reply, Ntswayibana said that it was not he but
Noni himself, who had been insulted. Thereupon, Noni
mobilised his forces under the leadership of his sons
who were, Mtshaba the great son and his younger
brothers who were, Gcaleka, Sidindi, Njimbana, Mxhiya
and Ntondo.	In the meantime he informed the Thembu
King Tato who allowed him to do as he liked about
redressing his grievance.	Mphosiwe was defeated and
many of his cattle were captured. One hundred cattle
were sent to King Tato to thank him for not having
interfered and the rest filled Noni's kraals and
those of his sons. Ntswayibana protested and
demanded that the booty he brought to him as the chief
of the Qwathi but Noni replied it was not he (Ntswayi-
bana) who	had been	insulted but him (Noni).
Ntswayibana made no further attempts to assert himself
as the chief of the Qwathi, he continued with his
usual routine of helping women in the gardens. Many
of his councillors began to look upon Noni as the
chief especially that in supporting Noni there was the
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possibility of amassing wealth through his bravery and
ability as a chief. In this manner chieftainship
passed into Noni's house ever since and there was no
attempt on the part of Dikela, Ntswayibana's son to
claim back chieftainship.	Up to now it is still in
the hands of Noni's descendants.37
(c) Qwathi Clans 
But that power had shifted to Noni does not mean that
the Dikela had been thrown away. Today some Dikela
are heads of certain tribal authorities in Qwathiland,
together with those of the Sidindi and Ntondo houses.
The great house is that of Mtshaba, son of Noni.
Noni allocated his sons in the following manner:—
Mtshaba was the great son. Mxhinya was attached to
the great house to be a milker of the great house.
Gcaleka (not to be confused with Gcaleka, the Xhosa
chief) became ixhiba, the seed bearer should there be
no son in the great house.	The descendants of
Gcaleka are found in the Western Thembuland. It is
from this house that Stokwe Ndlela, one of the Western
Thembu chiefs, who took part in Ninth Frontier War and
37.	Ibid.
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was killed in the 1880-1881 Rebellion, came. 38 It was
at this house of Gcaleka that Noni died."
Ntondo was made Isilunga sikaNina - keeper of his
mother.	Njimbane died in the war against Mphosiwe
Sebeni before allocation was made. It is doubtful if
he could have been allocated had he survived, since
the Qwathi at this time did not have Right hand
houses. Sidindi was not allocated. In an attempt
to secure the permanent survival of his house he asked
his father to get another wife who would bear him
brothers, who would be	allocated	under	him.
Mncancashe was the son from this house. Mncancashe's
son was Mabunzi the first Qwathi to remain at work
and never to come back home. The descendants of
this house are at Ngcaca in Zwedala's location on the
other side of the Tsomo River in the Lady Frere
district.40	The removal of the Gcaleka house to
Western Thembuland must have been a blessing in
disguise to the Sidindi house.	The Sidindi house
became the second in seniority. The status of
Ntondo, the youngest son was somewhat raised when he
was allocated as the keeper of his mother hence even
38. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
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today some of the Tribal authorities are under the
Ntondo.41
Today there are four senior clans in Qwathiland
namely, ImiTshaba	from whom Qwathi chiefs come,
amaSidindi, amaDikela and amaNtondo.	There are other
clans which are minor and do not hold political
positions.	As a small nation all Qwathi clans are
much closer to one another.	It is perhaps this
closeness, lack of discrimination and lack of
pronounced jealousy and rivalry that the Qwathi have
survived as a distinct group with its own national
history in the heart of Thembuland.42
There are two other important clans which have no
chieftainship or headmanship but which are closely
associated with the senior houses. ImiXhiya, as noted
above, were allocated as milkers of the great house.
Although they do not qualify for chieftainship, they
occupy an important position in the Qwathi history
both politically and socially.	The descendants from
Mxhiya are called amaKhombela. The second one is
ImiNcayi named after Mncayi in the Qadi of the Great
House of Lutshaba.	They are more related to the
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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ImiTshaba than any other clans.	They are found in
the Gqaga Valley.43
Attached to the Dikela clan are amaMvala who are
accepted as Dikela because of a long history of
closeness to the clan, though they are not Dikela by
birth. The amaMvala were acting as herds for
Ntswayibana and were gradually absorbed by the Dikela
clan hence they are recognised as the Mvala of Dikela.
The name -mvala comes from the verb stem -vala to
close.	This confirms that they were herds as it is
the responsibility of the herds to close in the stock
all evenings.	The kraal gates those days were made
up of loose poles which were made to cross each other
at the gate held tight by the gate posts - amaxhanti 
to prevent the stock from moving out. These loose
poles are called imivalo meaning things used to
close.44
Amabangula is another clan also closely related to the
senior clans.	This clan is named after Nobangula,
Nkovane's sister. The name "Nobangula" denotes a
feminine gender and is derived from the verb stem "-
bangula" by prefixing "no"-.	This verb stem means
43. Xundu, 12/7/87.
44. Titus, 2/7/87.
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to pick up a thorn from somebody's feet. This woman
must have been helping his father, the chief, by
picking up thorns from his feet or she was absorbed
into the house because of her helpfulness and was
given the status of a princess. She gave birth
outside marriage to two children, Bhose and Dumba - a
girl and a boy who committed incest and gave birth to
a boy. This shocked the Qwathi when it was revealed.
The Xhosa word for revealing something openly is
"daca" hence this boy was called "Mdaca" and the clan
"imiDaca".	From Nobangula, therefore, came the
following clans:- amaBangula, amaDumba and imiDaca.45
Another clan is that of amaBlangwe, they came from
Ndzoloshe whose son was Blangwe.	Blangwe's son was
Thandabuzo.	His children were Nqinayo and Nqilashe,
a boy and a girl.46
All the Qwathi clans date back from Mtshutshumbe's
time or later and not earlier hence these clans are
not found among the Xesibe. None of the Qwathi ever
went back to EmaXesibeni after having settled in
45. Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
46. Xundu, 12/7/87
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Qwathiland.	Their customs are more Thembu than
Xesibe.47
Intermarriage does take place between some of the
Qwathi clans.	This is so because as the nation
grows, each clan begins to develop as its own
ancestors became independent of the other ancestors.
The praise singers of chiefs and important leaders or
councillors or heads of clans also begin to sing
different praises for the sons of the same chief or
head.	This marks the beginning of a clan as
followers of the young chiefs begin to call themselves
after some of the praises.	As the clan grows, ties
of blood gradually disappear and are forgotten and
ancestors cease to be common.	Otherwise the Qwathi
are exogamous.48
For example Ntswayibana and Noni were brothers from
the same father. Ntswayibana began to have his own
line of succession known as "amaDikela" and Noni
"imiTshaba", "amaSidindi", "imiXhiya" and "amaNtondo".
The Dikela began to look at Ntswayibana as their
ancestor not at Nkovane, Ntswayibana's father and the
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
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descendants of Noni to Noni not to Nkovane.	Hence
the descendants of Noni do not intermarry and also
those of Dikela do not intermarry.	But the Dikela
and the descendants of Noni do intermarry.	The
Blangwe also do marry the Nqinayo and the Ndzolo.49
49.	Ibid.
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QWATHI GENEALOGY   
MTSHUTIHUMBE c 1650
MNDWANE c 1670
NCOBE c 1690  
NKOVANE c 1710
NTSWAYIBANA
DIKELA 
NONI c 1730
1	 I	I	 Ic 1750 MTSHABA (G.S.) GCALEKA SIDINDI MXHIYA NJIMBANE NTONDO
c 1770 LUTSHABA	BACA	KHUTSHWA	MNCAYI
G .H. G.H. R.H. QADI HOUSE
NO MALE ISSUE	FUBU
1780 FUBU (G.H.)        
1860  R. H.                        
NGCANGO BUNXASE QHOLE DALASILE(G.S.) SIGIDI NOTOZANA NODUKWE DANTI
LIGA
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From the above genealogy, it is clear that Mtshaba
took over from Noni in about 1750.	It was during his
reign that the Right hand house and the qadi houses
came into being.	His sons were as follows:- Lutshaba
and Baca in the great house, Khutshwa in the right
hand house and Mncayi in the Qadi house.	He was
succeeded by his great son Lutshaba who unfortunately
had no male issue.	Fubu the eldest son of the right
hand house succeeded Lutshaba in about 1780.	Even
today Fubu is the most famous and best known chief of
the Qwathi people.	This is because of his long
period of reign and acts of bravery. He fought and
almost warded off all the invaders during the Mfecane.
His victims during his reign were such well known
chiefs as Rharhabe of the Xhosa, Madzikane of the
Bhaca, Matiwane of the Mpondomise. His children were
Bhunxase, Nodukwe, Dalasile - greatson, Sigidi always
known as Sigidi Fubu, Qhole, Ngcango and Danti from
the right hand house.50
50.	Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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CHAPTER 2 
EARLY QWATHI WARS 1782-1848 
(a) Qwathi - Rharhabe War 1782 
One of the first important incidents of Fubu's reign
was his defeat of the noted Xhosa chief, Rharhabe.
It is surprising that such well known historians of
the Xhosa as Peires and Milton have neglected to
explain this event and have ascribed it simply to the
"Thembu" without noticing the role played by Fubu and
the Qwathi.'
Unfortunately the matter is far from easy to explain
as there are no fewer than ten sources and these
contradict each other in many respects.2
1. J.Milton, The Edges of War (Johannesburg, 1983),
p.34.
J.B.Peires, The House of Phalo (Johannesburg,
1981), p.50.
2. Cingo, Ibali labaThembu, pp.12-14.
W.D.	Hammond-Tooke,	The	Tribes	of Umtata 
(Pretoria, 1957), pp.37-38.
Colonel J.Maclean (ed), Compendium of Kaffir 
Laws and Customs (Grahamstown, 1906), p.19.
Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
Milton, Edges of War, p.34.
Mxutu, 13/6/87.
Peires, Phalo, p.50.
E.G.Sihele,	"Ngoobani	abaThembu	bevelaphi?"
pp.12-13.
PR 3665 1 of 4, M.Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu"
(Cory Library).
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However, it is clear that at least two factors played
a part in bringing about the clash. First it seems
that Ndaba, the King of the Thembu, was held captive
for some time by Rharhabe and was ill-treated by him
until Fubu came to his assistance.	Second, it seems
that there was a dispute about the brideprice owed by
a certain Thembu to Rharhabe.	We must look more
closely at each of these facts in turn.3
When Ndaba came of age, he married a Xhosa woman who
either was Rharhabe's daughter or sister.	Un-
fortunately the brideprice fell short.	He sent a
miserable hundred head of cattle. This was an insult
to such a well-known chief of the Xhosa.	He was
determined to punish Ndaba.4
Meanwhile at home, all was not well.	From the
beginning Ndaba showed signs of weakness. His throne
was challenged by his half brother "Ntlanzi".	He
also blundered by antagonising the Ndungwana because
Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, pp.131-132.
D.J.Potgieter (ed), The Encyclopaedia of Southern 
Africa, Vol.9, (Cape Town, 1973), p.247.
Xundu, 12/7/87.
3. Ibid.
4. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, pp.131-132.
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of the obsolete and notorious custom of sending for
all the Ndungwana girls to go to his place.	At the
instigation of Ntlanzi the Ndungwana appealed to
Rharhabe whose mother was a Ndungwana or a daughter of
Ndungwana of the iQadi house of Dlomo.	Embittered by
the insult of the brideprice, Rharhabe accepted the
invitation.	Ndaba was defeated and fled to Gcaleka-
land. In his place Ntlanzi who had long wanted the
reins of government acted as regent.5
Ndaba who was not a brave king, and did not have much
following, must have been afraid of coming back to
challenge Ntlanzi, the regent. He stayed in
Gcalekaland long after the war had come to an end.
Rharhabe who was not satisfied with the punishment
meted out to Ndaba, tried a trick to get Ndaba to his
Great Place. He pretended to be feeling guilty for
the treatment given Ndaba and asked him to leave
Gcalekalnd and come to the Rharhabe Great Place for
entertainment.	Ndaba, who was not far-sighted,
agreed.	But the entertainment he got was of a
different nature.	He was tortured and ill-treated at
the Rharhabe Great Place by being made to Jump over
5.	Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu" (N.P.N.)
Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu" (N.P.N.)
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the spears and other sharp weapons, so that if he
could not jump over them, they could hurt him.6
The news of the ill-treatment of the Thembu King
displeased Fubu, the chief of the Qwathi, who was
unhappy with the despotic powers of the Thembu regent,
Ntlanzi. He secretly discussed the issue with
Nkosiyana, one of the Thembu chiefs in the Mqanduli
district, who was also unhappy about Ntlanzi's reign.
They decided to rescue and reinstate Ndaba.7
Fubu led his forces to Rharhabeland. When they
approached the Hoho Forests, he sent Ncobeni of the
Bangula clan with a small force to go and inform Ndaba
that he, Fubu, had come to his rescue. 8	They found
him in one of the huts from which he could not escape
as the door was guarded.	Ncobeni and his followers
took the weapons with which the exit was closed and
killed the guards and rescued Ndaba.9 Young men were
6.	Cingo, Ibali labaThembu, pp.12-14.
• Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".
• Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
• Mxutu, 13/6/87.
Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
• Xundu, 12/7/87.
7. Cingo, Ibali labaThembu.
Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu". 
8. Mxutu, 13/6/87
9. Ibid.
• Xundu, 12/7/87.  
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sent by Fubu to drive away all the cattle from the
grazing lands as booty. Fubu and his forces helped
Ndaba back to his place and built kraals for him which
were filled with the Rharhabe cattle.'
When Rharhabe discovered that all his cattle had been
taken away, he led his forces into Thembuland but Fubu
would not allow him to cross Qwathiland. This led to
the battle of Ngxogi in which the Rharhabe were
beaten.	Rharhabe, himself, fell in the battle, and
in the battle of Luhewini, Rharhabe's Great son,
Mlawu, also died.	The Rharhabe were defeated by the
Qwathi under Fubu. Ndaba was reinstated without any
trouble as Ntlanzi did not show any resistence.	He
must have become afraid of Fubu and his Qwathi.''
(b) Qwathi-Thembu War 
Having successfully reinstated Ndaba,	the Qwathi
considered themselves to be real rulers of the Mbashe
area. 12	When Ngubengcuka, the Great son of Ndaba,
became the King about 1810, the tottering mornarch had
reached its lowest ebb.	He had to work hard to unite
10. Ibid.
11. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
12. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?", p.19.
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and strengthen	the Thembu Nation during a most
critical and challenging era, the era of the Mfecane
wars.	At this time, the Qwathi, the most powerful
group in Thembuland had begun to look down upon the
Thembu because of their weakness.	The Qwathi must
have been regretting the offer of hundred head of
cattle which	had become	obligatory rather than
voluntary. They tried by all means to provoke the
Thembu into war as success in the war would relieve
them of the burden.13
When Ngubengcuka ascended the throne, he had a hard
task of proving to his neighbours and his subjects as
to who was the real power in Thembuland." The build
up of tension began when the Qwathi boys killed some
calves of Thembu cattle.	When the Thembu boys
protested the Qwathi boys attacked them.	The Qwathi
boys had even coined an idiom, "chithi, chithi
gxothisa buHala". 15	This means that when you chase
somebody make him run like a Hala (The Hala are the
royal clan of the Thembu).	Even men became involved
in the conflicts.	In such encounters the Hala were
always defeated.
13. Xundu, 2/7/87.
14. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?", p.19.
15. Ibid.
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Ngubengcuka sent repeatedly to Fubu, appealing to him
to control his people and also complained about the
killing of the calves of the Hala cows whilst grazing
in the veld.	But Fubu showed no interest in the
matter. The Qwathi despite these appeals and
warnings continued to provoke the Hala into war. It
became clear that no amount of appeals, warnings and
reasoning would deter the Qwathi from the behaviour,
but only an appeal to arms would solve the problems.16
At last Ngubengcuka made a decision. He called upon
the Thembu and the other loyal chiefs to make weapons
in abundance and to prepare themselves for war, to
teach the Qwathi a lesson. He appealed to his
warriors to gather strength and courage and appealed
to their patriotic spirit, making them see that the
great nation was on fire.	The Thembu warriors in
tears, left the courtyard of the Great Place with one
accord, determined to crush the Qwathi. A violent
clash took place along the Gqaga valleys, with the
sons of Ndaba and Lutshaba determined to fight for
their lives.	The Qwathi appeared to have been taken
unawares and they began to retreat.	The Hala pushed
them over the valleys whilst the other Thembu warriors
16.	Ibid.
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drove away the cattle.	But it seems as if the
retreat of the Qwathi was a planned strategy to enable
them to organise themselves afresh.	Things became
bad for the Hala.	Ngubengcuka instructed his
brother, Jumba to escape with the Qwathi cattle.	He
said.17
My brother, Jumba, get away with those
cattle as fast as you can and leave me
behind to try yet another blow on these
Qwathi. But should you leave these cattle
behind you will remain poor for the rest of
your life.
Jumba with a few men drove the cattle away and crossed
the Xuka river.	As they crossed the river, the two
titans met with a violent clash. Fubu pushed harder
in his flank and the Hala opponents began to retreat.
Some Hala, in a confused state, missed the Xuka drift
and drowned in the deep water.	What saved the Thembu
was that Ngubengcuka, having realised the danger in
which they were, crossed the river at full speed.
With a handful of men he blocked the drift, thus men
died in the battle of Xuka.	The Qwathi paused to
reorganise themselves.
17.	Ibid.
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During this pause one 'fire eating patriot' on the
side of the Qwathi called 18
Had the cattle ever been taken away whilst
men were still alive, you cattle [men] of
Lutshaba of Noni?
The Qwathi, with one accord, pushed forward in pursuit
of the Hala who were already heading for the plains of
Sithebe, near Clarkebury. As the Qwathi were pushing
closer and closer, Ngubengcuka made eloquent appeals
to his warriors to make a halt and face the enemy.
To these appeals the Hala patriots responded valiant-
ly.	They doubly-redoubled their strokes upon the
foe. The Qwathi forces gave in and the day was lost
to the Thembu who pursued them, thus changing the
Qwathi idiom to fit them.	The Thembu victory was
great.19
The war earned Ngubengcuka respect from both the Hala
and the Qwathi.	Fubu is reported to have commented20
Yes, I am happy that this day has come to
prove that indeed you are a man, because
your father was a coward who failed to
assist me to defend this country.
From Fubu's speech, it is clear that, even though
defeated, he did not regard Ngubengcuka as his master
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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but as his partner who would assist him in defending
the country. As equals or partners they would both
defend the country from enemies.
In his speech after Fubu, Marhongo, a Qwathi coun-
cillor, made it clear that they desired to be freed
from the burden of taxation which started as a
voluntary contribution and also the war tax they were
traditionally expected to pay. He was speaking as if
he was not representing a defeated people but was
speaking as if no one had won.	The Qwathi speakers
had not at all been humbled. In fact had the Qwathi
warriors not pursued the Hala from Xuka to Sithebe,
they could have won the day.	If war had been resumed
after the Sithebe battle the Thembu would not be
certain of the result. This confidence on the part
of the Qwathi speakers made Ngubengcuka to think
wisely before saying anything or else his victory
would be short lived.21
In his closing speech, Ngubengcuka spoke wisely. He
agreed to abolish the tax and appealed to the Qwathi
to cooperate with the Thembu especially in times of
war.	He also appealed to both the Thembu and the
Qwathi that enmity between them should come to an end.
21.	Ibid.
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Ngubengcuka in his speech was not speaking from a
height, as the master over the Qwathi but as an equal.
He was afraid of antagonising the Qwathi at a time
when the atmosphere was saturated with the rumours of
war.	He needed a powerful, reliable and friendly
ally in order to ward off invaders.	The two leaders,
therefore, rounded up their discussions, fully
assuring each other of cooperation on the basis of
equality, hence throughout the Mfecane wars the Qwathi
were always cooperative, genuinely	assisting the
Thembu against their enemies.	Thus Ngubengcuka never
managed or attempted to exert full authority over the
Qwathi.	Later events imply that the Qwathi retained
their autonomous status.22
(c) Qwathi-Bhaca War 1824 
The nineteenth Century saw the beginning of turmoil
and violence among the African chiefdoms in which the
more powerful nations crushed, absorbed and pushed
away the weaker ones and the weaker ones carried
destruction to everything in front of them also
absorbing the weaker peoples with the aim of building
themselves into stronger nations to be	able to
challenge the	bigger ones.	These upheavals,
22.	Ibid.
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generally speaking, began in Zululand and from there
spread to the South, West and North. The effects of
such restlessness and violence were also felt in the
independent chiefdoms of the area between the Kei and
Mzimkhulu rivers.	Thembuland, therefore, was no
exception.23
Madzikane the mighty chief of the Bhaca people, was
the first of the leaders and devastators to set his
foot in Thembuland towards the end of 1823. In an
attempt to break out of the cramped conditions of
Northern Mpondoland, Madzikane led a raid to the South
into Thembu territory. Madzikane and his Bhaca
warriors entered Thembuland through Qwathiland from
the direction of Mpondomiseland and Gatberg district.
The Qwathi, therefore, were the first to feel the
edges of the Bhaca spears. Madzikane was believed to
have magical, mysterious and occult powers which made
him invisible when facing the enemy. 24
23. J.D.Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth 
Century Revolution in Bantu Africa (London,
1966), pp.168-182.
Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa (London,
1987), p.52.
24. A.M. Makaula, Interview with, 20/8/87 Grahams-
town.
.	Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
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Besides the desire for a living space, Madzikane was
attracted into Thembuland by the fertile land and
abundant supply of cattle since Thembuland was far the
the centres of conflict.	When the Bhaca entered
Qwathiland,	they built their homesteads without
consulting Fubu, the Chief of the Qwathi or Ngube-
ngcuka, the King of the Thembu.	Fubu warned him
against this and gave him three days in which to
remove from Qwathiland.	To this Madzikane replied.25
I am from Zululand and I will never be under
any chief or king and if you tell me about
war, that is my way of life, my weapons have
been lying there unused. You have reminded
me of my duty.
After three days, Fubu, having doctored his army, led
it against the Bhaca. As the Qwathi forces were
approaching, Madzikane called upon Jekwa, one of his
chief councillors and said.26
Chieftainship comes from God and that my
time has come to an end.
He told Jekwa that he was going to die at the hands of
the Qwathi. He then broke down the calabash in which
he kept his medicines, which action symbolised the
destruction of himself.	Now that his life had come
25. Ibid.
26. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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to an end, there was no need to keep his charms which
could not be shared with anyone even his sons. Hence
after blessing his sons, Sonyangwe and Ncaphayi, he
advised them to go to Faku who would give them land
and chieftainship.27
At that moment the Qwathi began to attack.	Madzikane
hid himself in the Gqutyini Forest. Taken by
surprise and discouraged by Madzikane's words, that he
was going to die, the Bhaca warriors offered no
resistance but took to flight at once.	They fled
away in the direction of Mpondomiseland. The Qwathi
hunted for Madzikane and when they saw him they
attacked him	but because his charms were still
working in him he could not be killed with the Qwathi
spears, though badly wounded.	At last he said:"
My days have come to an end, but you will
not be able to kill me with your spears.
He then handed out his own spear, and before Fubu
could intervene, a young man of the Gcina ethnic group
had already grabbed the spear and dealt Madzikane a
fatal blow.	Having killed Madzikane, this young
27. Makaula, 20/8/87.
Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
Mxutu, 13/6/87.
Somdaka, 13/6/87.
28. Ibid.
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Gcina is reported to have fainted and died out of
excitement.	Some say he had been affected by
Madzikane's charms. 29 However, the Qwathi infor-
mants, explain that Fubu, who was opposed to a
commoner killing a chief, who was not fighting, in a
fit of anger ordered the young Gcina to be killed.30
All the Bhaca fled into the direction of Eastern
Mpondoland according to Madzikane's advice. Thus
Fubu had succeeded in warding off the Mfecane invaders
from entering Thembuland. The area which Madzikane
and his followers had camped is, even today, known as
Madzikane's location.31
(d) The Qwathi and the Ngwane of Matiwane 1828 
As a result of the wars from Trans-Orangia, Matiwane
of the Ngwane decided to remove to a safer country.
But before they left, his followers made an attack on
Moshoeshoe's position at Thaba Bosiu.	The attack was
made in July 1827.	Though the Ngwane were more than
a match for the Sotho in the open field, they did not
29. Makaula, 20/8/87.
30. Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
Mxutu, 13/6/87.
31. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
Ntshokweni, Interview with, 15/3/87, Cape Town.
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succeed in storming the mountain.	Decimated by large
boulders and showers of spears hurled down from above,
their ranks began to waver.	They were routed by a
Sotho charge. Matiwane was furious with his
subordinates who had risked battle on such unfavour-
able terms and exposed the insecurity of his position.
Only the strength of public opinion prevented him
from putting the leaders of expedition to death. The
Ngwane position in Trans-Orangia had become untenable
and a second encounter with the Ndebele caused them to
abandon the area and follow the route acroiss the
Orange which led to Thembuland.32
The Qwathi-Thembu combined forces pushed the Ngwane
back to Lesotho and on their way they suffered from
severe dysentry.	The plague was attributed to
Ngubengcuka's diviners. Many people including his
brother Pehle,	opposed another attempt to enter
Thembuland but Matiwane forced his way, they entered
Qwathiland and he doctored his army.	They came into
a homestead where an intonjane ceremony	was in
progress.	They masacred everybody in that homestead.
The Qwathi tried to resist but were no match.	Fubu
withdrew his forces, promising to make another attempt
in a few weeks, but once more he was defeated.	He
32. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, pp.91-92.
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then sent a word to Ngubengcuka, who appealed to the
Gcaleka and the Colonial Government.33
Lieutenant-Governor R. Bourke sent	Colonel Henry
Sommerset with a force of a thousand soldiers.
Hintsa also sent a formidable force.	The Ngwane who
feared nothing in human form awaited, in confidence,
the armies approaching them. They had complete trust
in themselves but to their shock they found themselves
face to face with something unknown to them which
seemed at the time supernatural. They were familiar
with the war, accustomed to famine and hardship but
this day they met with what they had never met with
before - the destructive power of artillery.	The
Ngwane tried to come to close quarters with their
spears but in vain.	Long before they could approach
within charging distance they were shot down.	A
sound of thunder they heard, a cloud of smoke they saw
but they did not know what killed them.	They broke
before the storm of shot and shell.34
The battled of Mbolompo, 1828, put an end to the
career of the Ngwane as a powerful invading group.
33. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu"? pp.18-19.
34. Ibid.
Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, p.92.
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Most of the survivors, both Hlubi and Ngwane settled
down among the Qwathi, Thembu and Xhosa in a sub-
ordinate capacity where they came to be part of the
composite group known as the Mfengu.35
(e) Qwathi-Thembu Alliance against the Sotho 
In about 1830 Makhabane complained to his brother,
Moshoeshoe, that he was poor and had no cattle.
Moshoeshoe replied that she should take up arms and
lead the way to Thembuland in order to get cattle
since the Thembu were reported to be rich in cattle.
When they reached Thembuland Makhabane pushed straight
for Nyhwarha, Ngubengcuka's Great Place.	Some of the
forces were scattered over Qwathiland with the aim of
getting all the cattle available.	Makhabane having
captured many of the cattle moved into the direction
of Qwathiland.	Ngubengcuka sent his forces to
recover the cattle.36
As they were climbing up the Luhewini mountain they
were confronted by the Thembu and the Qwathi under
Ngubengcuka and Fubu respectively. Overwhelmed by
these reinforcements, Makhabane tried to escape but he
35. Ibid.
36. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.24 B.
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thought again of the cattle and decided to resist.
The Qwathi-Thembu combination was at an advantage in
that they were using spears which they could throw at
a distance while the Sotho were using battle axes.
The Sotho fled into the Nduku Forest. Ngubengcuka
appealed to his forces to drive the Sotho out of the
forest away from the country.37
One of the Thembu replied that they were short of
weapons because they had used up all their spears.
Ngubengcuka instructed them to get into the forest and
get themselves knobkeries and sticks with which to
fight.	Thereupon the Qwathi and the Thembu with new
weapons beat the Sotho out of the forest up the
mountain.	Makhabane was killed and left in the
forest. The Sotho fled away.38
The forest in which Makhabane died was named Nduku 
meaning a stick because it was from this forest that
the Qwathi-Thembu forces got the sticks with which to
drive the Sotho away. It was in the vicinity of this
forest that Dalasile, the great son of Fubu, built his
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
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homestead. Both Fubu and Ngubengcuka demonstrated in
this invasion that "unity is strength".39
(f) Fubu's hunting Party skirmished by the Gcaleka at 
Mntuntloni.
In one of his hunting expeditions, Fubu narrowly
escaped death in the forest that was later called
Mntuntloni. They were warned by the Qwathi women of
the locality that the Gcaleka warriors from Hohita had
surrounded the forest.	These Gcaleka were after Fubu
as they had heard much about his bravery. To save
Fubu, the hunting party decided that one young man
should be given Fubu's robe and asked to go out of the
forest in the direction of Mgwalana, wielding his
weapon by his left hand to emulate Fubu, and to hold
his shield by his right hand.	He was asked to run as
fast as he could to draw away the Gcaleka. When
indeed, the Gcaleka saw this man coming out of the
forest at full speed and in the manner described
above, they were certain it was Fubu, and they all
pursued him since it would add fame to anyone who
could kill Fubu.	They overtook the young man at
Mgwalana stream and killed him.40
39. Ibid.
40. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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In the meantime, Fubu and his party came out of the
forest in the opposite direction and took the road
which leads to the direction of the present town of
Cala without having been seen by his enemies. When
the Gcaleka realised that they had killed the wrong
person, they went back and once more surrounded the
forest but they were afraid to get in.	When nobody
came out they gave up the siege.'" According to
D.B.Mxutu, the name Mntuntloni for this forest and
surrounding area, dates back to this incident. This
was because the women who had raised the alarm did not
see anybody coming out and still believed that he was
still there and too shy to come out - Mntuntloni means
a shy person.42
(g) Qwathi-San War 
Chief Mgudlwa, the great son of Jumba, the right hand
son of Ndaba, who was the nephew (Mgudlwa) to the
Qwathi by his mother who came from the house of
Ntondo, the youngest son of Noni, fled to Qwathiland
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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and reported that his cattle had been captured by the
San and asked Fubu for assistance.43
When the Qwathi occupied the present Qwathiland they
were warned against the dangerous San by Dlomo but
they showed no fear of the San.	The day had come for
them to prove that they were superior to the San.	To
fight against the San needed a special skill since the
San used poisoned arrows which were	shot at a
distance.	Fubu and his Qwathi were aware of the
danger of the poisoned arrows. In planning the war
against the San they knew that they should take them
by surprise and chase them at close quarters so that
they should not have a chance to turn back and shoot
their dangerous weapons.	This the Qwathi success-
fully did.44
Having taken them by surprise, they routed the San
down the Mnyolo Valley to the vicinity of Clarkebury,
from Clarkebury they pursued them further towards
Thorha in the direction of Xonya. From there they
were pursued up to the Ntunja mountain - Gatberg.
The San swiftly ascended but the Qwathi on ascending
were delayed by heavy storm and when it had cleared,
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
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the San were nowhere to be seen but the Qwathi managed
to recover the cattle which were given back toMgudlwa.45
(h) Qwathi-Mpondomise War (Matiwane) 
As a result of the Mpondomise-Bhaca clashes, Myeki,
the Mpondomise chief fled to Mpangele, a Gcina chief
living in Cacadu in Western Thembuland. At this
place, he and his followers, were now in the neigh-
bourhood of the Thembu who had also run away, during
the beginning of the reign of Mthikrakra, as a result
of the Mpondo-Bhaca invasions of Thembuland Proper.
Mthikrakra decided that they should move on to Rhoda
in order to be as far away from Faku and Ncaphayi as
possible.	This took place in about 1838.46
Cordial relations were established between the Thembu
and the Mpondomise.	There was mutual respect for one
another as	well as intermarriage.	They even
cooperated when thieves came unexpectedly.47
45. Ibid.
46. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
47. Ibid.
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As Myeki was aging, he sent a message to Mthikrakra,
the Thembu King, to tell him that his son, Matiwane,
wanted to take over whilst he (Myeki) was still alive.
Mthikrakra asked Matiwane to wait until his father's
death. Matiwane and his followers having given up
went back to Mpondomiseland leaving Myeki behind with
a handful of his supporters.48
On the way, Matiwane, having seen the Qwathi cattle
became Jealous and greedy. There were also rumours
that the Qwathi were about to leave for Lesotho
because they were tired of fighting for the land that
belonged to the Thembu who had some time ago deserted
it.	As a result of this greed Matiwane hunted for
Qwathi cattle.49
At the very hour of the removal of the Qwathi cattle
by the Mpondomise, a battle ensued between them and
the Qwathi. An easy victory was won by the Qwathi
with the Mpondomise scattered all over during which
confusion Matiwane was captured by the Qwathi.	The
Qwathi declared that according to their custom and
tradition they could not kill a chief.	Matiwane had
to be released though wounded. Among the Qwathi
48. Ibid.
49. Mxutu, 13/6/87
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there were Mpondomise who belonged to the Velelo clan,
who said to the Qwathi,s0
You may go Qwathi and leave him with us, we
are going to kill him because we are used
to killing chiefs.
The Qwathi were just few paces away when the amaVelelo
did what they regarded as their task, that of killing
the chiefs.	This is how Matiwane, Son of Myeki, met
his end. Some of the Mpondomise claimed that the
Qwathi killed Matiwane, but this was only an attempt
to protect the Mpondomise who had committed the murder
from the wrath of the Mpondomise chiefs.51
The period 1782 to 1848 was a period of difficulties
for the Qwathi under Fubu because it was the period of
wars. But Fubu successfully resisted the invasions
throughout the period even to the extent of defending
Thembuland which had remained vacant from 1838 to 1850
when the Thembu came back from Rhoda under the leader-
ship of the regent, Joyi, after the death of
Mthikrakra. 52 But when the Thembu under Joyi
returned, Fubu, who had kept the promise made at Mount
Noni, that cooperation between the Qwathi and the
50. Ibid.
51. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
52. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
50
Thembu, was too old to play any important political
role. It remained with Dalasile, Fubu's great son,
to keep it or break it.
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CHAPTER 3 
QWATHI-THEMBU RELATIONS 1860-1875 
Nothing is known about the beginning of the reign of
Dalasile, the great son of Fubu, nor can any exact
date be given for the death of Fubu or Dalasile's
accession to the throne. From the missionary
records, it is assumed that Dalasile must have begun
to share power with his old father by 1859 because
when the missionaries arrived in Qwathiland Fubu was
very old and the missionaries were told that the final
decision rested with Dalasile.1
Stanford mistakenly assumed that Danti, Dalasile's
older brother, but from the right hand house, was at
one time a regent. 2 This stemmed out of the fact
that Danti was a chief councillor and was living with
his old father as Dalasile's homestead was about
fifteen kilometres away from Fubu's. But that Danti
was never a regent is confirmed by the missionary
records as both Fubu and Danti showed reluctance to
allocate land to the missionaries without the prior
1. Mic 172/96723/3	Reel	2 p.617, Reverend
J.Gordon's Report 31/12/1860, Cory Library.
2. J.W.Macquarie (ed.), The Reminiscences of Sir 
Walter Stanford. Vol.1 (VRS 39 Cape Town 1958),
p.53.
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approval of Dalasile who was at the time away after a
runaway wife.3
Fubu's death must have occured about 1860 and Dalasile
can be assumed to have officially taken over in 1860
by which time he must have been about fourty years.
An article in the "Cape Monthly Magazine" (1870-1876)
describes Dalasile in 1874 "as a good looking young
man rather short in stature".4
(a) Qwathi-Thembu Alliance against Mditshwa 1860 
The Thembu under Mthikrakra, having left Thembuland
Proper during the Mfecane wars in about 1838, vast
lands remained unoccupied. Mditshwa and his
Mpondomise followers, as a result of the invasions on
him by the Mpondo of Ndamase decided to settle in the
unoccupied lands of Thembuland Proper.5
When the Thembu came back in about 1850, after the
death of Mthikrakra, there were continuous isolated
conflicts between them and the neighbouring Mpondo-
3. Gordon's Report 31/12/1860.
4. Robinson,	Cape	Monthly	Magazine 1870-1876,
p.173.
5. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.35.
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mise. These started from beer-drinking parties
until they erupted into a full scale war in 1860
between the Thembu under the regency of Joyi and the
Mpondomise of Mditshwa in which the Thembu were
defeated.6
Upon defeat, Joyi appealed to Dalasile of the Qwathi
and Mgudlwa of the Jumba. Mgudlwa, at first,
hesitated as he was afraid of putting himself in a
difficult position since he and his old father, Jumba,
were sharing the same boundary with the Mpondomise
along the Tsitsa River. But when Dalasile promised
him land in his country, he agreed to come to the
assistance of Joyi.7
When the Qwathi and Jumba were ready, the war cry was
raised.	The combined Qwathi-Thembu forces soon burnt
and destroyed the Mpondomise homesteads. The
Mpondomise were scattered all over and were pushed and
pursued from Zimbane, Ncise, Kambi, Qokolweni up to
Mjika and the combined forces returned with a large
booty.	Since that day the Mpondomise of Mditshwa
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
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established themselves in the present districts of
Tsolo and Maclear (Gatberg).8
After the war Joyi thanked Dalasile and Mgudlwa by
giving them a large number of cattle. Once more the
Qwathi had successfully cooperated with the Thembu by
assisting in warding off the Thembu enemy. This was
an indication that Dalasile had not renounced the
policy of "good neighbourliness" with the Thembu which
had been pursued by Fubu in 1782 and was renewed after
the Qwathi-Thembu war of the early 19th Century.9
(b) Dalasile gives land to Mgudlwa 
At the beginning of the reign of Mthikrakra in 1838,
Mgudlwa was living in Tabase in the present district
of Umtata with his old father, Jumba, and his brother,
Mdukiswa. After a dispute about seniority between
Mgudlwa and Mdukiswa the matter was brought before
Mthikrakra and councillors, by the young chiefs but
their father, on account of ill-health did not attend.
They were instructed to come with him the next time
they should go to the great place and in the meantime
Mgudlwa was appointed heir pending the decision.
8. Ibid.
9. Xundu, 2/7/87.
55
When they got home, they told	Jumba about the
decision.	But Mgudlwa rather than put his father in
an invidious position decided to leave for Qwathiland.
His father also decided to leave with him.	Mdukiswa
decided to remain behind."'
It so happened that, in the meantime, the Thembu under
Mthikrakra were leaving for Rhoda, so they all moved.
Mgudlwa and Jumba did not stay at Rhoda. They both
left with the intention of settling in Qwathiland.
Mgudlwa chose the Qumanco valley, whilst Jumba chose
Mhlwazi above the mountains. But when Joyi, regent
for Ngangelizwe, went back to Thembuland, they both
moved and established themselves at Tsitsa."
When war broke out between Joyi and Mditshwa, Mgudlwa
feared to join in the war on the side of Joyi because
he was sharing the same boundary with the Mpondomise
along the Tsitsa river. Dalasile promised him land
in the Qumanco valley, the same land he had occupied
before leaving for Tsitsa.	This was part of
Dalasile's land.	But despite this, Dalasile did not
intend extendng his jurisdiction over Mgudlwa and his
people.	As a chief in his own right he preferred to
10. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
11. Ibid.
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give Mgudlwa land where he would rule as an indepen-
dent chief. Even today the Jumba are still in
occupation of the Qumanco valley which was extended to
the Mgwali river after the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880-
1881.12
(c) Dalasile's Relations with Ngangelizwe 1863-1875 
Up to this time relations between the Qwathi and the
Thembu were cordial. But after the accession of
Ngangelizwe to the throne in 1863, the relations were
strained.	Dalasile began to lead his own way without
much respect for Ngangelizwe.	This, Dalasile showed
as early as the installation of Ngangelizwe as the
King of the Thembu, after initiation in 1863.	He
absented himself from the occassion which was attended
by almost all the chiefs in Thembuland. This was an
indication that Dalasile was determined to go it alone
without any association with the new Thembu King.13
The reason for this estrangement was, perhaps, because
of the apparent alliance with the	British whom
Dalasile did not trust.	This alliance was shown by
E.J.Warner's being chosen to induct Ngangelizwe.
12. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
13. Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".
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Secondly, Dalasile must have been estranged from
Ngangelizwe because of his (Ngangelizwe) upbringing
and his subsequent behaviour.	Ngangelizwe from
earliest youth had been spoiled and flattered. Even
as a boy he knew what it was to have despotic powers,
his word was law and his temper had been allowed to
run riot "without even semblance of restraint". This
was too much for Dalasile to bear hence even at this
early stage of Ngangelizwe's life, Dalasile showed
reluctance to associate himself with him."
After his installation, Ngangelizwe's imperious, cruel
and tyranical reign and the disgusting treatment of
his many wives was such as to make "the coldest heart
burn with indignation".1 This is why Dalasile did
not come to the assistance of Ngangelizwe during the
latter's conflicts with Sarhili, the King of the
Xhosa, whose daughter he had married and subsequently
ill-treated.	These conflicts resulted from his ill-
treatment of this wife and her female attendant."
14. Robinson, Cape Monthly Magazine (1870-76) p.173.
15. Ibid.
16. W.T.Brownlee, The Reminiscences of a Transkeian 
(Pietermaritzburg, 1975) p.71.
Macquarie, Reminiscences of Standord, p.52.
V.M.Master, "Resistence to Colonial Control of
Thembuland".	(Unpublished M.A. Thesis U.C.T.,
1966), P.10.
Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu"
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It was not possible for Dalasile to be enamoured to
such a king as he was not a kind of a chief to accept
being bullied.	Moreover Dalasile's behaviour was in
direct contrast to Ngangelizwe's. Dalasile has been
described, in the Selected articles from the Cape 
Monthly Magazine (1870-1876), in 1874 "as a good-
looking young man, with a fine clear countenance which
inspired trust and respect."17
When Ngangelizwe realised that the Qwathi of Dalasile,
who had been given land whereon to reside by his
predecessors, were not submitting to his authority as
he expected them to do, he decided to check their
disobedient behaviour. To strengthen himself
therefore, he encouraged other aliens to settle in his
country.	He specifically favoured and admitted the
Zizi under their chief, Menziwa, and placed them on
the east bank of the Mbashe. Without consulting
Dalasile, he allowed a small community of European
farmers to settle in the Slang River area which was
supposed to be under the jurisdiction of Dalasile.
Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
PR 3670, A. Lennard,	"A Brief	History of
Clarkebury", Cory Library.
MS 14636, "Glimpses of History", Burton Papers,
Cory Library.
17. Robinson, Cape Monthly Magazine (1870-76) p.173.
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This so embitterd Dalasile that he later complained to
the magistrate, W.E.Stanford, that he had not been
treated officially. Hence the Qwathi and the Vundle
on the border continually raided the white farms.18
Ngangelizwe's attitude towards Dalasile must also be
ascribed to jealousy as Dalasile's large community was
daily increasing and becoming more powerful by
additions from the ranks of the non-Qwathi com-
munities, like the Gcina and to a certain extent the
Mfengu and the Mpondomise.	Ngangelizwe felt
threatened by the growing power of Dalasile.	In
contrast to Ngangelizwe, Dalasile was powerful and
fearless.	Also in contrast to Ngangelizwe, Dalasile
exercised tremendous influence over all his people.
This without	doubt made Ngangelizwe jealous and
unhappy.19
Ngangelizwe's blunders in the 1870's estranged
Dalasile and this estrangement weakened the Thembu
since in all past wars the Thembu had been strength-
ened by the Qwathi.	This weakness forced Ngangelizwe
18. CMT 1/27, W.E.Stanford to Major H.Elliot (CMT),
14/3/77
Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.45.
19. Robinson,	Cape	Monthly	Magazine (1870-76),
pp.177-78.
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to seek British protection in 1875	against his
enemies. This further estranged Dalasile from
Ngangelizwe as the Colonial Control of Thembuland was
bound to affect Dalasile and the Qwathi.20
In his letter to the Colonial Secretary in London
dated the 16th of February 1874, the Secretary for
Native Affairs, Charles Brownlee, explained that
Dalasile though nominally subordinate to
Ngangelizwe. 21
is actually independent of him and has a
great if not greater number of adherents
than Ngangelizwe.
He also informed him about the disagreement between
Ngangelizwe and Dalasile over the question of "British
protection" which Ngangelizwe favoured and which
Dalasile opposed as early as 1873 and that Dalasile's
influence	caused	the failure	of Ngangelizwe's
proposals.22
20. N.A.88, Major H.Elliot to Secretary for Native
Affairs, 2/8/83.
21. G 27-74, Secretary for Native Affairs to Colonial
Secretary pp.125-129, 16/2/1874 p.137.
22. Ibid.
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Dalasile and the Qwathi had a perculiar relationship
with Ngangelizwe whom they acknowledged as a king, as
owner of the land on which they lived. Yet while
they did this, they in many respects acted as if they
were separate and independent of him."
23. G 39-76, Probart's Report 31/12/1875 pp.21-22.
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CHAPTER 4 
DALASILE'S PASSIVE RESISTENCE TO COLONIAL CONTROL 1875-
80
(a) Events leading to the British Control of Qwathi-
land 1872-1875 
Ever since 1846 the Thembu of the Great House had been
following a policy of alliance with the colonial
government. This led to much colonial interference in
Thembu politics especially in the 1870's during which
period the Thembu were brought under colonial control.1
The government had three reasons to interfere in Thembu
politics.	First it was to prop up their ally because
Ngangelizwe was weak. According to Charles Brownlee
Ngangelizwe had proved to be the weakest spot, too weak
to withstand aggression and unnecessarily involved in
quarrels with his neighbours. As a matter of policy
the government felt it necessary to support him but his
actions were regarded with disapproval.2
Second, it was to settle their border.	Although the
Colonial border officially stopped at the Kei River,
1. Master, "Resistence", p.1.
2. Ibid. pp.1-2.
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there were colonial subjects like the Mfengu, living
beyond the borders of the colony in Butterworth.	This
ambiguous situation needed to be resolved. These
Mfengu would serve as a strong advanced post from which
the colonial government could gradually extend their
influence beyond the Kei and from which the Mpondo and
the Gcaleka, the enemies of the Thembu might be
overawed. The colonial government also felt that it
was a matter of urgency that the border between the
Thembu and the Gcaleka be settled as this would prevent
serious clashes between the two nations.°
Third, the colonial government was propmpted by the
expansionist and "civilising" traditions going back to
Dr Philip and Sir George Grey. They wanted to replace
certain aspects of the lifestyle of the Africans, such
as communal land tenure and traditional power of the
chiefs with individual tenure, magistrates and public
work programmes.4
All these purposes could most obviously be accommodated
if the people of the Southern Transkei come under
direct colonial control.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. pp.4-5.
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As a result of the Gcaleka-Thembu	war of 1873,
Ngangelizwe offered to cede his country to the British
Government. This was at a time when the Gcaleka had
taken possession of the Thembu country: the ploughing
season was passing and the Thembu of Ngangelizwe sought
protection from the government. Not only was it
obvious to the Thembu that a mere profession of loyalty
to the government did not entitle them to protection or
assistance but the prevalent opinion of the Thembu was
that they had made enemies on account of their having
remained faithful to the government.5
When Ngangelizwe proposed the acceptance of British
Control to Dalasile in 1873, Dalasile opposed him.6
Ngangelizwe was in favour of this control because he
hoped that he would be protected from his enemies but
Dalasile, who had no enemies saw no reason for this.
It is not clear how well informed Dalasile was
concerning the implications of Colonial rule, but
according to M.Xundu, Ngangelizwe explained to him that
5.	Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.10.
. Master, "Resistence", p.5.
. M.W.Spicer, "The	War of Ngcayechibi 1877-78"
(Unpublished M.A.Thesis Rhodes University	Cory
Library, 1978), p.32.
6.	G 27-74 Secretary for Native Affairs to Colonial
Secretary, 16/2/74, p.137.
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this "protection" entailed the payment of hut tax which
would increase the revenue for the payment of levies
during the times of war. It also entailed the removal
of councillors from the position of power and be
replaced by izibonda - headmen. When Dalasile
appeared to be confused as to what Ngangelizwe meant by
izibonda, Ngangelizwe made an example of a sledge which
is made up of two blocks of poles placed in a tri-
angular position with the front parts joined together.
On these blocks holes are drilled and on top of these
blocks small poles are placed horizontally - amanqwa-
nqwa - and holes are also made on these which enables
one to fix small poles of the size of the holes to join
and tighten the horizontal poles with the two blocks.
These small poles affixed into these holes are called-
izibonda.	If isibonda (small pole) does not fit, it
is sharpened to reduce its width so that it can fit the
hole.	If it is not tight nothing could be done about
it, it is thrown away. "This is what a headman is"
explained Ngangelizwe to Dalasile, "if a headman is
found to be resistent he will be pressurised into
submission or his power be broken and if found too
weak for control he is dismissed and is replaced by
another one who will satisfy the needs of the colonial
government."7
7.	Xundu, 2/7/87.
66
Dalasile told Ngangelizwe that his people would not
accept this. Ngangelizwe appealed to him to go to his
people and convince them of the advantages of colonial
control.	Dalasile left and never came back to report.
This was a clear indication that Dalasile was opposed
from the first, to British Control, and that
Ngangelizwe and Dalasile had reached the parting of
the ways.°
As a result of this opposition by Dalasile and the
withdrawal of the Gcaleka from Thembuland, Ngangelizwe
withdrew his offer to the colonial authorities. Later
the Thembu were again to display this ambivalent
attitude towards colonial control but on the next
occasion their regrets followed after control had
begun.°
Charles Brownlee, who had realised that Ngangelizwe's
change of mind was because of opposition from non-
Thembu elements, decided to assert colonial sovereignty
over the land settled by the people who acknowledged
the paramountcy of Ngangelizwe.	This implies that the
8. Ibid.
9. G 27-74 Secretary for Native Affairs to Colonial
Secretary, 16/2/74 p.139.
Master, "Resistence", p.5.
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people who were pursuing an independent line like the
Qwathi of Dalasile were to be left outside the colonial
camp. But he wanted the Thembu to take the ini-
tiative."
Brownlee believed that if the Thembu acquired support
and protection of government they could, like the
Sotho, place themselves under government and it would
only be then that the government could consider them as
British subjects. This means that Brownlee was not
prepared to take up Thembu quarrels and defend them
against their enemies. Whilst it was a government
policy to defend the Thembu and keep them intact
against their enemies, the Thembu could not as a matter
of right claim it."
The conflict of 1873 was by no means solved as
Ngangelizwe's temper led him to another brutal act in
1875 which led him into conflict with Sarhili.	This
was the	murder of	Nongxokozelo, Novili's female
attendant. As a result of this and Mpondo inroads
into Thembuland, the Thembu began to think of giving
10. N.A. 88	Secretary for Native Affairs to Elliot,
2/8/83, pp.125-129.
11. Master, "Resistence", p.5.
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themselves up to the government.	But the Qwathi were
not yet affected.12
In dealing	with the	subjugation of the African
chiefdoms by the colonial government, the role of the
missionaries cannot be ignored. When the missionaries
came into contact with the blacks, they were committed
to the task of breaking down the traditional way of
life of the Africans, in particular, the removal of the
head of the nation or chiefdom, the king or the chief.
Every effort had to be directed to this end. 13 This
was the so called "civilising" policy that had been
followed by Dr Philip and Sir George Grey. V.M. Master
in his unpublished thesis confirms that when he says,14
the missionaries were to indirectly aid in
this policy.
According to N. Majeke, the missionary came as a man of
peace, he came as a "friend" but it was much later that
the chiefs became aware of what was happening and put
12. G 39-76, J.Ayliff & W.Wright Report to Secretary
for Native Affairs 28/8/75, pp.2-5.
Master, "Resistence", p.12.
Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", pp.33-35.
13. N.Majeke, The Role of Missionaries in Conquest.
(Johannesburg, 1956), p.25.
14. Master, "Resistence", p.12.
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their finger on the fact that the missionary, con-
stituted a danger to their position.15
The Missionary identified himself with the government
but he was careful not to do so to the king or chief
himself. He came as his "friend" who was willing to
intercede with the government on behalf of the chief.
He protested a great deal on behalf of his protege.
But the more the chief relied on the missionary, the
more surely was he betrayed into the hands of the
government.16
This is true of the role of Reverend Peter Hargreaves,
the Methodist Missionary at Clarkebury and Reverend
John Gordon of the Anglican Church at All Saints in the
subjugation of the Thembu and Qwathi respectively.
According to E.G.Sihele it was Peter Hargreaves who
directly induced the Thembu to seek "protection" of the
government and was responsible for drafting the terms.
He reports Hargreaves to have said,17
Please remember we are at your service. You
must say it is you who are asking to be put
under the wing of the government. Otherwise
Sarhili will occupy your land. The whole
15.Najeke, Missionaries, p.25.
16. Ibid.
17. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.53.
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army [Bowker's police detachment] you see has
come to your aid.
That Peter Hargreaves was in favour of the breaking of
the power of Ngangelizwe and thus aiding the colonial
officials in their "civilising" policies is seen in his
not protesting against the deposition of Ngangelizwe
after he had accepted colonial control,18 and in
Dalasile's threat to invade Clarkebury should Clarke-
bury be used as a military base for the colonial
forces on the eve of the Rebellion in 1880.19
The colonial government and Peter Hargreaves followed
the line of policy put forward earlier by Dr Philip,
namely to persuade the chiefs to accept "friendship" of
the British Government, to accept its "protection",
second, to subsidise the chief and pay him a fixed
salary and thus making him a paid servant of the
government." This in fact is what was promised to
Ngangelizwe when Hargreaves drafted his proposals for
accepting colonial control.21
18. Master, "Resistence", p.17.
19. Lennard, "Clarkebury", pp.5-6.
20.Majeke, Missionaries, p.28.
21. N.A.88, Elliot to Under Secretary Native Affairs,
2/8/83, pp.123-28.
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Another factor that facilitated the Colonial Control of
Thembuland was the constant communication between Peter
Hargreaves, the Colonial Government and the Military
Commandant, J.H. Bowker.	The role of Bowker in the
subjugation of Thembuland is equally important.	When
tension broke out in Thembuland in 1875 as a result of
the Gcaleka-Thembu	conflict, Peter Hargreaves and
W.Wright, resident with Ngangelizwe, communicated with
the colonial government. The colonial government
whose eyes had now been fixed on the colonial control
of Thembuland sent Commandant J.H. Bowker, an exponent
of a vigorously expansionist policy, at the head of the
Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, into Thembuland on
the pretext of settling Menziwa, a Zizi chief, who had
been expelled by Ngangelizwe from Mtentu, when he
declared that he would be neutral in the event of war
between the Thembu and the Gcaleka.22
The question of the annexation of Thembuland was first
raised by Commandant Bowker. Whilst personally
supervising the relocation of Menziwa, he concluded
that only the annexation of Thembuland could bring
permanent peace to the seriously troubled Transkei.
He raised the matter with Brownlee, the Secretary for
22.	Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", p.36.
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Native Affairs, who then agreed after warning him that
no pressure should be put to bear on the Thembu. As a
result of the experiences of the difficulties with the
Gcaleka and Mpondo, the Thembu proved receptive to the
advances of Bowker and Hargreaves."
According to M.Mbutuma, Ngangelizwe was forced by his
councillors to hand over his country to the British
government as a result of the threatening attitude of
Bowker. Bowker threatened to invade Ngangelizwe when
he showed opposition to the resettlement of Menziwa in
the neighbourhoold of the Great Place.24
Hargreaves appeared at the office of Bright, the
Resident with Ngangelizwe, on the 28th of October 1875
to state that he had been deputed by the Thembu to
submit certain proposals to the Resident for the
consideration of the government. These proposals
included amongst other things that Ngangelizwe and
several clan heads be recognised as chiefs and that
they should receive salaries.	It was also proposed
that no hut tax was to be paid until 1878 and that
boundaries should remain undisturbed.	Except for
certain crimes and the right to appeal to certain
23. Ibid.
24. Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".
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magistrates, the	chiefs were	to retain Judicial
authority over the people.	Commandant Bowker was also
at the time, in the office of the Resident.25
In forwarding his report and the conditions to the
Colonial authorities, Bowker stated that a large
meeting had assembled on the 28th of October 1875 at
which all chiefs, with the exception of Dalasile of the
Qwathi, and Stokwe Tyali of the Vundle, were present.
He further stated that all chiefs present were
unanimous in giving themselves over to the government.
He stated that he had given no reply beyond that the
government was prepared "to meet them on liberal terms"
and that nothing was said on the future status and
power of the chiefs.	Finally he recommended that
Ngangelizwe be deposed because of his behaviour.26
All the conditions were approved except the continued
recognition of Ngangelizwe as the King of the Thembu.
Bowker was also ordered to leave Dalasile and the
others who were still opposed to do as they pleased.
Whilst accepting the existence of chieftainship and
25. Master, "Resistence", p.13.
Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", p.37.
26. G39-76	J.H. Bowker to Under Secretary for Native
Affairs 29/12/75, p.11.
F. Brownlee (ed.), The	Transkei Native Ter-
ritories: Historical Records (Lovedale 1923), p.31.
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that the chiefs be salaried, the Secretary for Native
Affairs expressed his wish that the arrangements could
be made similar to those of Mfenguland where there were
no chiefs.27
Bowker having received this message, called a meeting
on the 30th of October 1875 which was not well attended
and informed the Thembu, present, that Ngangelizwe had
been deposed. No protests were made at the meeting,
which Bowker interpreted as assent to the deposition of
Ngangelizwe. W.E. Stanford, the magistrate with
Dalasile, later objected to the conclusion drawn that
the silence of the Thembu at the meeting meant consent.
Subsequent events were to prove that the Thembu were
not at all pleased with the deposition of the King."
In a meeting of the 24th of December 1875, convened by
S.A. Probart, M.L.A. for Graaf-Reinet, as a special
commissioner to finalise the arrangements for the
extension of British Rule over the Thembu of Ngange-
lizwe, protests were raised by the Thembu against the
treatment of Ngangelizwe.
27. G39-76, Telegram from C. Brownlee (S.N.A.) to
Bowker 30/30/75, pp.11-12.
28. Master, "Resistence", p.17.
B.C.293:A1, Stanford's	Diary, Stanford to Mr
Judge 11/9/26, pp.4-7.
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The	Thembu	unanimously	demanded	assurance that
Ngangelizwe would be reinstated. When Probart
realised that the feelings of the chiefs were running
high, he promised that good behaviour on the part of
Ngangelizwe might result in his being allowed to resume
his former position.29
From the above it is clear that Ngangelizwe, having
been surrounded and threatened by his enemies, also
influenced by Reverend P. Hargreaves and pressurised by
Bowker, handed himself and his people over to the
government in the hope of "protection". It was too
late when he realised that this "protection" meant loss
of authority. Ngangelizwe and his people had now to
accept and endure the heavy yoke of the colonial regime
which undermined the traditional system of ThembuGovernment.30
But it should also be noted that the independence of
the other section of the Thembu was not to remain for
long. It was only a temporary measure to give a chance
29. G39-76, Probart's Report, 24/12/1875, p.38.
30. N.A.88, Brownlee (SNA) to Elliot (CMT), 2/8/83,
pp.125-129.
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to the agents of the Colonial government to complete
their plans with Ngangelizwe.
The extension of British Control over the portion of
Thembuland under Ngangelizwe was a step towards the
total subjugation of the whole of Thembuland Proper.31
(b) Qwathiland comes under British Control 1875 
The absence of Dalasile from the meetings of the 28th
October 1875 and of the 30th is not surprising. He
had shown as early as 1873 that he was opposed to
Colonial Control.	This was another deliberate attempt
to show both Ngangelizwe and the agents of Imperialism
that he was opposed to colonial control.	After the
meeting of the 30th of October 1875, Wright, the
Resident with Ngangelizwe, sent for Dalasile. On the
4th of December 1875, with a large number of his
people, Dalasile arrived to hear that the rest of the
chiefs and the people had offered themselves to the
government and that the government insisted on knowing
what he had to say on the subject.	Dalasile arranged
to call a meeting of his people.32
31. Ibid.
32. CMT 1/39, W. Bright's Report, 4/11/1875, p.14.
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In reporting back to the colonial officials, Dalasile
made it clear that he had not harmed anyone nor
committed any crime and therefore had no need to be
taken over by the government as the Thembu had.	No
definite agreement was arrived at respecting a
magistrate as none of the Qwathi spokesmen indicated
they wished to surrender the control of the people to a
magistrate.33
The Qwathi under chief Dalasile came under government
after much persuasion by Reverend J.Gordon, the
Missionary of the Anglican Church at All Saints.
Gordon offered to draft	proposals on	behalf of
Dalasile.	The missionary
... perceived that if people did not go under
British rule of their own free wills (sic.),
they would be taken over against their wills,
and as moreover such a change would be
beneficial to our mission work, put a stop to
"witchcraft", smelling out, etc., I felt it
my duty to advise the chiefs and tribe to
agree to the change...34
Pressure also came from Commandant Bowker and Probart,
the special commissioner from Graaf-Reinet sent to
33. Ibid.
34. C.C. Saunders, "Annexation of Transkeian Terri-
tories": Archives Year Book for South African 
History (Pretoria, 1978), p.48.
. Gordon's Report, 31/12/1875.
. Master, "Resistence", p.5.
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conclude the agreement for the cession of Thembuland
since Charles Brownlee, the Secretary for Native
Affairs was in England.
Dalasile having succumbed to this pressure, Gordon
drafted the proposals for the acceptance of the British
Control - (See Appendix III). These were publicly
made known at the meeting of the 10th of December 1875
in which Bowker informed the Thembu of the coming of
Probart and the approval by the government of the
deposition of Ngangelizwe.	But once more Dalasile
was absent having been reported seriously ill.35
Dalasile's absence must have been an attempt to avoid
attending the meeting as he was opposed to British
Control. To avoid embarassment and to further
demonstrate his lack of enthusiasm for Colonial Control
he absented himself from the meeting.
Dalasile was embittered when he heard the news that
Ngangelizwe had been deposed. He feared that what had
happened to Ngangelizwe would happen to him should he
accept British control, hence his determination to
reject it.	He led the chiefs, even those of Western
Thembuland in protest against Ngangelizwe's deposition.
35. N.A.88, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs,
2/8/83, pp.123-124.
Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.54.
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This deposition had aroused a sense of justice,
brotherhood and nationalism amongst the African chiefs,
since this deposition was a threat to the traditional
way of life. This made the chiefs suspicious of the
government and its officials."
The Special Commissioner, S.A. Probart, arrived on the
17th of December 1875 to take over the annexation
arrangements from Bowker. He had messages sent
throughout Thembuland to all the chiefs and people to
attend a public meeting at the seat of the Resident, at
Mjanyana on the 24th of December 1875.	All the
chiefs, with the exception of Dalasile, attended. He
only sent one or two minor chiefs to bring him the news
of further developments to help him plan new strategies
against Colonial Control.	Ngangelizwe was present but
remained	quiet	throughout the meeting apparently
suspicious of Probart's intentions. Probart confirmed
what Bowker had told them, that the country and the
people had been taken over and that Ngangelizwe owing
to his bad behaviour had been deposed.37
36.	Master, "Resistence", p.15.
• BC 293:A1 Stanford to Judge, 11/9/76.
37. Brownlee, Transkei Native Territories, p.31.
• Master, "Resistence", p.16.
• G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.21.
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As Dalasile was not present at the meeting, Probart who
had realised that Dalasile's absence was a deliberate
attempt to avoid committing himself, was determined to
exercise patience in order to get him into the colonial
net and once in, there would be no need for further
patience. Probart thought it was best to convene a
separate meeting at some central spot in Dalasile's
country for the same purpose."
That a separate meeting was arranged for Dalasile hints
at his independence of Ngangelizwe because had he been
considered Ngangelizwe's subordinate he would auto-
matically have become a British subject once Ngange-
lizwe had concluded his agreement."
The meeting with the Qwathi took place at All Saints,
on the 31st of December 1875 and was well attended.
Probart addressed the assembled chiefs and people much
to the same effect as he had done at Ngangelizwe's
meeting.	He told them that their offer to come under
government had been accepted.	He then read the
conditions under which they had asked to be accepted.
He further explained that implicit obedience to the
38. Ibid.
39. N.A.88, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs,
2/8/83, pp.125-129.
81
orders of the government and respect for the decisions
of the magistrate would be expected of the chiefs and
people upon all occasions. He told them that in
future no charges of witch-craft or "smelling out"
would under any circumstances be allowed.40
regards certain allowances asked for senior man
mentioned in the proposals, he explained that Bowker
would communicate with the government and inform them
of its decision. He concluded by asking the chief
whether he and his people were of the same mind as to
coming under government. Dalasile, before he could
commit himself, asked for an hour in which to consult
with his councillors.41
Upon resuming, Dalasile at first appeared desirous of
withdrawing from the proposals. Probart had to use
great pressure to persuade Dalasile to accept the
conditions.	Dalasile was unwilling to surrender his
authority. He stated no less than fourteen times
during the meeting with Probart that his interpretation
of the proposals submitted through Reverend Gordon was
that he was to have full control over his own people,
although, individually, he had handed himself over to
40. G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/12/76, p.22.
41. Ibid.
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the government and that if there was to be a magi-
strate, he and Dalasile would share power and discuss
cases together. He also emphasised the difference
between his case and that of Ngangelizwe. 42
Agreement only came at the end of the meeting after a
second hour-long consultation of the Qwathi among
themselves. They then said that they accepted
Reverend Gordon's formulation of the conditions and
Probart's	interpretations	of them	with certain
reservations. Even after this agreement, however,
Dalasile had misgivings. He asked43
Why is the government so anxious to take
immediate control of my people, seeing that I
have agreed to come under government and
divide my authority?
But unfortunately, Dalasile was followed by a pro-
government speaker, Mangele, a Gcina by a Qwathi woman,
who was Dalasile's chief councillor, who claimed to be
speaking for Dalasile.	He said they would accept full
governmental sovereignty. His expressions of full
thanks so embarassed Dalasile that he finally thanked
Probart and apologised indirectly for his earlier
statements.	From then onwards Mangele became a
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
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government supporter whose loyalty was to be exploited
by Magistrate W.E. Stanford to the detriment of
Dalasile and the Qwathi people.44
According to Probart, the deciding factors in the
Qwathi decision to come under government were govern-
ment recognition that Dalasile came under government
independently of Ngangelizwe, and Probart's threat that
the government might not on any future occasion offer
any equally favourably terms.45
In his report, Probart stated that the submission of
the chief had been brought about without any pressure
and that he had given him an opportunity of withdraw-
ing, if he chose. But by stating that what Dalasile
was saying was not in accordance with the proposals
originally made, and by threatening him that by virtue
of Ngangelizwe having concluded his agreement, he,
Dalasile, automatically became subject of the govern-
ment, Probart certainly did not give Dalasile any
option of withdrawal nor could he justify the claim
that he had not put pressure on Dalasile.	The
presence of police at Probart's meeting must also
44. Ibid.
Master, "Resistence", p.17.
45. G39-76 Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.22.
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have influenced Dalasile's decision.	Their presence
was indeed intimidating."
Probart's report that the meeting was perfectly
satisfactory as leading to a thorough understanding
"was in view of Dalasile's expressed reluctance based
less upon the realities of the situation than on
wishful optimism."47
He reported,"
The results of the meeting were perfectly
satisfactory as leading to a thorough
understanding and clearing away all doubt and
uncertainty either as to the wishes of the
chief and people or the terms under which
they agreed to come under government.
The perceptive eyes of Magistrate W.E. Stanford later
discerned what Dalasile understood by his agreement to
come under government.49
For some time a struggle, quiet but hardly contested,
went on to prevent the influence of the magistrate
being felt - Dalasile very plainly intimated once, that
46. Ibid.
47. Master, "Resistence", p.17.
48. G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.22.
49. N.A.49, Stanford to Elliot, 4/6/79, pp.26 ff.
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his impression of that officer's duty was that he
should be the means to protect him from aggression and
injustie from without but that he should not entirely
interfere with his people.
From the onset Dalasile was opposed to "British
Protection" - a nice way of deceiving African chiefs
when their authority had been usurped by the white
colonial power. He regretted having accepted the
terms of cession because as it turned out, now his
people could avoid bringing to him their complaints and
refer them to the magistrate.	This would have serious
implications.
First, this would imply that the people would no longer
be bound to their chief politically and the chief would
easily lose his authority and control over the people.
They would now respect the magistrate at the expense of
the chief.
Second, the chief would lose a portion of income since
much of his income came from the fines imposed by him
in traditional court cases.	This would now go to the
government.	A chief without material possession was
certain to lose popularity and the respect of the
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people.	This had been demonstrated by the Qwathi when
they deserted Ntswayibana and defected to Noni."
Third, this implied surrendering the land and the
people to the white government. This was the worst
crime Dalasile could think of. Hence he never went to
claim his allowance of hundred pounds per annum offered
by the government.	He felt that this money
was a reward for his having sold his people
and his father's land.51
That Dalasile was opposed to the Colonial government
should not be interpreted as if he was anti-white. He
was certainly not anti-white but anti-colonial in
outlook. This becomes clear when one considers the
fact that when the party of the magistrate escaped from
Engcobo on the eve of the 1880 Rebellion, a Mrs Webb
who had been left behind was not molested but taken
care of by Dalasile and his people. Second, when the
combined Qwathi-Thembu forces were to fight in Western
Thembuland during the Rebellion of 1880, Dalasile
warned a trader named Clarke, who was in command of
50. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
51. Ibid.
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some government forces, to leave as they did not want
to harm him.52
In this manner Thembuland came under British Control.
Probart suggested that the region be divided into four
magisterial districts each to	be under	its own
magistrate but all four to be under the chief magi-
strate for Thembuland. For the post of the chief
magistrate, he recommended W. Wright at Mjanyana who
"by his experience in the country, his knowledge of
the natives and the respect in which he was held by
them as well, suited for the position." He also
suggested that the magistrates be placed over definite
sections of the people rather than that their terri-
torial boundaries be defined. Thus the magistrate
with Dalasile was supposed to have jurisdiction over
all Qwathi no matter where they resided.
The first of these districts was Mjanyana in the area
under the jurisdiction of Silimela, Ngangelizwe's right
hand son. It was to be under magistrate W. Wright who
also acted as the Chief Magistrate for the whole of
Thembuland.	The second seat of magistratcy was in
Umtata under Ngangelizwe who was also the King of all
52. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 23/11/80.
J.W.	Clarke,	"Native Reminiscences" in S.A.
Pamphlets Vol.23, pp.14-15.
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the Thembu.	The magistrate appointed for this
district was Major Boyes who assumed duty in April
1876. The third district was Mqanduli which was
dominated by the Thembu under Bacela, hence J.H. Scott
was designated, on appointment, as the magistrate with
Bacela.	The fourth was the district of Engcobo, the
site selected for the magistrate with Dalasile. In
April 1876, W.E. Stanford was stationed there as
magistrate.53
Thus colonial control was formally asserted over the
Qwathi in April 1876 when Stanford arrived. Dala-
sile's outright opposition to control had given way to
a reluctant and hesitant acquiescence.54
(c) A period of doubt and dismay 1876-1877 
On his appointment, Stanford was instructed to proceed
to Mjanyana to report to chief magistrate, Wright, for
duty as "magistrate with Dalasile". Messengers were
sent to Dalasile by the chief magistrate calling upon
him to attend a meeting at All Saints Mission in which
53. Brownlee, The Transkei Native Territories, p.32.
54.	Master, "Resistence", p.18.
89
the new magistrate would be introduced to him and his
people.85
On the day scheduled for the meeting, Wright, Stanford
and W.G. Cumming, appointed as clerk in the new
magistracy, rode to All Saints.	On their way they
halted at Danti's homestead. He, like his brother
Dalasile, was opposed to Colonialism.	He came forward
and greeted Wright. Wright introduced him to Stanford,
his new magistrate.	Danti gave Stanford "a steadfast
challenging look in which no sign of friendliness could
be detected". 55	They left him and proceeded to All
Saints.
Dalasile having received the message deliberately
delayed meeting his magistrate in order to demonstrate
his lack of interest in colonialism and his dissatis-
faction at the loss of his authority. The day passed
without his appearance. The	chief magistrate,
Wright, left before he arrived because he had other
business to attend to and that he could not bear "to
wait indefinitely	the pleasure	of Dalasile".57
55. Macquire, Reminiscences, p.52.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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Stanford and Cumming were left to meet Dalasile on
their own.
Dalasile did however observe the traditional customs
with regard the welcoming of guests. Just as he did
in 1874 during the visit of the Secretary for Native
Affairs, Charles Brownlee, he sent Mangele, his chief
councillor, who was pro-colonialism, to present the
magistrate with an ox as just isidudu (porridge) for
the magistrate. In the afternoon, Dalasile's people
approached the mission gracefully singing their war
songs and the bard rhythmically chanting his praises of
the chief with allusion to the past history of the
people.	They scattered in a semi-circle near the
church and waited for the arrival of the magistrate."
Stanford and Cumming came out in the company of Makasi,
a pro-government headman from Glen Grey, who tried to
reassure them when he realised that the magistrate was
rather uneasy and without confidence. When they were
seated, after a signal from the chief, the people
saluted Stanford	by his	Xhosa praise name "Ah!
Ndabeni"59
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
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Dalasile and his younger brother, Qhole, came forward
to shake hands. The magistrate thereafter thanked the
chief for his gift and expressed his regret that the
chief magistrate had to go back without having been
able to introduce them.	He also outlined his duties
as a magistrate and what was expected of the chief and
his people. After questions based on the magistrate's
address by Mangele and Matyobeni, two chief coun-
cillors, Dalasile spoke"
I have agreed to come under government but I
do not give myself over as Ngangelizwe has
had to do through his fear of enemies.	Nor
do I appear with blood in my hands. These
people are mine, they are sitting at my back.
I, alone, come under the government. They
remain on my back.
Dalasile, here, was stressing the fact that he was
opposed to surrendering his authority over the people
and handing them over to the colonial government. He
wanted the magistrate only as a personal adviser, not
somebody who would subject him and his people to the
colonial government. He once more stressed the
difference between his case and that of Ngangelizwe and
protested that unlike Ngangelizwe he had no enemies to
be protected from. In fact the only enemy Dalasile
had was the colonial government itself which was
claiming that it would give protection when in fact the
60.	Ibid.
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colonial government intended to take away his authority
over his people.
He also expressed disappointment that Stanford had been
appointed magistrate over chiefs Mgudlwa of the Jumba
and Stokwe Tyali of the Vundle.	He said61
I asked for a magistrate for myself ..., but
why do I hear that Mgudlwa and Tyali are
also placed under you. They are not my
tribe, I do not wish to enter the same door
together with them.
After some vague and unconvincing explanations by
Stanford, Dalasile and his people left. Stanford
remarked at this time that Dalasile had no love for the
yoke which Ngangelizwe had placed on his neck."
The outstanding feature of the first year of control
1876 to 1877 was Qwathi doubt and dismay as they came
to realise that they had lost their independence. The
results of "protection" were bitter and distasteful.
The Thembu under Ngangelizwe could have perhaps endured
this high price for protection because it was brought
about partly because of Ngangelizwe's blunders. But
for the Qwathi people, who had no enemies from whom to
61. Ibid., p.55.
62. Ibid., p.56.
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be protected, the results must have been heart-breaking
and discouraging."
The Qwathi felt generally uneasy throughout the period
as a result of the change of government from the sole
rule of an independent chief to the "guidance" of an
officer of	the colonial government.	From the
beginning there was to	be considerable suspicion
regarding the intentions of the government towards
them. Stanford found that the Qwathi were very
suspicious and his actions were naturally watched.
That such suspicions existed is not to be wondered at.
It was a new thing for the Qwathi to be sent for
anywhere but to the Great Place, hence for some time,
they were reluctant to attend at the office when
summoned.'"
Dalasile's conduct had not been pleasing	to the
magistrate, although outwardly he appeared willing to
obey the commands of the government. He rarely
attended the office and evinced but slight interest in
matters connected therewith."
63. G12-77, J. Scott (R.M. Mqanduli) Report, January,
1877.
64. G17-78, W.G. Cumming, Acting Magistrate to Elliot
(CMT), 5/2/78, p.113.
65. Ibid.
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In May 1877 there was considerable excitement amongst
the Qwathi people over the reports that Mrs Elliot, the
wife of the chief magistrate, had died of small pox.
Dalasile used this occasion to further his political
ends, as a result of which the Qwathi people, for a
time, ceased to go to the office of the chief magi-
strate. On learning that Mrs Elliot was to be buried
at All Saints station, Dalasile sent to Reverend
Gordon objecting to the arrangement. He was assured
by Gordon and subsequently by the magistrate that there
would be no danger of infection in consequence."
Dalasile, who was not impressed by their assurances,
held a meeting of his people and gave orders that all
intercourse with the people of the mission station
should cease and that no one should appear at the
office of the Resident Magistrate if sent for and
further, that spears should be used against policemen
should they go to a Qwathi homestead. In this order,
particular mention was made of those men of Qwathi
nation who had made themselves useful to the magi-
strate, such as Mangele and one or two others.	All
business at the office with the Qwathi stopped at once
66. N.A.41, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 25/5/1877.
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and hardly a Qwathi had been there since.	At All
Saints matters were in the same state.67
Finding this, Stanford tried another trick. He
thought it advisable to send messengers to all the
chief councillors of chief Dalasile to attend to the
office to tell them that there was no cause for alarm
and that Dalasile was much to blame for the steps he
was taking. These councillors betrayed Dalasile when
they apparently sided with the magistrate. Sitonga of
the Sidindi clan, in thanking the magistrate for his
message assured him that if they were again called to
the great place to attend a meeting and that he would
advise the magistrate of the results."
In this meeting all pro-government councillors were
present and the effects of the magistrate's communica-
tion with them was apparent in the fact that they
combined and opposed their chief, Dalasile. Mangele
and Sitonga told Dalasile that it would be wise to let
the small pox matter drop. In this, Stanford had
successfully used these minor chiefs as tools to
offset Dalasile.69
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
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(d) The Ninth Frontier War 1877-1878 
Tragic as the event might have been, that of being
betrayed by his own senior men, Dalasile struggled
persistently to win back his authority. The outbreak
of the Ninth Frontier War between the government and
the Gcaleka offered him an opportunity to test his
authority over the people. It was also a test for
Ngangelizwe to prove his loyalty and his promise that
he would fight on the side of the colonial government.
When the war broke out, the question arose, on whose
side the Thembu would fight.	Had their loyalty been
won by the Colonial government or had its administra-
tion alienated them?	At first while matters were ,
unsettled everywhere else with one of the hardest
fights taking place in Gcalekaland, the Thembu were
quiet and orderly. Stanford thought that neither
Ngangelizwe nor Dalasile would attempt anything unless
Sarhili, the Gcaleka King, gained some successes.70
But the tone of Stanford's private letter, four days
later to the chief magistrate was one of tension,
alertness and some anxiety.	He could obtain no
70. BC293:A1, Stanford to C. Levey	(R.M. Southey-
ville)	2/9/77, p.37.
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information for the rumour that Sarhili had been
sending messages to	Dalasile	and Ngangelizwe.
Excitement had been caused the previous day when some
Hala turned out in force and started to move about and
finally the Mfengu under Mendela, located ten kilo-
metres from the magistracy, told Stanford that they
noticed that their Qwathi and Jumba neighbours were
unfriendly and that they feared an attack.'"
Towards the end of September 1877, evidence about
Qwathi participation on the Gcaleka side against the
colony and the Mfengu was reported to Stanford.
Dalasile was reported to have declared this allegiance
openly and had received the women and cattle of Venge,
a Gcaleka chief, and of Stokwe Ndlela of Western
Thembuland for safety.72
Cumming, the acting magistrate with Dalasile, on the
26th of September 1877, summoned Dalasile and asked him
why he had accepted Stokwe Ndlela's stock as he was
disaffected to the government. He also asked Dalasile
about the purpose of a meeting at his Great Place.
Dalasile denied any knowledge of Stokwe Ndlela's cattle
being harboured in Qwathiland.	In regard to the
71. B.C.293:A1, Stanford to Elliot 6/9/77.
72. N.A.43, Stanford to Elliot 25 & 26/9/77.
98
meeting, he told Cumming that it was customary for the
Qwathi during the period of drought to assemble at the
graves of the ancestors and "cry" for rain. Although
Cumming knew that Dalasile was not telling the truth
there was nothing he could do.73
Two	independent	reports stated that Ngangelizwe,
Dalasile and Mdukiswa, Mgudlwa's brother, would join
the Gcaleka. Arthur Stanford, magistrate for Umtata,
thought that, even if some remained loyal, the Thembu
and the Qwathi would not render any assistance to the
government.	Elliot, the chief magistrate, held the
more optimistic view that he would get a large force to
attack Sarhili, the Gcaleka King. Walter Stanford of
Engcobo revealed his opinion in a scribbled note at the
back of Arthur's letter.74
I agree with Arthur's views	none of my
people are to be trusted.
After a fight at Bika on the 29th of September 1877
Major Elliot called upon the Thembu to take up arms on
behalf of the government, but an ominous stillness
followed.	In the Engcobo district not a Qwathi
stirred and the Qwathi police began to desert.	About
73. CMT 1/27, W.G. Cumming to Elliot 26/9/77.
74. F(c)I	Stanford Papers, A. Stanford to W.E.
Stanford 24/9/77.
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twenty Mfengu who had admitted their fears of an attack
from Mgudlwa or Dalasile	positively responded to
Stanford's call to arms. In Umtata only the Mfengu
responded but in Mqanduli almost all	the Thembu
volunteered.	Ngangelizwe's role was crucial at the
time. According to Stanford, Ngangelizwe opted to
support Elliot being followed in this by practically
all his minor chiefs and people despite their earlier
attitude of hostility towards the government.75
But according to Mbutuma, when the Gcaleka war broke
out Elliot, fearing that the Thembu would not take
part, secretly took Ngangelizwe away and when they were
as far as Idutywa Reserve, he called upon the Thembu to
come in as Ngangelizwe was already fighting, hence his
loyal Thembu joined the war. Mgudlwa also followed
Ngangelizwe and joined the government forces.76
75. G17-78 Stanford's Report	15/2/78 pp.110-111.
76.
77.
Mbutuma,
G17-78,
"Ibali	labaThembu".
Stanford's Report,	5/2/78, pp.110-111.
Dalasile hesitated and after expressing an unbounded
loyalty to the government, he consulted his people and
then intimated that he wished to "sit still" as he was
not a fighting man.	For disobeying this order he was
hundred head cattle.77fined a	of
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Stanford had no doubt that Dalasile, as a nationalist,
was sympathetic towards Sarhili and his Gcaleka and
that if he had had a favourable opportunity he would
have shown his sympathy in an active form.	Never-
theless he paid the fine.78 Stokwe Tyali of the
Vundle decided to follow Dalasile's example to "sit
still" but later joined Mfanta of Western Thembuland in
the rebellion of 1878 in which they were captured and
sent to Robben Island.	Stokwe Tyali's land, although
part of Dalasile's land was divided into four portions.
One portion was given to capable black farmers, mostly
Mfengu, another portion was given to Mpangele and his
Gcina people. The right bank of the upper Mbashe was
given to Mgudlwa and the left bank to Dalasile.79
The ninth Frontier War proved that there was a lot the
government had to do to secure peace in the territories
as their control was still resented by many of the
African chiefdoms.	The Gcaleka had been crushed.
Stokwe Tyali and Mfanta had been imprisoned but the
spirit of resistence had not been destroyed.	In
78. G17-78, Cumming's Report, 5/2/78, p.111.
79. N.A.43, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs,
13/2/77.
N.A.44, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs,
6/3/78.
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Qwathiland it had become an underground movement ready
to flare up when opportunity offered.	It had proved
that the Qwathi were still openly anti-colonial.
Dalasile's decision "to sit still" was nothing else but
defiance and a confirmation of what he said in 1875
that he had no enemies to be protected from.	He was
not prepared to make enemies with the Gcaleka in favour
of the whites without provocation. The Ninth Frontier
War also proved that Dalasile still held a wonderful
influence and say over his people as none took up arms
on the side of the government.	Rather than scaring
the Qwathi into submission, the Ninth Frontier War made
the Qwathi more and more resistent,	to Colonial
Control.
This spirit of resistence to colonial control cul-
minated in the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880-1881.80
(e) A Period of Uneasy Peace 1878-1879 
After the war there followed a period of uneasy peace
characterised by tension and rumours of war.	All was
not quiet on the eastern frontier. It was for this
reason that the new Secretary for Native Affairs,
William Ayliff, visited the Transkei territories in
80. Master, "Resistence", p.55.
102
1878. Over a period of two months he visited all
chiefdoms and to all he could hold out a trump card-
the inevitable fate of men who went to war with the
Cape Colony.81
On the 19th of September 1878, Ayliff addressed a
meeting of the Qwathi at Engcobo magistracy. Charles
Brownlee, Ayliff's predecessor, and Stanford were also
present. Ayliff used this opportunity to introduce
himself as Brownlee's successor, thus establishing
personal contact with the Qwathi, a feature of Native
administration during this period.	He also explained
that a change of personnel did not mean change of
policy.	The whole address was paternalistic.62
The word of government is peace ...	That is
what your father, the government feels
towards all children, all must feel that the
government is their father but still a father
who loves you and punishes those who are bad
but will help those who do good.
About two hundred Qwathi had assembled, Dalasile being
absent. Although Ayliff thanked the Qwathi for having
come only one percent had attended because out of about
Twenty Thousand Qwathi only two hundred had attended.
The absence of Dalasile and ninety nine percent of his
81. G43-79, Secretary for Native	Affairs Report,
1878, pp.3-4.
82. Ibid.
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people could be seen as continuation of resistence to
colonial control. The meeting once more revealed that
despite the efforts of the magistrate to get the Qwathi
on their side, Dalasile still held sway over the
majority of his people.
Despite the apparent unhappiness at the absence of
Dalasile, Ayliff was careful enough not to attack the
Qwathi in his speech for their neutrality during the
war but rather seemed anxious to conciliate them. But
no amount of conciliation in his address removed the
tension that hung over the Transkeian territories and
in particular, Qwathiland.
That Dalasile was not happy with the colonial govern-
ment was shown by his not withdrawing his allowance of
hundred pounds per annum - a full proof of passive
resistence to colonial control. Some senior Qwathi
chiefs also followed the example by not claiming their
allowance due to them.	Only one councillor claimed
the allowance.	This was Mangele, a Gcina who had
always been used by Stanford against Dalasile, to
promote colonialism.	From the onset, Mangele
expressed his preparedness to receive it.	In
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recommending him for the claim Stanford described
Mangele as83
deserving of every consideration for not only
has he shown himself loyal to government but
from the influence which he possessed in the
nation.
But this influence is doubtful because had he been so
influencial, he could have influenced the Qwathi during
the Ninth Frontier War to take up arms on the side of
the government and he could have prevented the Qwathi
Rebellion of 1880-1881. This influence must have been
sectional not national.
But Mangele had to pay for this subsidy.	Stanford
exploited this loyalty to the government and tried to
use him to foil Dalasile's movements.	Stanford had
successfully taught Mangele how nice the fruits of
betraying his own chief were. 84	(List of chiefs
entitled to subsidy see appendix V).
(f) Judicial Conditions 
Another cause for dissatisfaction was the fact that it
was becoming more and more clear that the magistrates
83. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 17/5/79.
84. Ibid.
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were taking over the judicial powers of the chiefs.
There were conflicting interpretations of this state of
affairs. Some, including Charles Brownlee, agreed
that in customary law, people could choose whether to
take their cases to the chief or to the King.85 This
view is not wholly correct in that according to custom
one was expected to take the case first to the
councillor.	The councillor could then take it to the
chief and the chief could take it to the King. Only
when the councillor was unpopular or had failed were
cases taken to the chief without him having been
consulted. In Qwathiland there was no room,for appeal
beyond Chief Dalasile as he and his predecessors did
not recognise the supremacy of the Thembu Kings in
either internal	or external affairs.	The final
decision rested with him and his councillors at his
Great Place." Even Reverend Peter Hargreaves, the
Methodist Missionary at Clarkebury, had told Probart
that the chiefs expected the cases to go to them first
before they could be referred to the magistrate. In
other words, the magistrate could serve only as courts
of appeal.87
85. B.C.293: DI,	Stanford	to Charles Brownlee,
3/5/77.
86. Xundu, 2/7/87.
87. DI, Stanford to Charles Brownlee, 3/5/77.
106
This view was unpopular with the colonial government as
it wanted to discourage certain customary laws. If
they could serve as courts of appeal only, they would
not have a direct interference with the customary laws.
That many supported the first view was because they
saw in it the possibility of influence and winning over
the confidence of the Africans. Dalasile was of the
opinion that the magistrate and himself would share
power and discuss cases together." Walter Stanford
thought that there was not enough definition of the
subject. Whatever the case may be, in February 1877
one of grievances of the Qwathi was that cases went to
the magistrate which should be settled by the chief."
Brownlee's solution to this problem was that it was
inadvisable for the officials to seek for cases against
chiefs regarding matters in their own communities, but
to give heed to only such as were officially brought to
their notice. He further pointed out that the reins
could not be tightened up90
until the present excitement (Ninth Frontier
War) has passed over and when our position is
better understood and more appreciated.
88. G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.21.
89. DI, Stanford to Brownlee, 3/5/77.
90. Ibid.
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To this end he thought it desirable that their
decisions should not appear unnecessarily severe and
fines for criminal cases should not appear to have been
made for the purpose of attaining revenue.	He further
advised the the magistrate that91
the object which should never be lost sight
of is to convince the people that their
[white] administration of the law is more
just and merciful than their [African] own,
otherwise the effect would drive the people
to their chiefs.
From the advice of Brownlee above, it is clear that had
it not been for the tension that existed in 1877, he
might have allowed the magistrate to go out and seek
for cases against chiefs.	Having given this advice he
never bothered	to check if the magistrates were
following it. For example Stanford, hearing of a
murder case by a Qwathi of Mntuntloni, proceeded to the
scene of murder before chief Dalasile could take any
action, 92 and when "Dalasile", younger son of Sarhili
was involved in a gunpowder explosition in Qwathiland
during the ninth frontier war Stanford went to the
scene before Dalasile, chief of the Qwathi, could take
91. N.A.843, Stanford to W.Wright (CMT), 4/10/76.
92. N.A.42, Stanford to Elliot, 26/7/77.
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up the case, only to accuse him of having been aware of
all the circumstances.93
When Stanford realised that all cases were being sent
to the chief, he stipulated certain types of cases
which were common in Qwathiland such as adultery,
witchcraft, theft and faction fights which should be
sent to him for adjudication and those to be dealt with
by their chief which happened to be more trivial.
But to bluff the magistrate, the Qwathi people began to
refer trivial cases to him of which he later com-
plained, accusing them of litigation.94
Stanford boasted that, within two years, the people
began to gain confidence in the magistrates and began
to refer cases to them, leaving the chiefs with no
cases.95 This is highly questionable in that if they
had had so much confidence in the magistrates what made
them take up arms against the colony in 1880?
93. CMT 1/27 Stanford to Elliot, 24/7/78.
G47-78, Stanford's Report, 15/2/78, p.114.
94. G17-78 Cumming to Stanford (Acting CMT), 29/1/78,
p.113.
G33-79	J.W. Morris (Acting R.M.) to Elliot,
6/1/79, p.87.
95. CMT 1/27 Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/78.
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If Dalasile had fallen for this scheme and allowed the
people to send their cases to the magistrate he could
have been deprived of income derived from fines imposed
on his subjects. Without these fines he could have
been poor and could have lost his dignity and authority
as a chief.	But Dalasile was determined to fight
against this usurpation of his judicial authority,
hence his enmity with Stanford, the magistrate. The
1880 Rebellion must be seen against the background of
the attempt by Dalasile to fight against the usurpation
of his judicial powers, hence the mock trial in the
court by Dalasile after Stanford had escaped on the eve
of the rebellion."
In his annual report for 1876, Stanford reported that
at the beginning, the judicial work was light but as
time went on it increased.97 This was so, perhaps,
because the Qwathi were reluctant to bring their cases
to the magistrate until the magistrate stipulated that
certain cases could not be dealt with by the chief,
thereby forcing the people to refer important cases to
him.	Or, perhaps, if it is true that when the whites
96. N.A.54, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs,
27/11/79.
.	CMT 1/27	Stanford to Secretary for Native
Affairs, 23/11/80.
97. G12-77 Stanford to Wright, 4/1/77, p.88.
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took over there were few cases, it means that they were
responsible for the escalation of crime in these
territories, in particular Qwathiland.
Most of the cases resulted from theft. Much discon-
tent had been shown by the Qwathi on the subject of the
Spoor system especially by those Qwathi on the border.
They had no right to trace their stock into the white
farms whereas the Dutch farmers traced their stock into
Qwathiland and even took the stock that did not belong
to them but to the Qwathi, accompanied by the police
from the border districts.	This, even according to
chief Magistrate, H.Elliot, "was	not first class
legislation".98
According to Mxutu and Xundu cattle thieving was
unknown in Qwathiland before colonial control. They
maintain that when the Qwathi wanted cattle they would
declare war on another nation and would take cattle as
booty. Cattle thieving from the whites should not be
taken as theft in the true sense of the word but should
be viewed against the background of "social banditry",
as the aim was not to steal but to rob in retaliation
for the wrongs done by the whites and their government.
For example C.E. Warner, in his report to the chief
98. N.A.88 Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 5/4/80.
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magistrate, cited an incident in which a number of the
Qwathi from Engcobo entered the white farm in the
present district of Elliot, and drove a large number of
cattle and sheep belonging to some Dutch farmers and
when arrested they protested that they did not consider
it was stealing but only "capturing stock from the
enemies of their king.99
Just before the outbreak of the Rebellion the people
of Mpangele, Mgudlwa and Dalasile in the upper parts of
the district of Engcobo entered the farms of the Dutch
farmers and captured all the cattle they could find.
This was a challenge to the white community and the
colonial government and the beginning of the 1880-1881
Rebellion. 100
99. CMT 3/91, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 31/12/1901.
100. CMT 1/27,	Stanford to	Secretary for Native
Affairs, 23/11/80.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE QWATHI REBELLION 1880-1881 
(a) Dalasile's grievances against Colonial rule 
From the previous chapter it is clear that the latter
half of the seventies was a period of tension and
uneasiness in Qwathiland in which the Qwathi showed
resistence to colonial control. This passive
resistence paved the way for the path of blood that
followed in 1880-1881.1
The causes of the rebellion go back to 1875 when
Qwathiland was brought under British Control to which
Dalasile was opposed. From the onset it became clear
that British control meant surrendering his authority
over his people to the magistrate. He regarded this as
unfair and unjust since he had troubled no one and
therefore had no enemies to be protected from.	But in
the face of pressure from Bowker and Probart he had no
alternative but to reluctantly	accede to British
Control. This reluctance was shown by his refusal to
withdraw his annual allowance and by his "sitting
still" during the Ninth Frontier War of 1877-1878.
1.	Brownlee, Transkei Native Territories, p.36.
113
This passive resistence to Colonial Control culminated
in the 1880 Rebellion.2
The ninth Frontier war also contributed to the outbreak
of the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880 - because as a result
of Dalasile's neutrality, that is, his refusal to
assist the colonial government when called upon to do
so, he was fined one hundred head of cattle. This led
to the resentment and frustration on the part of the
Qwathi people.	Dalasile saw in this a threat to the
economy of the country since his people economically
depended on cattle. He viewed this as a provocation
by the whites and as a kind of exploitation on the part
of the government which could only be redressed by
resorting to war against the colonial government, hence
the rebellion of 1880.3
The census of 1879 could also be counted as another
reason for Dalasile's rebellion as it contributed
largely to the tension that existed in Qwathiland.
There was reluctance on the part of the Qwathi to allow
their stock to be counted.	Some asked4
2. G39-76, Probart's Report, 6/2/76, p.21.
CMT 1/27, Cumming to Elliot, 15/2/78.
3. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
4. Ibid.
CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.
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whether it was usual when the census of a
white population was taken to count their
money.
The Qwathi regarded their stock as a form of money and
when it was to be counted they became suspicious that
attempts were being made to reduce it.
Enumerators met with resistence as they had at the time
of the first census of 1876. Danti, Dalasile's
brother and chief councillor, openly refused to allow
Reverend Green of All Saints and his team to conduct a
census in his homestead and the team was asked by the
magistrate to pass to other homesteads and leave Danti
alone.5
Sub-chiefs, Mangele of the Gcina, a nephew of Dalasile,
and Sitonga of the Sidindi clan, who had already shown
that they were colonial government supporters, stood
out against their chief, Dalasile, and accepted the
census without any questions. They distinguished
themselves by their zeal in supporting the promotion of
the measure politically and they assisted the enumerat-
ors in the registration of the people and property.6
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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It so happened that during this period	messages had
been passing from Mditshwa to Dalasile and Ngangelizwe
about a planned rising against the whites.	After
Dalasile had	received such	message, he went to
Ngangelizwe, ostensibly to consult him on the census
taking. When he returned he informed Stanford that he
had no objection to the census being taken and that he
intended to call his people together to explain to them
fully the nature of it.	As Stanford knew this was a
pretext to	discuss Mditshwa's message he ordered
Dalasile not to hold it, saying, that the census had
already been explained to the people.	Despite this
the meeting was held.?
When Stanford asked Dalasile why he had disobeyed,
Dalasile pretended to apologise and explained that the
messengers to summon the meeting had left before his
instructions reached them. Dalasile also argued on
behalf of Danti, who had at first refused to register
his homestead, saying that at the time Danti refused to
give information to the enumerators, he (Dalasile) had
not informed him of the final decision of the people.
Both Dalasile and Danti were only reprimanded since the
officials could not take harsh measures because of the
circumstances of the country. But tension in
7.	CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.
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Qwathiland between	the Qwathi and the magistrate
remained.°
The tension that had always hung over Engcobo was
worsened by the demand that the hut tax be paid in
1879. The imposition of hut tax and the deterioration
of economic conditions were further causes of unrest in
Qwathiland during this period. The hut tax was
generally regarded as unfair because the government did
not build the huts, neither did they provide the
material. Why, therefore, should the government tax
the people upon their labour and the natural products
of their own land?9
Dalasile requested that the collection of hut tax be
deferred for another year - 1880 - on the grounds that
his people were poor and had been hard pressed by
droughts, but Stanford rejected this and demanded
immediate payment of the tax, telling him, that the
rest of the Thembu chiefs and people were willing to
pay it and that he and the Qwathi should also do so.10
8. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 2/9/79.
N.A.52, Elliot to Stanford, 5/9/79.
9. G20-81, Elliot's Report, 31/02/80, p.79.
N.A.51, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs,
10/9/79, p.103.
10. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 3/11/79.
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To get the tax paid without delay, Stanford persuaded
his most obedient sub-chiefs to bring the hut tax from
their areas without regard to the position of Dalasile.
In this way Mangele, Sitonga and the All Saints
residents were induced to pay. Chief Sandile of the
Ntondo consented to come but hesitated on the day fixed
for him and sent to say his wife was very ill and he
could not leave her.11
The support rendered the magistrate by Mangele and
Sitonga and other pro-government elements had been
valuable to	Stanford and by weakening Dalasile's
leadership he forced him into submission. Once more
Stanford had successfully used the minor chiefs against
their chief, Dalasile, as he had done during the small
pox excitement and census question, thus completely
undermining Dalasile's authority. Much odium was cast
by Dalasile and the rest of the Qwathi people upon
those who had paid the tax and the magistrate felt that
it would be necessary to support them against any
attempt of Dalasile to punish them for their dis-
obedience.12
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
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(b) Increased external pressures 
The years 1877 to 1880 were years of concerted effort
by black nations throughout the sub-continent to throw
off the yoke of colonialism. The Zulu successes at
the battle of Isandiwana against the British forces
shattered the idea of British invincibility and
encouraged other nations like the Qwathi and Western
Thembu to challenge the authority of the colonial
government. 13 The Pedi of Sekukuni were also involved
in war against the Zuid Afrikasche Republiek in 1876-
1877 14 and against the Imperial forces in 1878-1879.15
The same period between 1876 and 1879 was also a period
of unrest in Griqualand West.16	From 1877 to 1880
Moorosi of the Phuthi rebelled against the imposition
of colonial system of direct rule in Lesotho.' ?	Even
nearer was the ninth Frontier war of 1877-78 in which
the Gcaleka fought against the British forces.	In
13. J.Guy, The destruction of the Zulu Kingdom (Ravan
Press, 1982), pp.52-53.
CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 3/11/79.
14. P. Delius, The land belongs to us (Ravan Press,
1983), pp.182-216.
15. Ibid.
16. K. Shillington, The Colonisation of the Southern 
Tswana 1870-1900 (Pretoria, 1985), pp.61-83.
17. S.B. Burman, Chiefdom Politics and Alien Law: 
Basutoland under Cape Rule 1871-1884 (), pp.108-131.
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this war the Qwathi, despite being called to arms by
the government remained neutral which was an indication
of passive resistence on the part of the Qwathi.18
In his address to the Cape Parliament in 1878 High
Commissioner, Frere, warned the members of Parliament
about this resistence to colonialism but he wondered
where to turn attention first. 19 Colonial officials
tended to blame these uprisings on conspiracies in
order to evade the blame for their own bad policies. 20
As a defence measure and as a means of greater control,
the Peace Preservation act known as the Disarmament Act
was passed in 1878 - Act No.8 of 1878. As this was to
be applied in Lesotho first, it was rumoured that
Letsie, the Southern Sotho King, had sent messengers
south of the Drakensburg to say that Disarmament was a
question affecting all black nations in South Africa
and if other chiefs stood aloof while the Sotho were
being disarmed their turn would follow.21
18. Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", pp.33-35.
19. Master, "Resistence", p.55.
20. Brownlee, Transkei Native Territories, p.36.
D2, Stanford to Elliot, 26/8/1878.
21. N.A.45, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 11/12/78.
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As Thembuland had not yet been annexed to the Colony,
the Disarmament Act was not legally applicable to them.
The Thembu were, therefore,	asked to voluntarily
surrender their arms. A.B.C. Levey, the magistrate at
Southeyville, made a blunder of collecting guns from
homestead to homestead in the company of a threatening
force. Despite Levey's threats to stop his pay and
refuse to recognise him as a chief, Stokwe Ndlela, one
of the Western Thembu chiefs, refused to surrender his
arms.
When Major H. Elliot, the chief magistrate met
Matanzima, Matanzima protested against the Disarmament
Act which appeared strange to him as he had never
fought against the government or done any harm. When
Elliot met Gecelo and Ndlela at Xalanga, the two chiefs
brought forth a list of grievances amongst which was
the question of disarmament.	Elliot told them that
the fear was that they might use them against the
government.	This was an admission that the colonial
authorities feared them when they were armed.	This
gave the chiefs confidence and made them more reluctant
to disarm.	Those who surrendered, only surrendered
useless and obsolete guns and hid the effective ones.22
22.	Master, "Resistence", pp.5-9.
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The Qwathi believed that, as soon as they were
disarmed, the government would seize their property, a
fear which was further stimulated by the census taking
of 1879. Other rumours suggested that the government
intended to limit men to one wife each and send their
children to the colony to be educated and girls to be
sent apart as wives to the soldiers with a view to
raising a future army to keep them in subjection. It
was also said that the government intended to allow
them to keep only a limited number of cattle, that
their country was to be taken from them and their wives
and children were to be seized and conveyed to the
Western Province and enslaved. Thus disarmament was
associated with dispossession and slavery, and the
census that followed in 1879 led the Qwathi to reject
both disarmament and the census itself as it would
reveal the number of people and domestic animals in a
homestead to help eliminating them.
The Act, as Matanzima complained,did not differentiate
between friend and foe. All had to disarm. Even
Chief Magistrate Elliot complained privately to the
Secretary for Native Affairs that the Disarmament Act
showed treachery and ingratitude to those people who
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had assisted the government in the Ninth Frontier War
so much so23
that they now feel that the time is arriving
when the black man must stand up for his land
and rights or become a slave of the white
man.
The act indeed was unnecessary, even from the viewpoint
of a white official, it did more harm than good.
Another cause for concern in the Transkei generally was
the question of the abolition of chieftainship. It
should be remembered how protests were raised in 1875
by both the Thembu and Non-Thembu people against the
deposition of Ngangelizwe. Even Dalasile of the
Qwathi, despite his refusal to accept Ngangelizwe's
suzerainty over the Qwathi, was one of the leading
chiefs who protested aginst the deposition. He saw a
threat in the deposition of Ngangelizwe, that all who
had accepted British Control would be deposed and he
feared that he would be the next.24
The office of chieftainship was highly venerated by the
Africans.	The king or chief was far more than a
judicial and executive head of the people.	He was the
23. N.A.55, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 23/12/79.
24. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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symbol of	their unity and exclusiveness and the
embodiment of their essential values.	It was an
institution created and supported by the people.
Whenever measures were taken to relieve the chiefs of
"a power they glory in" it resulted in disaffection.
When the Sotho realised in the 1870's that their chiefs
were ignored in public affairs, they became disaffected
to the government. The deposition of Sandile, the
Rharhabe chief, which led to the Eighth Frontier War
in 1850 and the deposition of Ngangelizwe in 1875 are
also significant examples.
It was also because of this threat that messages passed
from chief to chief in the late seventies to the effect
that the "white people are taking away our native
chieftainship and shall we submit without throwing an
assegai? Let the word of the chiefs be heard." 25 When
this message reached Dalasile from Mditshwa, the
Mpondomise chief, he went to Ngangelizwe on the pretext
of going to find out about the census whilst in actual
fact he went to find out if Ngangelizwe was prepared to
fight or not against the colonial government.26
25. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.
26. Ibid.
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Stanford concluded that the 1880 Rebellion was simply
an attempt by chiefs to regain independence, though he
admitted that it was as much a war of the people as it
was a war of the chiefs.	Levey agreed with this view
that the cause of the rebellion of the chiefs in
Thembuland and elsewhere appeared to have one source-
"Kaffir chieftainship against civilised government."27
(c) "The Road to War"
The tyranny of the colonial government threw the chiefs
headlong against it.	Throughout Transkei there was a
growing opposition to the magistrates. This opposi-
tion to the magistrates as agents of colonialism
culminated in the murder of Hope, the magistrate of
Qumbu in 1880 by chief Mhlontlo of the Mpondomise.28
In Western Thembuland, Matanzima and Stokwe Ndlela,
having clashed with Levey over a number of issues,
including disarmament, contemplated his forced ejection
from Southeyville. They communicated with Dalasile,
who encouraged them and suggested that Stokwe Ndlela,
in preparation for the war, should start sending cattle
27. Master, "Resistence", p.74.
28. Macquire, Reminiscences, pp.116-118.
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to Qwathiland in small herds as he had done during the
Gcaleka war. He also advised them that should they be
challenged by a white force in their attempt to drive
Levey away they should fall back into the forests of
Qwathiland. In November 1879, Matanzima and Stokwe
approached their subjects about this but unfortunately
their councillors and people refused to support the
move.	But this did not end the resistence movement in
Western Thembuland or Dalasile's influence.29
At the same time a peaceful attempt was made to get rid
of the hated magistrates by petitioning the Secretary
for Native Affairs for the removal of A.H. Stanford and
W.E. Stanford of Umtata and Engcobo respectively. The
Thembu complained that these two brothers did not care
to take an interest in the people and that their
feelings against	the Thembu and the Qwathi were
negative.	For peace sake they asked for their
removal. The petition was a failure.	The Secretary
for Native Affairs, contrary to the request of the
petitioners, sent the petition to Elliot. When Elliot
received this petition he convened a meeting of the
Thembu and the Qwathi and directed W.E. Stanford to
chair it and get the grievances of the Thembu and the
Qwathi.	The attendance at this meeting makes one
29. B.C.293: AI, Stanford to Elliot, 23/12/79.
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suspicious that only pro-government chiefs and people
were invited to attend. Dalasile and Ngangelizwe were
absent. Prominent amongst those who were present were
pro-government chiefs like Mgudlwa and Mangele who
spoke on behalf of the people.	They denied any
knowledge of the petition and stated that they wanted
the magistrate to remain. It appears that the whole
meeting was a propaganda exercise to destory any
evidence of opposition to and dissatisfaction with the
magistrates. But the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880 proved
that Stanford's report was not a true reflection of the
spirit of the Thembu-Qwathi support of these two
magistrates.30
The protests against these magistrates should not be
taken as emanating out of personal dislike for
individual magistrates but should rather be seen as a
challenge to colonial control.	The government refusal
to remove the magistrates so frustrated the Qwathi that
they were prepared to resort to war. Thus the news of
the murder of Hope by Mhlontlo, the chief of the
Mpondomise, in October 1880 inspired the rebellion of
Dalasile in the following month.	His main purpose was
30. N.A,54, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 27/11/79.
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to kill Stanford, destroy the magistracy and end
colonial rule in Qwathiland.31
That the rebellion was aimed at the magistrates was
confirmed by Stanford who pointed out that Mhlontlo's
word at the death of Hope was32
I am not fighting traders or missionaries I
am at war with the magistrates only. If we
kill all the magistrates no man of that class
will venture among us again but we shall want
traders and missionaries.
Elliot agreed that the Africans had planned to kill all
government officials in their countries. He said33
I was sure that all nearly all the native
tribes in and around this territory were
making a strenuous effort to combine and
throw off the rule of the white man.
(d) Dalasile's Campaign 
The rebellion having broken out in the Mpondomise
country, Dalasile visited Ngangelizwe for the purpose
of preparing a joint uprising.	He informed him that
31. Macquarie, Reminiscences pp.116-118.
32. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Secretary Native Affairs, 23/11/80.
33. N.A.66, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 8/3/81.
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he was ready to take action.	In reply Ngangelizwe
said34
No Dala [Dalasile] withdraw from this for it
is often said that the white man fires from a
distance and a man is killed, we shall be
destroyed completely.
This was a blow to Dalasile who had strained every
nerve in 1875-76 protesting	against Ngangelizwe's
deposition.	Having been restored to power, Ngange-
lizwe seemed to have forgotten the black man's struggle
to throw off the rule of the white man. His deposi-
tion must have taught him a lesson that the white man
could not be challenged, hence as early as 1877,
during the Ninth Frontier war, he fought on the side of
the government.	After the 1875 experience, Ngange-
lizwe decided to give up the struggle.	He now wanted
to live peacefully in his homestead. When the
message from Mditshwa was delivered to him he said to
his men35
Show me a chief who after fighting the
English has been able to build his homestead
in his own country.
34. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
35. BC293:AI, Stanford to Elliot, 25/8/79.
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But Dalasile could not be scared neither could he be
deterred.	He pointed out,36
It is dangerous to withdraw when the warriors
have been doctored, they become like hungry
lions capable of devouring anything. If I
stop them, they can destroy me because when
doctored the medicine must be given a chance
to work.
When Dalasile came back from Ngangelizwe he called upon
Gqabhu, the chief commander of the Qwathi forces to
summon all the Qwathi forces, fully armed to the Great
Place for the final ceremony before going to war and to
divide them into columns.	The first column was made
up of ImiNcayi, the cobweb sweepers.	The second
column was a column of the Dikela. This was followed
by the Sidindi.	The fourth was made up of the Ntondo.
ImiXhinya belonged to the fifth column. The sixth and
the last column was made up of the forces from the
Great Place - ImiTshaba.37
On the 27th of October the first column was sent to
waylay Stanford at Mhlophekazi. The Qwathi knew that
the magistrate was at Clarkebury and they assumed that
he would return by the Mhlophekazi to Nkondlo route.
Unfortunately for	the plans, Stanford decided to
36. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
37. Xundu, 2/7/87.
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contact Major Boyes, the magistrate of Mjanyana on his
way back from Clarkebury, and therefore, instead of
taking the road which leads to Mhlophekazi, he took the
Mjanyana road which leads to Engcobo via Manzana, thus
completely avoiding the Qwathi who tried to waylay him
at Mhlophekazi.38
The Qwathi then planned to ambush Stanford at the
magistracy, but owing to the incomplete walls of the
fortress Stanford decided to abandon the station and to
escape to Dordrecht.	He was escorted by his police
force which included Langa, Dalasile's great son. But
when they were at Zadungeni Langa decided to go back to
join Dalasile in the rebellion rather than betray his
father and the cause of the Qwathi people.	He feared
that he would be taken as a collaborator and a coward
by the Qwathi.	Stanford appealed to him in vain,
promising him anything and warning him	that the
rebellion would end with a Qwathi defeat. But Langa
having made his decision, could not be disuaded. He
left Stanford and his company in a desperate state and
he joined his fellowmen.39
38. CMT 1/27,	Stanford to	Secretary for Native
Affairs, 23/11/80.
39. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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When the Qwathi arrived at Engcobo, they found the
magistracy deserted and expressive of triumph, Dalasile
play-acted a mock "trial" in the court room, deriding
the magistrate's judicial authority, 40 and thereafter
burnt the offices, court room and the residency.
Dalasile feared that the Clarkebury mission might be
used as a military centre by the English troops and
therefore sent a message to Reverend Hargreaves, the
missionary, that he was on his way to the mission
station to burn it and that he should leave with all
the white people who had taken refuge on the station.
In reply Hargreaves said.41
Tell Dalasile that I did not come here at his
invitation and I am not going away at his
bidding.
As this was a mere threat which was not part of the
planned campaign, Dalasile did not send any force to
Clarkebury.
On the 29th of October, Dalasile was joined at Engcobo
by the Western Thembu chiefs such as Stokwe Ndlela,
Gecelo, Mbambonduna and Siqungathi.	They decided to
40. Saunders, "Annexation of Transkeian Territories",
p.93.
CMT 1/27, Stanford to Secretary Native Affairs, 23/11/80.
41. Lennard, "Clarkebury", pp.5-6.
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launch an attack on Western Thembuland and Mfenguland
first. That these chiefs decided on a joint action
makes it impossible to distinguish between the Qwathi
and the Thembu since they were fighting side by side.
For this reason it will be fitting to use the term,
"rebels" instead of "Qwathi".
The rebels crossed the Mgwali river, marched through
Beyele to Ncorha where they fought against white forces
that had been stationed at the shop known as
"Dlinkobe".	The white forces were defeated and the
shop was burnt down. It was in the battle of Ncorha
that the commander of the white forces, Blakeway, fell
and more than thirty Mfengu were killed.42
Having defeated the white and Mfengu forces, the rebels
retired to the Ngqwarhu hills but did not attack in the
morning. The white forces had moved their camp to
Ngqwarhu trading station as it was made of stone which
would provide fortification for them.43
The rebel chiefs already mentioned sent a messenger to
the camp to ask for J.W. Clarke, a trader at Qumanco,
42. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
Xundu, 2/7/87.
43. Xundu, 2/7/87.
Clarke, Native Reminiscences, pp.14-15.
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who responded despite warnings by other whites.	When
he arrived Dalasile asked what he was doing there and
Clarke told them that he had been ordered to take
charge of the Mfengu and white volunteers and to look
after the border.	Dalasile then ordered him to leave
that day as they did not want to harm him. Clarke
told them that it would be impossible for him to leave
that day but on the following day he would be going to
join his family at Ngqamakwe. Gecelo assured him that
they would not attack the camp whilst he was there and
told him that if by morning he was still there they
would send a messenger to tell him their decision. It
was the intention of the rebels to attack the camp
first but since they did not want to harm Clarke, the
trader, they decided to postpone it. This was a clear
indication that the rebels were not at war with the
traders but at war with the colonial agents.44
When Clarke had left the camp, the rebels attacked it
and the Mfengu and white volunteers were chased away.
Seven Mfengu were killed and Mbulawa their chief was
stabbled in the thigh.	The rest escaped across the
Tsomo river.	The rebels once more retired to the
Ngqwarhu hills.45
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid p.16.
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On the 11th of November 1880 Captain Von Linsingen
arrived with the "Kaffarian Mounted Volunteers" and
took charge of the camp at Snodgrass shop.	Two more
Mfengu contingents arrived from Butterworth. On the
following day while von Linsingen and his troops were
marching towards Makhwababa and W.T. Brownlee, the
commander of the Mfengu levies, was moving to the camp
at Gqogqorha Poort, the rebels came down the hills in
force. The engagement took place at Ngqwarhu kopies
and the combined white and Mfengu forces were repulsed.
The rebels pushed them beyond Snodgrass shop which they
looted and destroyed.
The battle of Ngqwarhu having been won by the rebels,
they pushed Brownlee's force towards Gqogqorha and then
turned towards von Linsingen's force which was trapped
in the Xaba flats.	He ordered his men to save
themselves by running away. 46	One of the troopers was
hurled down and his horse galloped away. He tried to
run on foot, crying. von Linsingen, in trying to come
to his assistance had his leg broken by his horse which
had been shot down by the rebels.	His son, despite
46. Brownlee, Reminiscences of a Transkeian, p.72.
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warning by his father to run away, tried to help them
but they were all killed by the rebels.47
The Mfengu camp at Xaba flats was also attacked.
Fifty-seven Mfengu were killed and many were wounded.
The rebels got a large number of rifles and horses.
They pursued the enemy up to Gqogqorha in the Tsomo
district.	When they came headlong against Colonel J.
Maclean's force which had been sent by Captain Blyth to
go to the assistance of the Mfengu and white volun-
teers.	With superior weapons and fresh Maclean's
force pushed the already exhausted rebels towards
Ngqwarhu hills. With few casualties, the rebels took
flight towards Engcobo driving a large number of cattle
which were then hidden in the Qebe, Gqaga and Gulandoda
forests on the North Eastern side of Engcobo. They
left them to the care of few armed herds and pushed
towards Maxongo's Hoek.48
At Maxongo's Hoek the rebels linked up with Mgudlwa's
great son, Langa, who had decided to fight against the
47. Ibid.
Ms 14611, Colonel L.H. Baile, "A brief history of
the Kaffarian Rifles" - East London Daily 
Dispatch, Cory Library.
48. Brownlee, Reminiscences of a Transkeian, p.77.
Clarke, Native Reminiscences, p.18.
Xundu, 2/7/87.
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wishes of his family and Mpangele of the Gcina. The
combined rebel forces were under the command of their
chiefs, Dalasile of the Qwathi, Gecelo of the Gcina
from Xalanga, Mpangele of the Gcina of Maxongo's Hoek,
Langa of the Jumba and Sifuba from Tsomo Valley.	They
began to plan strategies for the expected attack of the
.	colonial forces.49
Maxongo's Hoek seemed to be of strategic advantage to
the rebels because of the natural terrain of the rugged
areas, caves, hills and forests which favoured the
rebels.	Had the rebels been well equiped they might
have defeated the colonial forces.	Some of them did
have guns but they were of a poor quality, and the
others were armed only with African weapons. On the
other hand, the colonial forces were made up of white
volunteers, the Cape Mounted Riflemen and the Mfengu
levies.	Queen Victoria had also offered the Cape
Colony Imperial troops through Lord Kimberly.50
The five rebel chiefs and their followers spotted a
huge cave which could be used as a natural fortress.
The entrance of the cave was partly covered by a big
stone which would protect the rebels from direct fire
49. Xundu, 2/7/87.
50. Saunders, "Annexation", p.95.
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from the colonial forces.	Because of the rugged
nature of the area with steep valleys and hills the
colonial forces had to rest their horses.	The rebels
captured some of the horses and pulled them inside the
cave for further protection from direct fire.	With
this cave strategy the rebels provoked fighting. They
pressed hard on Captain W. Chalmers, the commander of
the police force and Captain Hulley of the Rovers, a
force of white volunteers, who retreated before the
rebels.	When the rebels realised that some reinforce-
ments were coming up, they retreated towards the cave.
To draw away some of the colonial forces about twenty
five to thirty rebels took an opposite direction, while
the rest retreated to the cave.	The plan worked well
as the colonial forces were forced to halt in con-
fusion, half of them stopping to face the few rebels
who had taken the opposite direction.	By the time the
colonial forces discovered the cave, the rebels were
already inside and ready to fire.	The colonial forces
tried to attack the cave in vain. The rebels fought
back from the cave as fast as they could.51
After a good deal of firing, the reinforced colonial
forces made an effort to come closer to the entrance
against fire from the rebels.	Komani, a black
51. BC 293: A3, Stanford's Report, 10/12/80.
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policeman on the side of the colonial forces was shot
down while trying to creep up to the stone.	Another
trooper was stabbed by a spear and wounded. About the
same time one of the Frontier Armed Mounted Police
received a bullet in the brain from the rebels and died
immediately.52
Unable to face the rebels, the colonials decided to
shoot at the horses in order to locate the rebel
position. During this wild shooting chief Sifuba and
a few men were shot but the colonials in the face of
heavy fire gave up the struggle and marched away in
order to draw the rebels out of the cave. Lieutenant
Baird who was the last to leave received a shot from
the rebels and died immediately."
The battle of the cave had been decisively won by the
rebels.	When they left the cave, they encountered the
white forces near Mpangele's homestead.	The rebels
immediately took shelter im the huts and kraals and
fired from within.	When the colonial forces realised
that they were at a disadvantage, they retreated in
order to draw the rebels out.	When they were at a
distance the rebels went out led by Langa Mgudlwa.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
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They rushed for the hill on their left but unfortunate-
ly the colonial forces took control of it before the
rebels.	Langa was shot on the thigh but kept on
encouraging and cheering his fellow rebels who had
first to drive away the colonial forces before they
could attend to Langa.	At the advice of Ncwashu and
Mdalana, Langa's councillors, they rushed directly at
the colonial forces at full force with the aim of using
their spears as they were running out of ammunition.
Indeed, the rebels rushed at their enemy, stabbed them
at close quarters.	After a short encounter, the
colonial forces retreated. They were pursued up and
down the hill and across the river.54
The rebels having gained another victory, removed Langa
Mgudlwa to Didwayo Forest in the Upper Mbashe area and
the bullet was taken out of his thigh and was left
there with a few men to recover. Three of his men
plotted against him and killed him as they did not like
his despotic attitude and stubbornness.55
From the North the battles shifted to Zadungeni on the
South East of Maxongo's Hoek above the Gulandonda
ranges. When the rebels saw the whites preparing for
54. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
55. Ibid.
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an attack they charged in full force.	The colonial
forces thought that they were in retreat and never
realised that they were charging at them.	They were
taken by surprise and were forced to retreat. But
having managed to regroup themselves they charged at
the rebels and in a violent clash the rebels began to
give in.	They were now completely exhausted and
almost weaponless, having used up not only their
ammunition, but even most of their spears.	They were
forced to flee for safety into the Gulandoda and Gqaga
Forests with the colonial forces at their heels. This
marked the end of the rebellion with the rebel forces
defeated. 56
Some isolated battles were fought in the Gulandoda and
Gqaga valleys during which the rebels were routed.
The colonial forces began to hunt for rebels' stock in
the forests meeting with little resistence.	All the
chiefs were reported to have hidden themselves in the
Mbashe valley and forests.	The colonial forces
captured and drove away into the colony about 16 000
cattle and about 5 000 sheep and goats. The death
toll was high on both sides. 57 The defeated Qwathi in
frustration and disappointment killed Gqabhu, their
56. Ibid.
57. BC 293: A3, Stanford's Report, 10/2/80.
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chief commander.	They held him responsible for the
defeat although he was in fact not responsible."
All in all the campaign lasted for five months, from
October 1880 to February 1881. From the above it is
clear that the combined rebel forces in fact won
victory after victory, through high motivation, strong
numbers and clever use of natural features such as
caves and forests. They were not defeated in the
battle but by the superior resources of the colo-
nialists.
Besides superior resources, the colonialists broke down
the power of the rebels by capturing all their stock,
about 16 000 cattle and 5 000 sheep and goats. They
caused the rebels to starve during the period of the
war which led them to fail to resist. Even their
gardens which were ready for reaping which could have
been used to ward off starvation were reaped by the
colonial government thus rendering the rebels unable to
continue the war. Had the rebels been well equipped
like59 the colonial forces the scales of the rebellion
might have been tipped in their favour.
58. Xundu, 2/7/87.
59. BC 293: A5, Stanford's Notes 17/12/81 - 19/12/81.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE AFTERMATH 
(a) Unconditional Surrender 
The	defeated	rebels	were required to surrender
unconditionally. They were not only to give themsel-
ves up but also their arms and stock.	There was very
little stock to surrender since most of their cattle
and sheep had already been captured.	Government
officials, were, however, worried about the arms
situation, since most of the rebels surrendered without
arms saying that their arms had been confiscated by
other magistrates or by the colonial forces. But the
officials feared that they might have handed over their
weapons to the rebels who had not yet surrendered.1
This unconditional surrender, therefore, meant not only
rendering these rebels defenceless but also poor and
submissive.	They emerged from the war helpless and
homeless with their homesteads	burnt down, their
gardens reaped and their cattle captured.	This was a
bitter lesson to those who took part in the rebellion.2
1. BC 293: A5, Stanford Notes, 17/2/81 - 19/2/81.
2. Ibid.
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The Gcina chiefs were the first to surrender and were
followed by the Jumba. The Qwathi and some other
Thembu chiefs were the last.3
On the 6th of February 1881, Satana, a councillor of
Dalasile, and several other Qwathi surrendered. On
surrender, Satana stated that Dalasile, Siqungathi and
Nyamankulu were in the Ngele Forests. Dalasile was
afraid to surrender because he thought that he would be
severely punished by the government or, perhaps, sent
to Robben Island like Stokwe Tyali and Mfanta after the
1878 rebellion. The Qwathi, who surrendered, did so
without having consulted their chief whose whereabouts
were unkown except for the rumours that he was hiding
at Ngele Forests.	Sigidi Fubu, a brother and
councillor of Dalasile, and other councillors were
reported to be still hiding in the Didwayo Forests.
Satana also informed Commandant B. Frost that the
Gulandoda Valleys and Forests had been reoccupied by
the Qwathi rebels, some of whom wanted to surrender but
fear of the consequences still deterred them.4
On the 7th of February, Skota and Mgongxo, two other
councillors of Dalasile, came in stating that Mata,
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.  
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Dalasile's mother, had sent them to state that she
wished to surrender with a portion of Dalasile's people
but denied any knowledge of Dalasile's whereabouts.
The patrol, which was sent to search for him and other
rebels at Ngele, did not get them, neither did they
find any trace of him in the Qutuba Valley Forests.
During the same patrol, some rebels came out of the
forests and faced the patrol.	After some shots from
both sides, the rebels gave up with one rebel dead and
one wounded on the colonial side.	On the 11th of
February, Ntabankulu, Dalasile's younger son with six
councillors, surrendered.	Dalasile was alleged to
have fled to Bomvanaland.5
Meanwhile at All Saints, a policeman, named Thomas
Ntshacile Poswayo, one of the policeman who escorted
Stanford to Dordrecht on the eve of the rebellion and
the one who warned Stanford about Dalasile's prepra-
tions for the rebellion, was entrusted with the task of
receiving surrendering rebels.	He had a large number
of men, women and children who had come in.	It was in
March 1881 when Stanfrod returned to Engcobo. One of
the first things he did was to take some of the rebels
to the residency and showed them the overgrown state of
weeds in the garden and walks and instructed them to
5.	Ibid.
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clear it before they could be relocated.	Dalasile's
whereabouts were still unknown.6
The Qwathi continued to surrender in small numbers but
bringing only arms of an inferior class. The
officials of the colonial government were suspicious
that the best weapons had been exchanged with those of
the men still in the bush.	They were afraid that the
chiefs, in hiding, were planning to resume hostilities
as no chief of any influence had surrendered.	This
means that the defeat of the rebels in 1881 did not
mean the end of tension.	Elliot's cup of distrust was
overflowing. One of his assumptions was that
government was still not desired by the Africans
generally.7
The role of government officials after the rebellion
was still to a large extent military, for not only were
dissident elements still at large, but Elliot's fears
of a United African Front continued from the end of the
war until 1885 when Thembuland was annexed.°
6. Ibid.
7. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot 1/3 and 11/3/81.
G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82, p.51.
8. BC 293: A7, Stanford's Notes, 30/1/82.
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Mangele, Stanford's favourite minor chief and colonial
collaborator, was reported to be in Major Boyes'
territory.	He was afraid to come back to Qwathiland
because he did not take part in the war.	He and
Mgudlwa had taken refuge there. When Stanford
returned he urged them to come back as he needed the
assistance of loyal leaders.9
It was in April that some other minor chiefs, Ngce-
ngane, Venu and Ntwangu with other rebels from all
parts of the country surrendered.10 On the first of
June, Stanford received messages from Qwathi chiefs,
Sandile of the Ntondo in Mnyolo and Sitonga of the
Sidindi in Qutubeni, asking for peace.	Both these
chiefs had once been Stanford's favourites. In
Stanford's opinion they were amongst the least guilty
of the rebels and he, therefore, thought it would be
advisable to allow them to come in.11
On the 5th of June Stanford received information that
Dalasile intended to return to the bush in the
neighbourhood of his country as he was now reported to
be either in Bomvanaland	or the Idutywa	Reserve.
9. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 11/3/81.
10. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 19/4/81.
11. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 1/6/81.
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Others believed that he was in Ludwesa Forest in
Gcalekaland.12
On the 8th of December 1881, Qhole, Dalasile's brother,
called at the magistrate's office to report that
Dalasile was asking to be allowed to surrender. After
some delay the secretary for Native Affairs ordered
Stanford to promise Dalasile that if he would surrender
his punishment would not be greater than that adjudged
to Mditshwa which was three years imprisonment.13
Dalasile was not yet prepared to surrender under the
conditions.14
As Dalasile was known to be hiding in the coastal
forests, his name became linked with that of Sarhili,
the King of the Gcaleka Xhosa, who had been hiding in
the same neighbourhood eversince the end of the Ninth
Frontier War in 1878. Since the Gun War was still in
progress, Sarhili and Dalasile were rumoured to be
plotting joint action with Lerotholi, the Sotho leader.
The rumours proved to be completely unfounded but they
12. BC 293: A5, Stanford to Elliot, 5/6/81.
13. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 10/12/81.
• CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 11/1/82.
• CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 16/1/82.
14.	CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 2/2/82.
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kept the magistrate's suspicions of Dalasile running
high. 15
On the 5th of November 1883 Stanford reported that
Langa Dalasile, the great son of chief Dalasile, had
surrendered. In his defence, Stanford stated that
both Langa and Dalasile had treated the Europeans who
fell into their hands during the war with remarkably
kindness. He pointed out that, as there were legal
difficulties in the way of Langa being tried for
rebellion, he might if government felt so disposed be
allowed to reside at the place of Qhole, his uncle.16
It was only in October 1884 that Dalasile sent a
message that he wished to surrender. Stanford replied
that, in matters of this kind, messages were unsatis-
factory and that he had best come himself and say what
he wished. 17 Thomas Ntshacile Poswayo, the head
policeman went to fetch Dalasile but at first, Dalasile
refused, expressing his fears that he, like Mfanta and
Stokwe Tyali, would be sent to Robben Island.	Poswayo
15. CMT 1/28, L. Farrant (ARM> Report, 1/8/82.
CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 20/7/82.
BC 293: D7, Stanford to Elliot, 30/1/82.
16. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 5/11/83.
17. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 8/10/84.
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assured him that he would never be sent there." When
Dalasile finally arrived at the office on the 28th of
October 1884, Stanford informed him again that his
punishment would not exceed that of Mditshwa - three
years imprisonment. But he further promised Dalasile
that the government might take this period of three
years in which he was abroad as the period of imprison-
ment, and that he might be instructed to remain for the
same period as a prisoner at large where the magistrate
had placed his sons and brother apart from the Qwathi
people.19
In his favour Stanford admitted that Dalasile's cause
in 1880-1881 was excusable because he had never
willingly accepted white supremacy from the onset. Hesaid20
I saw no great blame in his joining the
insurrectionary chiefs.
He further admited that Dalasile was never a cruel
chief but a kind hearted chief. He pointed out:21
Let it count to him for his righteousness
18. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
19. BC 293: B34, Stanford to Elliot, 28/10/84.
20. Macquirie, Reminiscences, p.185.
21. Ibid.
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that he had shown kindness to Mrs Webb and
children when in his power.
It was for these considerations that Dalasile was never
imprisoned. Finally, Stanford expressed his feelings
that Dalasile's return to the district would not bring
any trouble, "and experience proved that my view was
the right one."22
(b) Relocation Schemes 
When the Qwathi rebels surrendered, they were relocated
between Mbashe and Qumanco rivers below the
Gulandoda mountains.	None of them were settled above
the Gulandoda mountains. This left the territory
between the Gulandoda and the Drakensburg ranges, which
included Maxongo's Hoek, which was originally Stokwe
Tyali's land, but had been given to the Gcina chief,
Mpangele, after Stokwe's rebellion in 1878, with the
exception of the portion that had been given to the
"good" Mfengu and loyal Thembu, vacant. Since
Mpangele had joined with Dalasile and other rebels, he,
too, had to vacate the area.23
22. Ibid.
23. G66-83, Instructions	to Thembuland Settlement
Commission, p.VIII.
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The existence of such a large, rich and vacant tract of
land tempted destitute white farmers from the colony to
move in.	They were determined to take possession of
the country and overcome all resistence. The white
"squatters" justified their conduct with the claim that
the farms in the colony had been worked out and that
there was insufficient pasturage. They argued that
the country had been cleared by the colonial volunteers
and as such should be reallocated by the government for
the general benefit of the burghers especially those in
need like themselves.
So, though they had not taken part in the war, they
expected, that as suffering "children" of the govern-
ment, to share in the victory. 24
On the other hand, Ngangelizwe, fearing that the
victorious colony would appropriate his land, proposed
to the Native laws and Customs Commission that the
Thembu should have title acknowledging their right to
hold the land occupied by them. 25	He stated that he
did not want his country to be given to strangers.	He
feared that if there were vacant lands people with
24. Ibid.
25. G4-83, Question 7800, p.444.
G47-82, Vol I, part II, Interview with Ngangelizwe
by SNA, 14/11/81, pp.83-84.
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money in their hands might come and take them. He
also reminded the commission that the conditions of
1875 had stipulated that the lands should be un-
touched. 26 A similar request had been made to the
government through the chief magistrate but no reply
was ever received. He further reminded the commission
that during all wars with the colonial government he
had remained loyal to it.27
The plea was repreated directly to J.W. Sauer, the
secretary for Native Affairs, in November 1881. Sauer
told Ngangelizwe and his followers that they need not
have any fear of dispossession if they remained loyal.
Ngangelizwe, then, asked that some of his people be
settled on the lands laid empty by the dispersal of the
Qwathi rebels.	He did not wish his country to be laid
in farms but kept under the old system.	He would be
satisfied if the government would allow him to fill up
the land forfeited by Dalasile with loyal Thembu.
Such was Ngangelizwe's distrust of colonial intentions
with regard to Thembuland that he asked for a document
securing it to himself and his people.	He wanted such
a document in his possession as he did not know what
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
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might happen	after Elliot, the chief magistrate,
This rich and vacant land also attracted the Mfengu of
Peddie and	those in	the Transkei territories.
Stanford the magistrate was opposed to giving the land
to the Peddie Mfengu and proposed that their claims and
applications should take second place behind his own
local favourite Mfengu.	He argued that the latter had
rendered good service to the government in every war
since 1846.	He also was opposed to the allocation of
this portion of the country to the white "squatters"
whose claims he considered exhorbitant.	He suggested
that the vacant land be surveyed into farms with a
government headman appointed over each. Distribution
of government lands and pastures would be made by the
senior headman of each of them.29
In a letter to the chief magistrate of Thembuland dated
3rd August 1882, J.W. Sauer, the Secretary for Native
Affairs, instructed him to open negotiations with
Ngangelizwe to secure his cooperation regarding the
28. Ibid.
Xundu, 2/7/87.
29. N.A.68, Stanford's Report, 11/6/81, p.169.
• G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82, pp.62-64.
• Master, "Resistence", p.94.
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disposal of the vacant land. He pointed out that if
arrangements could be made, it was proposed to settle
European farmers in Maxongo's Hoek and Black farmers in
the other portions of Dalasile's country.	The Thembu
might be settled in portions not intended for European
occupation.	He also presumed that a money payment
either in one sum or annually to Ngangelizwe would be
the best mode of compensating him.	He said that it
should be pointed out that, Dalasile, by having gone
into rebellion, had forfeited his land. This meant
that a large part of the vacant land which Stanford had
recommended for the Mfengu and loyal Thembu had to be
reserved for white settlement.30
Initially, Sauer, the Secretary for Native Affairs, was
unwilling to grant the white "squatters" free land in
Dalasile's old country. He wanted land already
occupied by the white "squatters", to be put up for
sale. But political pressure from the Afrikaner Bond
led to the appointment of two Bondsmen, van Rensberg
and Joubert, as additional commissioners who adopted a
strongly pro-squatter line.31
30. N.A.78, Secretary for Native Affairs to Elliot, 3/8/82.
31. Master, "Resistence", pp.92-93.
G66-83, Instructions	to Thembuland Settlement
Commission, p.VIII.
N.A.77, Marginal Note by Sauer, 22/7/82, p.225.
N.A.79, Stanford to Elliot, 10/8/82.
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As a result of the increase in the number of white
"squatters" who had now taken possession of land with
Africans upon it, as well as vacant tracts, disputes
arose between the squatters and African Farmers. 32 The
.African farmers raided the stock of the squatters.
Hardly a night passed without cases of depredations and
looting. The stock so captured were either sent to
the forests and valleys of Qwathiland for safe keeping
or slaughtered.	This was certainly not thieving, it
was a form of rural protest of the peasant farmers in
whose lands the squatters had encroached.	They were
reacting to the conditions that threatened them. The
rugged nature of the territory prevented the white
farmers from retrieving their stock easily.
Stanford thought that the old border warfare might have
started afresh if the government had not pressurised
Ngangelizwe to cede the land already in the hands of
the squatters. Once more the Africans lost because,
the government successfully put pressure to bear on
Ngangelizwe to obey its will.33
BC 293: D7, Stanford's Notes, 8/8/82 - 9/8/82..
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
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The present day districts of Elliot and Indwe, formerly
part of Thembuland, were defined, beaconed off and
ceded to the government of the colony. Ngangelizwe
did at least make it clear that, while he consented to
the government taking over, confiscation should not be
extended south of the line. He feared that should the
boundary be extended, the Qwathi would not only lose
some more territory but excessive overcrowding of the
rest of Thembuland would be the result.34
Sauer, the Secretary for Native Affairs, approved of
the cession and the squatters were allowed a free land
in the vacant territory. Not only the Qwathi but also
the Mfengu, who had been the allies of the government
ever since 1846 lost. It should have dawned on the
Mfengu that once the war had been won by the whites,
their assistance no longer counted. For example in
1878 the Mfengu faced disarmament despite their having
been traditional allies of the government and now in
1881-1882 they lost the opportunity to get land in
Qwathiland. This must have taught them that fighting
for the white government was of no advantage and
benefit to the Africans but only to the whites no
matter how much help they had given.
34. G8-83, Stanford's Report, 31/12/82, pp.163-168.
.	Master, "Resistence", p.97.
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In the same letter of 3rd August 1882, J.W. Sauer
instructed Elliot, the chief magistrate, to locate the
surrendered rebels in places he thought would ensure
proper supervision. They were to be located regard-
less of ethnic differences and no authority other than
that of the magistrate was to be exercised. Elliot
carried out these instructions in the Engcobo district
with the assistance of W. Stanford, the Resident
Magistrate.	Temporary locations were made between the
Mbashe and Qumanco rivers. 35 An inducement for the
surrender of the Qwathi was that they were relocated in
the district to which they belonged and that gardens
would be apportioned for them for their maintenance, as
they were without stock.36
The country, below the Gulandoda range of mountains and
eastward of Engcobo to the Mbashe river, was given to
the surrendered Qwathi rebels. 37 On surrender,
Dalasile with the members of his family was located in
the Manzana location, not very far from the magistra-
cy, it being considered that better supervision could
35. N.A.78, Sauer to Elliot, 3/8/82.
36. N.A.74, Elliot to Sauer, 20/2/82, p.23.
37. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82.
A52-82, Stanford to Elliot, 11/7/82.
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be exercised with regard to him. 38 The settlement of
Dalasile in this location was a temporary measure
because it was feared that his proximity to the
magistracy was dangerous and risky. Hence he was
later relocated at Qota about twenty five kilometres to
the South East of Engcobo.39
As compensation for the loss of Mhlwazi location, known
as "Jumbasvelt", confiscated for European settlement,
Mgudlwa, the loyal Jumba chief, was given land between
the Qumanco and Mgwali rivers, land formerly occupied
by the Mfengu chief, Mendela, who had been placed there
by Dalasile. Before the war Mendela was cooperating
with the magistrate and Stanford had relied on him for
support during the rebellion. But Mendela and his
people did not turn out and so he fell into disfavour.
He was now removed with his people to the eastern side
of the Mgwali river.40
Mcobololo, another Mfengu chief, who had proved to be
loyal, was relocated in his former location between
38. Ibid.
39. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
Xundu, 2/7/87.
40. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82, p.52.
A52-82, Stanford to Elliot, 11/7/82.
G8-83, Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/82.
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Xuka and the Mbashe rivers as the ploughing season was
drawing near.41
Within a radius of six kilometres from Engcobo, Blacks
of certified good character and industrious habits,
among them, the Mfengu and loyal Thembu, were located.
The idea behind this scheme was that, in the event of
another outbreak, there would be a population in the
immediate neighbourhood of the magistracy whose
loyalty could be depended upon.42
(c) Headmanship and the Ward System 
(i) Dalasile loses chieftainship 
The defeat of the Qwathi in the war had serious
repercussions not only on the question of land but also
on the question of chieftainship. The war put an end
to Qwathi chieftainship for a period of twenty one
years, for it was only in 1902 that chief headmanship
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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was bestowed on Langa, the great son of Dalasile.
When Langa surrendered in November 1883, he was given
clearly to understand that should he make any attempt
to exercise chieftainship amongst the Qwathi it would
result in his removal from the country.43
When Dalasile surrendered in October 1884 he was told
in no uncertain terms that the rebellion had put an end
to chieftainship and that he would be treated as a
commoner. Stanford warned Dalasile to keep himself out
of all national matters in which his people would like
him involved.	This sealed the fate of ever becoming
chief once more. Thomas Poswayo, the former chief
policeman, seems to have assumed the role of senior
headman and advisor to Stanford. In support of his
magistrate, Poswayo reminded Dalasile about Stanford's
intercourse with him, warning him about his behaviour
and the dangers of opposing the government. He told
Dalasile that the magistrate was not responsible for
the position in which Dalasile found himself, but he,
himself, was responsible. 44 All this time Dalasile was
quiet and sullenly heeded these warnings. But he was
determined to defy the orders of the "usurpers" and of
the "elevated" Mfengu police headman who was now
43. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 5/11/83.
44. BC 293: A9, Stanford to Elliot, 1/11/84.
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behaving as a chief over him. It was for this reason
that in January 1885 Stanford sent Dalasile a sharp
message about his behaviour, pointing out that he had
not been keeping himself as quiet as he should have
done. Dalasile's attitude towards Thomas Poswayo, who,
according to Stanford, had been "kindness itself to his
family and himself," 45 did not meet with Stanford's
approval. It is, however, difficult to see how
deposition and deprivation of authority on the part of
Dalasile by the magistrate with the help of Poswayo
could be seen as "kindness".
That Dalasile was a determined nationalist and a chief
in his own right is shown by his unwillingness to
succumb to the forces of colonialism. Stanford
himself was disillusioned, for he had expected Dalasile
to be submissive, hence his complaint that46
Since his return from the bush, his behaviour
has not been all that I could wish for.	It
is a difficult question	to decide what
measure should be meted out to these native
chiefs when they surrender. If banished
from the country, the punishment appears
disproportionate to the officer considering
that some excuse can be found for fighting
the government and yet when leniently dealt
with they soon begin to gasp at power again.
45. Ibid., 7/2/85.
46. BC 293: A10 Stanford's Notes, 7/3/86.
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But Stanford was making a mistake to think that the
loss of chieftainship was a lesser punishment than
banishment. In fact it was the worst punishment for a
chief to lose his position of power and authority over
his people.	Demotion from the position of a chief was
most humiliating especially when Dalasile's commoners,
like Poswayo, were to wield authority over him.
Stanford's assertion that Dalasile had been dealt with
leniently is	devoid of truth and shows lack of
understanding of "the veneration with which the office
is held." 47	After all, Stanford had not tasted the
bitterness and frustration of demotion. Were he to be
demoted to a rank of a clerk and his clerk to be
promoted as his magistrate he would see how bitter the
humiliation would be.
Dalasile was overwhelmed with joy when Stanford
announced his transfer on promotion to Kokstand since
he and other Thembu's dream of the removal of the
Stanfords were on the point of being realised. But on
being questioned by Stanford about this, he denied
being mixed up in any way with the agitation then going
on in Thembuland.	This agitation was a protest
against the	division of	Thembuland into several
47. M.	Fortes	and E.	Evans-Priteland, African 
Political Systems, (London, 1940), p.53.
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magistracies and an attempt by Nehemia Tile to bring
about a union of Thembuland under the chief magistrate
alone, with all other magistrates withdrawn."
The deposition of Dalasile was a blow to African
resistence in general in that throughout the Transkei
territories, Dalasile was recognised as a nationalist
who had shown preparedness to fight the forces of
colonialism with all the means available. With his
power as chief curtailed, his loss of health, and new
system of headmanship, Dalasile was unable to revive
the spirit of resistence in Qwathiland.	His death in
1895 as a result of small pox, 49 marked an end to
resistence movements in Qwathiland. Even when Langa,
his great son was given chief headmanship in 1902 5° he
did nothing to revive the spirit of resistence against
colonialism. Langa failed to put Qwathiland in the
vanguard of resistence movements in the first decade of
the Twentieth Century as Dalasile had done in the last
quarter of the Nineteenth Century.
Dalasile's tragedy was that, however, scrupulous he
might have been in his relations with whites, the
48. BC 293: A10, Stanford's Notes, 19/6/86.
49. CMT 3/87, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 18/5/95.
50. CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 19/9/1902.
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exercising of an independent line by him in Thembuland
was inimical to the trend of colonial policy, which was
not only to maintain British influence throughout the
territories but also to gradually extend British
control over the area in a "civilising" mission.
(ii) Introduction of the Ward System and Headmanship 
After the defeat of the Qwathi, Stanford lost no time
in abolishing Qwathi chieftainship and the house of
Dalasile that had given him enormous problems. He
wholeheartedly supported the introduction of the ward
system which was the division of the magisterial
district into wards known as locations each of which
was to be under a headman.51
Vast lands under the control of the chief and his
councillors were divided into small units under a
headman who was usually a senior man from the locally
dominant lineage. 52 The magistrates thought it wise
to fill in the ward with people of the same lineage
with a senior man being appointed as a head for easy
51. W. Beinart and C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles in 
Rural South Africa (Johannesburg, 1987), p.7.
52. Ibid. p.7.
165
control. 53	As will be seen later this method was not
without its problems.
The ward system was a new feature of government control
after the wars. It was most easily adopted in the
district of Engcobo where the only remaining chief,
Mgudlwa, was loyal to the government.54
The most important aim of headmanship was to help
undermine the authority of the chiefs, especially those
like Dalasile, who aspired to independence. That is
to say the introduction of headmanship was brought
about to promote the	interests of	the colonial
government not the interests of the people. By
getting on their side the loyal and influential men,
the colonial government hoped to win the struggle
against African Nationalism whose tide was running
stronger than before. The headmen, therefore, were to
become puppets of the colonial government whose aim was
to break the powers of the chief and the traditional
way of life. 55 Thus to be a headman was to be a
servant of the government and not to be a chief or a
true representative of the people.
53. Ibid.
54. N.A.91, Stanford to Elliot, 11/12/83.
55. BC 293: D8, Stanford Notes, 30/4/83.
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This system of "Indirect Rule" stemmed initially from
the Cape's unwillingness to admit the Transkei into
full colonial system of administration and representa-
tion.	Subsequently it was shaped by segregationist
policies which froze areas densely occupied by Africans
as reserves and also by the resistence of Transkei
communities to absorption in the colonial frame work."
Many of the appointed headmen felt exalted and were
ready to undertake the troublesome duties of headman-
ship.	The position carried great social prestige and
was much sought after.	Though not very highly paid,
it offered opportunities for bribery which was another
means of exploiting the people.	The duties of a
headman were onerous, if they were fully utilised by
the magistrates. They were forced to carry out lawful
orders of the magistrates or chief magistrate directly
or indirectly communicated.57
They are continually harassed by requests
from the office to trace and bring in natives
under their control for official business at
the office.
56. Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles, p.7.
57. A.G McLoughlin, " The Transkeian System of Native
Administration", Unpublished M.A. Thesis 1936, p.83.
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Dereliction of duty exposed the headman not only to
administrative action but to penalties as provided,
for example, under the noxious weeds proclamation and
Land Proclamation as well as Native administration act.
"Inspite of all its hardship and danger the post is
attractive and tends to become hereditary in somefamilies."58
Besides allowances due to headman, diligent headmen
received rewards for arresting thieves, recovering
stolen stock and stopping faction fights. Because of
his skills, as a former policeman, Headman Poswayo
became the greatest shareholder in the fines imposed on
the thieves and fighters he had detected.59
Headman Mntonintshi of Sitoleni location who had traced
the spoor of stolen stock to Kupiso's homestead,
arrested Kupiso and sent him to the office with the
sheep.	He was given twenty shillings as a reward for
his conduct. The chief magistrate, recommending this
to the secretary for Native Affairs, stated,"
I think encouragement in the shape of rewards
58. Ibid.
59. N.A.181, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 1/2/96.
60. N.A.95, W.Stanford to Elliot, 17/6/84.
N.A.96, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 18/6/84.
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to headmen and others would be attended with
beneficial results.
To make the position of a headman further attractive,
A.H. Stanford, the Resident Magistrate for Engcobo,
applied for an increase of allowance for deserving
headmen, in 1892. In Qwathiland he recommended Thomas
Poswayo, Langa Dalasile and headman Mcaphukiso.61
As servants and "children" of the colonial government,
the headmen were subject to punishment should they
fail in their duties.	The most common form of
punishment was deposition or dismissal. One example
of this was the deposition of headman Tshongweni who
had encouraged a faction fight between his men and
headman Sitoza's.	He was instantly dismissed and his
son Tayiboso was appointed in his place."
Another example of misconduct which often led to
deposition was conviction in a court of law. One
example of this was headman Zonyana of Gqaga who was
convicted at the circuit court at Cala for contravening
Section 22, Act No.35 of 1893 and was sentenced to pay
61. CMT 3/87, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 10/6/92.
N.A.180, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 2/1/96.
N.A.194, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 12/9/96.
62. CMT 3/87 C.J. Warner to Elliot, 20/9/95.
i
169
a fine of £15 or four months imprisonment.	He was
deposed and Mkutwana was recommended to succeed him.
His sons were ignored."	Ngcengane, who was impli-
cated in a theft case, was also dismissed.'"
Another headman who became the victim of colonial
measures was headman Rasmeni Gemane of Gqobonco who was
accused of having failed to report the arrival of
suspected stolen sheep at Mangoloti's homestead but
instead bought two of them."
But had Rasmeni Gemane known, as headman, that
Mangoloti had stolen such a flock of sheep, he would
not have bought them but would have asked for them free
of charge so as to keep quiet.	That he bought two was
an indication of innocence.
The magistrate expected the headmen to play the role of
detectives but unfortunately he failed to train them.
Perhaps it was for this reason that Stanford encouraged
some of his policemen to take up headmanship. These
were: Thomas Poswayo, Phillip Poswayo, George Jama-
63. CMT 3/89, Warner to Elliot, 10/5/97.
64. Ibid.
65. CMT 3/91, L.G. Levey to Elliot, 18/4/1901.
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ngile, Mfundisi,	Vetu Gcanga, Langa Dalasile and
Lwana."
The question of succession to headmanship posed another
problem which was very confusing to the Qwathi people.
It was purely colonial rather than traditional. Under
headmanship it did not follow automatically that if one
was the great son or next of kin one would become the
successor. Headmanship as a colonial institution, was
not based on blood relationship, but was based on
whether the incumbent would best serve the interests of
the colonial government.	In order to be appointed as
headman one had to have the interests of the colonial
government at heart. No man who did not obey the
dictates of colonialism would ever be allowed to
succeed to headmanship as it was feared he would
"poison" the people of his ward.67
This became clear when Sitonga, of the Sidindi clan of
Qutubeni, one of Stanford's favourite chiefs died,
C.J. Warner, the magistrate recommended one Qhoshisa, a
resident of the ward, who was Sitonga's distant cousin.
This led to unrest at Qutubeni. A deputation led by
one Mfundisi, Sitonga's nephew drew, up a petition to
66. N.A.181, C.J. Warner to ELLIOT, 1/2/96.
67. CMT 3/88, Warner to Elliot, 5/11/96.
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the chief magistrate in which the people of Qutubeni
complained about this appointment. They pointed out
that Mqwakumbana, the right hand son of Sitonga who
according to custom had to act as regent during the
minority of Nqwiliso, Sitonga's great son, had been
ignored."
The petitioners felt that there was no valid reason for
the appointment of an outsider. They asked the chief
magistrate to withdraw the appointment of Qhoshisa. If
Mqwakumbana was unfit they would rather have Mfundisi,
Sitonga's nephew.	But despite the fact that Qhoshisa
was only a distant cousin, the word of the magistrate
prevailed.	The magistrate tried to convince the chief
magistrate that the relationship was not as distant as
the petitioners imagined. He claimed that Qhoshisa's
father was the son of the "iQadi" of Sitonga's father's
mother, an argument which even thosed skilled in Qwathi
custom found it hard to follow."
It was almost the same problem at Ntibane Drift. When
headman Matiso died, his son was not recommended on the
ground that "he does not bear a good character."70
68. CMT 3/89 Warner to Elliot, 11/1/97.
69. Ibid.
70. N.A.251, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 19/11/1899.
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When the magistrate had no confidence in anybody in the
ward, rather than appointing an unsuitable person he
would prefer that adjacent wards be amalgamated even
aginst the wishes of the people so that the two wards
could be under one headman in whom the magistrate had
confidence.	This was the case when Rasmeni Kombela of
Nqancule resigned.	His ward was amalgamated with that
of Sinqumeni under headman Dolophini. The people of
Nqancule objected to this, demanding that one of them
be appointed as headman, but the magistrate would not
accede to their demands on the ground that there was no
one fit for appointment.73
(iii) Opposition: The Headman System 
It is a mistake to think that all headmen were in
favour of this system. Some of the headmen were minor
chiefs in Dalasile's time, who had been in control of
large sections.	They protested when their lands were
to be subdivided into wards.	This reduction meant
that their sphere of influence would be reduced, which
meant fewer followers and limited sources of income.
The smaller the land was, the fewer the gardens and the
71. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to ELLIOT, 21/11/1903.
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smaller they became.	This reduction, therefore, put a
limit to the power and indirect income of headmen.
Of course, objections to the ward system should also be
seen against the background of whether the headman
himself was in the good books of the magistrate or not.
These two, at times, went together. If the headman
found himself in trouble with the magistrate he would
be opposed to the colonial system, and if the magis-
trate found himself undermined and opposed by a
certain headman, he would try and make things difficult
for that headman.72
Beinart and Bundy see the problem as resulting from the
changes in the patterns of early collaboration and
resistence. As an example, they point out that after
the 1881 rebellions the loyals received new locations
and were promoted to headmanship whereas the rebels had
their land confiscated and their chiefs removed. But
they also observed that some of the most bitter black
opponents of the government in the post rebellion
period were from loyalist communities of formerly
progressive peasants who had had their expectations
72.	Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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shattered.	Former allies found themselves jettisoned,
then no longer favoured.'"
This was true of Mendela, a Mfengu chief, who was
admitted to Qwathiland in 1876 before Stanford arrived.
As a Mfengu Mendela had been favoured by the magistrate
at the expense of the Qwathi. Because he was regarded
as a progressive and loyal chief, Stanford had expected
him to come to his assistance when Dalasile rebelled.
But Mendela declined to help Stanford, and as a result,
he fell into disfavour, hence his removal from the
Western side of the Mgwali river to the eastern side to
give more land to Mgudlwa. 74	Mendela was also
arrested for allegedly practising witchcraft.75
Stanford even denied that he had ever been a chief
before hence his division of his land into small wards
and offering him one of these. Stanford argued that
when Mendela was received by Dalasile he was never
recognised as a chief neither were there any Mfengu
with him.	He claimed that this information came from
Qhole, Dalasile's brother and Ntabankulu, Dalasile's
73. Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles, p.10.
74. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/81.
75. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 1/12/83.
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youngest son, who were rebels during	the Qwathi
rebellion.76
But whether this was true or not, the fact remains,
Stanford had elevated Mendela to a position of a chief
at the beginning of his administration.	He was always
speaking of	"Mendela" and	"Mendela's people" or
"Mendela's Fingoes", but now Mendela is said to have
had no followers and no "kraals".	If Mendela had no
followers, how coud he have relied on him during the
war?	Even during the period of relocation he spoke of
having to remove "Mendela and his people" to the
eastern side of the Mgwali river.	The truth is,
Mendela, having failed to come to the assistance of
Stanford, was sure to suffer political revenge.	As in
Dalasile's case, Stanford tried to convince all the
other headmen that Mendela was a nuissance.	For
example in	a meeting with the chief magistrate,
Mangele, who had always been used to undermine
Dalasile's authority, stood up to inform the chief
magistrate of the sorrow of their magistrate being
troubled by Mendela.77
76. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 5/11/83.
77. CMT 1/30, Minutes of the Meeting, 4/8/85.
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The following are the wards into which Mendela's land
east of the Mgwali river was divided:- Ntozini's Ward,
Kangela's Ward, Mlunguza's Ward, Tsham's Ward and
Nobatana's Ward, known as "Ward 2", which was original-
ly offered to Mendela. 78	Mendela refused to accept
headmanship over this ward. This brought him into
conflict with the magistrate. In frustration Mendela
left for East Griqualand and when he came back a
frustrated man he defied the orders to leave Ward 2,
over which Nobatana had been appointed headman.
Having been reprimanded, he succumbed to the forces of
colonialism. He was allowed to remain in that Ward on
condition he was to accept the position of a commoner
with no aspiration to headmanship. 79 The days of
friendship were now over and in the words of Beinart
and Bundy,"
the currency of client-patron transactions
had deteriorated and was increasingly being
replaced by the harder coin of court based
and bureacratic magisterial authority.
78. Macquirie, Reminiscences, p.177.
79. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 1/12/83.
CMT 1/30, Stanford to Elliot, 18/12/84.
• CMT 1/31, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 8/2/89.
CMT 3/86, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 14/7/94.
• CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 20/3/96.
80. Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles, p.10.
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The headmen also faced opposition from the people over
whom they had been appointed because many Qwathi
resented such easy extension of colonialism to their
midst.	The headmen amongst other things were called
upon to urgently eradicate burweed and thistle-thorn
prevalent in the upper parts of Engcobo.	The people
tried to	get the headmen into trouble with the
magistrate by refusing to obey the orders. They knew
that the headmen had been seriously warned that failure
to get these weeds eradicated would lead to severe
punishment. Many headmen complained that,'"
... the people refuse to assist them hoping
perhaps to get headmen into trouble and
perhaps to secure dismissal.
(iv) Land Disputes 
The ward system was also a source of trouble in
Qwathiland in that it led to many disputes about land
between neighbours and also between homestead heads and
the headman himself. This occured because some of
the headmen, through favouratism placed their friends
in communal land like grazing lands or allocated people
from other parts of the country at the expense of the
members of the ward.	At the same time, it should be
81.	CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 9/4/97.
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noted that jealousy played a role in these disputes.
The system was responsible for this in that when the
system was introduced the government thought it would
be wise to divide the land according to lineages so
that members of the same lineage would be more or less
in the same ward under the head of the lineage.	The
government was not aware of family jealousies when the
people of the same lineage were put together."
Admission of foreigners into the ward of a single
lineage was another cause of quarrel.	This often led
to disputes	especially about stock trespass and
gardens. Lack of definite boundaries between wards
also led to some disputes. The people whose home-
steads were on the boundaries were always in conflict
with each other where beacons had been ignored.83
This was so because with the breaking up of the land
into wards the settlements became closer to each other
than before.
As a result of these disputes many people suffered as
they had to lose their huts, already built or parts of
their cultivated gardens. Worst of all such disputes
involved quite a number of wards in faction fights.
82. Mxutu, 13/6/83.
83. Ibid.
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For example a faction fight occured between Vetu
Gcanga's people and the Hala of Mgwali over the
question of the grazing grounds.84
A case of jealousy and revenge came up at Mntuntloni in
the ward of Flepise who refused to allow Nyakatya, a
forest guard, to occupy land he had purchased from a
resident who had moved out. The headman pointed out
that he had refused permission for Nyakatya to reside
there even before he had bought the land.	Nyakatya as
an educated man solicited the services of A. Champion,
an attorney of Cala, who advised him to buy the land.
The headman was determined not to yield whilst Nyakatya
on the other hand felt that he would not be defeated by
an illiterate headman.	Champion, acting on behalf of
Nyakatya argued85
The only reason for the headman's objection
is that Nyakatya has carried out his duties
as a forest guard too strictly to suit the
views of the natives of the part.
There were many other cases of dispute which emanated
from the ward system. This seems to indicate that the
ward system did not work as well as its architects
pretended it had.	And in all these disputes the
84. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 23/3/97.
85. CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 17/1/99.
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headmen as servants of the colonial government were
never seen to be on the wrong. They were always
protected because the colonial government did not want
to accept blame for the failure of the system.
(d) Judicial Conditions 
From the reports of the resident magistrates of Engcobo
between 1882 and 1910, it appears that there was a
gradual decrease in criminal cases but an increase in
civil cases. The decrease in criminal cases could be
attributed to greater control measures such as the
system of	headmanship. Fear of dismissal and
subsequent humiliation made the headmen work hard in
preventing stock theft and detecting crime.	They
proved more eficient than policemen. In his annual
report for 1896, C.J. Warner, resident magistrate,
commented that he would even prefer the headmen to
policemen who had no incentive to make them energetic
in the performance of their duties sincere there were
no prospects of promotion."
But the period after the rebellion was not without its
judicial problems. The very judicial status of
Thembuland itself was open to question since the
86. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 4/1/97.
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territory had not been legally annexed and Leonard the
Cape Attorney-General, was of the opinion that even
after 1881 the chiefs were still independent rulers in
the eyes of the law. This uncertainty was only ended
by Proclamation 13 of 1882 of Sir Hercules Robinson
which stipulated that the laws then in force in the
colony of the Cape of Good Hope should then be the laws
in force and to be observed within Thembuland except as
specially otherwise provided in that proclamation."
Colonial law could not	be applied	unchanged to
Thembuland.	One problem that arose was the sentence
of death in murder cases.	The Chief Magistrate gave
three reasons for his opposition to it.	First, the
death sentence for murder was a punishment unknown to
African customs, they called it "second murder"."
Second, in view of the political unrest after the war
it was	not considered that it was opportune to
introduce capital punishment. Third, the opinion of
the Native Laws and Customs Commission of 1883 was
against it.89
87. Master, "Resistence", pp.82-83.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
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Under customary law with its simple punishment of
confiscation of property, murders and crime were less
common than under the colonial system.	One example
was the case in which Salman	of Mntuntloni was
convicted of the murder of Nobinza, his wife. But
instead of the death sentence which he would have been
given in the colony, he was sentenced to a flogging and
confiscation of his property.90
Another case was that of the death of an insane man in
Sipango's ward, who had been a source of trouble and
annoyance to the people of his homestead. Although
these facts did not justify his death by foul means, in
the opinion of the Africans it diminished the "vicious-
ness of the crime".93
This seems to indicate that African traditional law was
more "civilised" in that the European legal systems
that later made insanity as a mitigating factor in
passing sentence in criminal cases developed from this
African legal system.92
90. CMT 1/27, C. Brownlee	(SNA)	to Elliot (CMT),
28/8/77.
91. Master, "Resistence", p.84.
92. Ibid.
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Another question was the problem of dividing a fine
between the magistrate and the chief.	The chief used
to get half or a considerable portion of the fine when
cases had been	adjudicated according to African
customs.	But according to Proclamation 13 of 1882
this system was changed. The Proclamation provided
that all fines were to go to the government with the
exception of a portion not exceeding one half which the
magistrate had the power to award to the person giving
information which led to the discovery and conviction
of the offender.	The chiefs began to protest against
this new law. Elliot, the Chief Magistrate, tried to
explain that in matters of that nature neither the
magistrate nor he had discretionary power, as they had
to act under clearly defined instructions. In his
communication with Sauer, the Secretay for Native
Affairs, Elliot noted that should the whole or even
half of the fines imposed on the territory be awarded
to the chiefs, it would amount to a considerable
reduction of revenue.	Sauer ruled that the regula-
tions had to be obeyed.93
The government's decision to keep assault fines for
itself led to public protest by Stokwe Tyali on behalf
of Dalasile, in 1877 which and was one of the causes of
93.	Ibid.
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the 1880 rebellion. 94	The Qwathi also objected to the
colonial court procedure in force, which if no proof
beyond reasonable doubt, that a man had committed
theft, could be set free.	According to African law,
failure to account satisfactorily for stock found in
one's possession was sufficient evidence against one.95
Again, in civil cases, headmen might sit as assessors
and, in these, Stanford also allowed them to examine
and state their opinions but when the law agents
appeared and the procedure became colonial in form, the
services of headmen were redundant for they became
confused with "objections", "exceptions" and other
technicalities which they did not understand.96
Another point of clear	divergence between Afrian
procedure and the colonial legal procedure was the
question of costs. Under colonial law the losing
party paid costs, with the Africans the costs were paid
out of the value of the thing in dispute and if after
judgement nothing of value passed from one party to
another, there were no costs.97
94. CMT 1/27, Elliot to Stanford, 21/9/76.
95. G3-84, Stanford's Report for 1883, p.51.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
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This could be illustrated by the following example: A
Mfengu man travelling with a wagon, had some difficul-
ties in crossing a stream, the oxen left the road and
caused some damage to a mealie field.	The owner of
the field, a Qwathi, came rushing down with some others
from his homestead and a quarrel began at once.	The
Mfengu offered	some payment which was considered
inadquate by the indignant Qwathi and words began to
run high.	Just then, someone called out to them not
to fight but to go to the magistrate.	The judgement
happened to be the amount the Mfengu had offered and
the Qwathi had rejected.	This meant that the Qwathi
had lost the case. As a loser he had to pay the
costs. It was where the trouble began because the
Qwathi could not understand why he was called upon to
pay having come to his "father", the magistrate to ask
for advice.	He asked98
And now you say, I must pay. Is this a fine
for coming to you and because I did not fight
and beat a Mfengu? If I had beaten him then
you could have fined him?
No explanation could convince him.	He again asked99
What is this money for? Are you not our
magistrate sent to us ... to listen to all
our complaints and tell us when we do right
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
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and wrong?	and now I must pay a fine for
coming to you? How is it?
The direct result of enforcing colonial rules was that
the number of cases brought to the magistrate diminish-
ed at once "which means so much authority and influence
thrown back to the chiefs".100
(e) Social Conditions 
(i) Christianity and Education 
Of missionary failure in Qwathiland there is no doubt.
The adoption of stricter measures of control after the
war and the extension of this control through the
policy of "Indirect Rule", to Qwathiland by the system
of headmanship did not help much to change the social
conditions of the Qwathi. The chronicling of the
increase of the number of schools or institutions
established by the missionaries cannot be accepted as
evidence of the growth of christianity. Even today
the Qwathi cannot be generally referred to as a
christian nation. 101
100. Ibid.
101. D. Williams,	"The Missionaries on the Eastern
Frontier of the Cape	Colony 1797-1853" (Un-
published Doctoral Thesis, Witwatersrand, 1959), p.1.
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From the list of headmen (see appendix vi) of Qwathi-
land it appears that some few headmen were drawm from
Non-Qwathi clans, perhaps, in order to dilute anti-
colonial feelings in Qwathiland. These were the
headmen who tried to bring about social changes in
their locations.	They were Thomas Poswayo, Vetu
Gcanga, the former policemen, who played a part in the
escape of Stanford on the eve of the rebellion.	By
accepting christianity they were trying to help promote
colonialism in Qwathiland. What also helped to bring
about acceptance of christianity in their locations was
the fact that their locations were heterogeneous hence
some social changes. 302
To further the aims of colonialism, Poswayo opened up a
school for the sons of chiefs and headmen and paid a
teacher himself, in his farm at Cengcu. He also
occassionally taught in the school and helped here and
there.	This school aimed at making young men "good
headmen" from a colonial point of view.	It was
supported by both the magistrate and Reverend T.W.
Green of All Saints who supervised it.	It was here
that some Qwathi boys came into contact with Chris-
102. S.Green, First Hundred Years, 1873-1973 (Umtata,
1974), p.40.
Titus, 16/7/89.
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tianity. But it is doubtful if this brought about any
significant changes in the social conditions of theQwathi.103
Another headman who tried to bring about social changes
in his location was also a non-Qwathi by birth. This
was Hlakula who became a headman over a heterogeneous
portion of Qutubeni location. He had worked for
farmers for a long time and acquired Christianity from
his employers which he tried to impart to his subjects
as a chief.	S. Green describes him as "a real
uplifting influence in more ways than one". 304
Another person who accepted Christianity was Klaas
Titus, a Qwathi, who was a catechist and a shoemaker,
who founded "one of the largest and most faithful
families".	Even his influence could only be confined
to his family. He came into contact with Christianity
not in Qwathiland but in St Marks under the influence
of missionaries.105
103. Ibid.
104. Leadly Brown, All Saints Parish, p.12.
Green, First Hundred Years, p.42.
105. Ibid.
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Few of the Qwathi of Engcobo, even after the rebellion
showed any inclication to accept Christianity and to
change the social conditions under which they lived.
Even Sitonga, a Sidindi chief at Qutubeni, who was
prepared to cooperate with both the missionaries and
the magistrate was disobeyed by his people, hence
Reverend Green's comment, "but his people are not
heartily with him." 1 0 6 Mangele, a loyal minor chief,
who was used by Stanford against Dalasile on a number
of occasions, did not show any cooperation when it came
to christianity and education.	Reverend, T.W. Green
said of him.107
He puts me off with one excuse after another
when he is pressed into activity for the
education of his people.
In the same report Reverend Green commented that the
Qwathi were as "indifferent as ever to education and
religion". 106
What embittered even those Qwathi who were inclined to
accept white civilization was the fact that they were
106. Ibid.
107. CMT 1/28, Reverend T.W. Green to W. Stanford,
19/12/82.
108. Ibid.
190
also required to help build the schools and to pay the
teachers. Reverend Green reported109
They will accept schools if the classrooms
are built for them and teachers sent free of
expense.
In his report for 1885, dated 8th January 1886, A.H.
Stanford, the magistrate, stated that progress amongst
the "heathen natives" was very slow. Few if any
availed themselves for education. 110
C.J. Warner in his report to the chief magistrate in
1896 pointed out that a few individuals had built
square houses and enclosed their gardens in which they
had planted trees. These did wear European clothing
but they wore them when away from their homesteads.
The bulk of the Africans, he reported "are as bar-
barous, ignorant and superstitious as they were ten or
fifteen years ago."111	Instances had also come under
the magistrate's notice which showed that even
"civilised" and educated Africans in Qwathiland were
not free from a fear of witchcraft.112
109. Ibid.
110. CMT 1/31, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 8/1/86.
111. CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/1/96.
112. Ibid.
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That by the end of the Nineteenth Century the impact of
missionary work was still at a low ebb is evidenced by
the reports of the magistrates between 1896 and 1899.
For instance C.J.Warner, in his report for 1896, stated
that the africans as a whole (of Engcobo) were not
making progress towards "high civilisation". Hereported113
The red people are very conservative and
cling to the habits and customs of their
forefathers.
He expressed doubts that even contact with the outside
world in the labour markets had brought about any
influence. He reported that the reds were very averse
to having their children educated and did not hesitate
to say that the reason was that educated children
looked down upon their parents and disdained to perform
the ordinary duties.	He concluded the report by
expressing his opinion that the influence of the chiefs
"is, with	some exceptions against the spread of
Christianity and civilisation. ++114
Still in his report for 1898, C.J.Warner reported that
the "red" who formed the bulk of the population "appear
113. CMT 3/89, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 14/1/97.
114. Ibid.
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to be content to live on without any attempt to improve
their surroundings" 115 and C.E.Warner in 1899 commented
that with regards to the social conditions of affairs
"there is no remarkable progress to report upon,
heathen practices still prevail."116
From the above, it is clear that even after the
rebellion the Qwathi were still as conservative as
ever. They were suspicious of the missionaries whom
they associated with colonialism ever since Reverend
J.Gordon successfully persuaded. them "to sell their
nationhood and	independence" under	the guise of
"protection". 117 It was only in 1902 when the
District Council was established that some social
changes began amongst the Qwathi.118
(ii) Health Services 
With reference to health services there was not much
activity and work for missionaries and officials of the
colonial government.	This was so because the Qwathi
were always in good health.	Under normal circumstan-
115. CMT 3/88, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 3/1/96.
116. Ibid.
117. CMT 3/89, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 14/1/97.
118. Ibid.
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ces they remained healthy until an outbreak visited
them. The only almost incurable disease that did much
to reduce the number of the Qwathi population was war.
What helped the Qwathi against normal sickness was the
availability of herbs from which herbalists and
diviners made medicine for the treatment of certain
diseases.	As Qwathiland is a country of dense forests
and mountan valleys there	were plenty of these
medicines.119
Another disadvantage of the colonial officials which
tended to promote the use of traditional healing by
diviners and herbalists was the absence of a district
surgeon and this made it difficult for the whites to
promote "civilised" healing. In his letter to the
Chief Magistrate in 1882, W.E.Stanford, the Magistrate,
complained that the absence of a district surgeon was
retarding the work of introducing "civilised" health
services and recommended that one district surgeon be
appointed for both Mjanyana and Engcobo with head-
quarters at Clarkebury. 120
It was because of the absence of a district surgeon
that on the 27th of August 1882, Stanford recommended
119. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
120. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82.
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the following men to undertake the task of vaccinating
in the district since the outbreak of small-pox needed
preventive measures to be taken, Reverend Green, Mr
Petric, a trader at Ngxogi, and Mr Clarke, a trader at
Qumanco, and appealed to the government to vote an
allowance for each of them. 121 As a result of the
absence of a district surgeon, still in 1883, Stanford
recommended the appointment of Mr Million in the
practice of Medicine pending the appointment of the
District Surgeon. In his letter Stanford stated that
Mr Million had given valuable advice and careful
attention in several instances.
In areas such as Qwathiland, medical practice was not
encouraging to young doctors because the Qwathi people
had no	confidence in European medicine.	They
preferred African medicine to European medicine. It
was because of this that Doctor Woolby resigned as a
district surgeon of the Engcobo and Mjanyana districts.
In his annual report for 1883, Stanford expressed his
frustration at this resignation as he had hoped that
Doctor Woolby would help destroy belief in witchcraft
and break the power of the	Qwathi diviners and
herbalists.	He therefore recommended that the
government should offer £100 allowance per year as the
121. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/82.
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residents were also prepared to offer the same amount
for the district surgeon who would be permanent and
able to trace any disease to natural causes in order to
break down the power of diviners.122
The Transkei suffered repeated outbreaks of small pox
which in 1884 was reported to have broken out eight
miles from All Saints.	This made it imperative that
the whole area be quarantined.	Of three hundred and
ninety people under quarantine, ninety four were
affected and of these twenty four died.	At another
area five miles from All Saints fifteen people were
reported to have died.	T.R.Merriman of All Saints, in
his letter to the magistrate, recommended prevention of
communication between homesteads. 123	In response,
Stanford convened a meeting of the Qwathi people and
induced them to accept vaccination. In the absence of
the district surgeon, Stanford secured the services of
Petric, a trader with some medical experience. 124 In
1885 there was another outbreak of small pox which
started at Qutubeni.	Four cases were reported and of
these one died. Quarantine measures were adopted.
The disadvantage of the quarantined people was that
122. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 4/9/83.
123. G3-84, T.R. Merriman to Stanford, 9/1/84, p.129.
124. Ibid.
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they were unable to provide grain for their families as
they were not allowed to go about to obtain assistance
from friends who were better off. They requested the
government to make advances to enable them to obtain
food and promised to retain grain after harvest.125
Another outbreak was reported in 1895 at Langa's ward.
Eight cases were reported in four homesteads which were
discovered to be relatives of ex-chief Dalasile who had
died of small pox.	Other cases were reported
throughout Qwathiland. James W. Weir, the new
district surgeon complained that it was difficult to
adopt any plan which would secure complete satisfaction
and success as the Qwathi were frequently very slow in
reporting cases and gave the excuse that they did not
recognise the disease as small pox.	Hence it spread
to many locations. He recommended the appointment of
a person who would go from homestead to homestead to
vaccinate and report, superintending disinfection and
quarantine. He believed that his services might also
be useful in reporting the appearance of another
epidermic such as typhus, malaria fever, whooping cough
and measles.
125. CMT 1/30, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 15/10/85.
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The District Surgeon, Dr Weir, also reported that the
existing system of quarantining for small pox had been
renderd ineffective in checking the spread of the
disease because it had found its way into the district
from other parts of the country, and second, it had
been left to spread for some time before reported at
the office. His suggestion was that every headman
should be instructed to order all huts to be cleansed
out and resmeared and that 100 lbs weight of each of
chloride, lime and sulphur be forwarded from Cape Town
for each district - Engcobo and Mjanyana and that the
headmen be instructed to report immediately upon the
appearance of the diseases in the districts.126
Another outbreak was observed in 1899. C.E. Warner,
the acting magistrate, in his report to the chief
magistrate discouraged use of private vaccinations as
the Qwathi were averse to vaccination by private
people.	He recommended that he be assisted by the
chief constable	who had	had some experience in
vaccinating. As a large number of children were born
every year he recommended that an annual tour through
the district be made by the district surgeon forvaccination.127
126. CMT 3/87, J.W. Weir to C.J. Warner, 20/8/95.
127. CMT 3/90, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 20/9/99.
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Very few cases of Leprocy were reported in Qwathiland
those discovered were referred	to Mjanyana Leper
Asylum. 128	Another disease was typho-malarial fever,
which was reported in Dolopini's ward at Sinqumeni, in
September 1899	causing a	considerable number of
deaths.129
Had it not been for the repeated outbreak of small pox
in Qwathiland there could have been little or no need
for a permanent district surgeon because seemingly it
was only	small pox which was not responding to
traditional healing.	Most of the diseases were easily
healed by traditional means.	A.H. Stanford confirmed
this in his annual report of 1892 when he said130
Very few cases of contagious diseases had
been reported, where they occur they are
usually treated successfully by native
doctors.
128. N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.
129. Ibid.
130. N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.
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CHAPTER 7 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
(a) Rise and Fall of Qwathi Peasantry 
(i) From Subsistence Economy to Peasantry 
When the Qwathi arrived in Thembuland during the second
half of the Seventeenth Century, their activites were
farming, both pastoral and agricultural, and hunting.
For these activities to go on smoothly division of
labour was necessary.	Agricultural farming was in the
hands of women and it was characterised by a low level
of technology.	The implements, in use, were wooden
hoes and stone axes, as Qwathiland is mountanous and
covered with indigenous forests.	These were very
unsophisticated and thus only subsistence farming could
be expected.	The main crops were maize, sorghum,
kaffir corn and pumpkins. The women were also engaged
in gathering and collecting wild food and dry branches
of trees from the forests and dry cow dung in the
grazing grounds for fuel.	Harvest was also done by
women since no means of transport was available.1
1.	Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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But it should be noted that despite this division of
labour there was nothing preventing men from giving a
helping hand in agricultural farming. In fact, some
Qwathi men, like Ntswayibana, liked to work in the
gardens, helping women there.	This was also observed
by Reverend Gordon when he arrived as an Anglican
Missionary in Qwathiland. In his report for 1860 he
remarked that there was one thing he appreciated with
the Qwathi men and this was that it was not the women
alone who worked but also men bore a helping hand
during the planting season.2
Division of labour engaged men in stock farming and
hunting. The Qwathi proved to be very good hunters
and often went for a week subsisting entirely on game
which they procured and often returned laden with
various kinds of game. 3	From these kinds of game the
Qwathi also got skins and hides from which to make
clothes and mats.	But hunting did not last long.
The take over of the country by the colonial government
with the forest regulations	and hunting licences
2. Gordon's Report, 31/12/60.
Titus, 12/7/87.
3. Ibid.
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discouraged the Qwathi hunters, who then fell back to
agricultural and pastoral farming.4
Stock farming was also in the hands of men as women
were not allowed to come near cattle as it was believed
that should cattle come into contact with women they
would suffer from Umlaza (ritual impurity of women).5
Cattle loomed largely in a man's thought. They were
his principal form of wealth, his most treasured
possession and anything concerning them and their
welfare focussed his attention. In his letter to the
Secretary for Native Affairs, in 1904, C.A. King, the
magistrate, reported,6
Cruelty to	animals was a most uncommon
occurence among Africans.	They are too fond
of their stock to ill-treat them.
Cattle were the principal medium of exchange and the
medium in which court fines were levied. They were
also a means of keeping on good terms with the
ancestral spirits and	slaughtering	was nominally
4. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
5. Mazwembe, 24/10/87.
Somdaka, 24/10/87.
6. CMT 3/93, King to Elliot, January 1904.
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reserved for ceremonial activities whose importance was
highlighted by the magnitude of a sacrifice.'
Sansom, in his description of cattle, says8
They are an equivalent of money.	They are
stores of value, standards of value and
medium of exchange. They provide what
Schreiner calls the "big notes" rather than
"small change" in tribal transactions.
Amongst the Qwathi one could observe very rich and very
poor men in terms of possession of cattle. Generally
it was due to geographical conditions, one area being
suitable for cattle farming and the other suitable for
agricultural farming or not suitable for both.	But at
the same time there were differences even between
individuals of the same locality. Some could get rich
because of care for the cattle, of use of certain
medicinal herbs for his cattle and of brideprice for
his many daughters. But what was appreciable with the
Qwathi was that the poor were taken care of by the
rich, they were given cows for milk to keep for an
indefinite period. In many instances the cows so
loaned to the poor - inkomo yenqoma - would be kept
until it had given birth to another heifer which would
7. Somdaka, 24/10/87.
8. B. Sansom "Traditional economic systems" in W.D.
Hammond-Tooke's The Bantu Speaking Peoples of 
South Africa (London, 1974), p.152.
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enable the poor to build up his stock on that heifer.
In other instances, this cow could be kept so long as
the loaner still had something to keep him going but
should he run short of cattle or cows, he was entitled
to claim the cow so loaned to the poor, hence the Xhosa
proverb "Inkom'enqoma yintseng'ibheka" meaning when one
has been loaned a cow, he does not milk it with all the
comfort, he tends to look up, down and around in the
process of milking in case the owner has come to fetch
it.9
Another gesture of kindness to the poor was to supply
them freely with milk on a daily basis. When the
Qwathi slaughtered a beast for consumption there were
rules of distribution based on criteria for kinship and
residential association.	These hindered the use of
milk and meat as commodities to be marketed.10
Oxen were often trained for races without riders,
contests between them being one of the most favoured
sports.	They were also the means of securing wives.
A person with many cattle was sure to have many people
coming to stay in his homestead because it was where
9. Mxutu, 23/10/87.
Somdaka, 24/10/87.
10. Sanson, "Traditional Economic Systems", p.152.
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they were sure of getting food, and was respected even
in the social gatherings and political meetings. This
means that economic viability earned one both an
enhanced social and political status.''
But it was not long before the Qwathi viewed their
stock from an economic point. One of the factors
contributing to this was the arrival of traders and
missionaries with new values.	During the last half of
the nineteenth century, stock farming began to take a
new meaning.	Hence the Qwathi moved from a subsis-
tence economy to peasant farming. 12
The Qwathi began to barter their cattle for the
manufactured goods, they were in need of.	The main
trade goods	were blankets, firearms, agricultural
implements and metal products, such as spears and
knives. These barter transactions were not only
between the Qwathi and traders, they were also between
the Qwathi and colonial farmers, who needed draught
animals since they had lost their	stock through
diseases such as lungsickness, redwater and east coast
11. Ibid.
12. C.Bundy, Rise and Fall of South African Peasantry
(London, 1979), p.9 (I have used Bundy's interpretation of
the term "peasantry").
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fever.	Both these groups, because of their needs,
welcomed this economic interaction.13
Between 1860 and 1875 Dalasile was also able to derive
considerable revenue from taxing trade and sites on
which traders built their huts or houses and stores and
shops at the rate of £6 per annum. In his native
Reminiscences, Clarke wrote"
In those days trading licences were paid to
the chiefs Mgudlwa and Dalasile the senior
chiefs of Engcobo.
Trade in stock was the most common as cattle in
Qwathiland were in abundance, not obtained from
outside, as there was fear of outside diseases, but
from within. The increase was therefore natural not as
a result of imports.	This is what Beinart also
observed in Mpondoland.15
As a result of this exchange, imported textiles began
to gradually replace the well tanned hides and skins of
both wild and domestic animals which were used for
13. W. Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland 
1860-1930 (Johannesburg 1982) pp.22-30.
Clarke, Native Reminiscences, p.2.
14. Ibid.
15. Xundu, 23/10/87.
Beinart, The Political Economy	of Pondoland,
pp.22-30.
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clothing.	These textiles diminished the time needed
to prepare hides and skins and made more hides availabe
for exports. As time went on, they became the
socially accepted articles of dress for people at all
levels of society."
Imported agricultural implements in the 1870's rapidly
displaced the wooden hoes and stone axes.	This helped
to improve agricultural farming.	Of all the agricul-
tural implements	that	revolutionised agricultural
farming during this period, the introduction of the
plough was a boon to the farmers. With it, the Qwathi
subsistence farmers began to assume the status of
peasant farmers as a result of greater production that
arose from its use.	In his letter to the chief
magistrate Stanford reported'?
By 1878 the use of the plough had become
general.
This revolution in agriculture also changed the
division of labour in that the introduction of a plough
made it impossible for women to be responsible for
agricultural farming.	The use of cattle for pulling
the plough in the fields led men to take over agricul-
16. Ibid.
17. G33-79, Stanford to Elliot, 6/1/79.
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tural farming.	Women, also to some extent ceased to
collect harvests and firewood, oxen and wagons being
used for the purpose.	The cattle, the adoption of
sledges, ploughs and wagons were intimately linked.
With the oxen as draught animals, the Qwathi peasant
farmers were not pinned down to selling to the nearest
traders. If there were prospects of fair prices and
fair profits from afar, the farmers would take their
produce to that distance."
In his report for 1895, C.J. Warner, the magistrate
commented19
The plough has almost superseded the hoe as
an implement for agriculture, the use of the
latter being now confined to clearing the
lands.
Most of these peasant farmers had found encouragement
from missionaries who emphasised diligence and
initiative as a result of which the Qwathi became
prosperous farmers capable of cultivating almost all
types of products.	This is clear from Reverend
Green's report to the magistrate.	He wrote,20
18. Xundu, 23/10/87.
.	Beinart, Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-
1930, pp.22-30.
19. CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/1/96.
20. CMT 3/88, Reverend T.W. Green to Warner, 3/1/96.
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These farmers cultivated five kinds of grain
and irrigate	extensively.	Some have
potatoes and other vegetables. Many have
procured several kinds of fruit trees.
The surplus produce was sold to the traders, mis-
sionaries and sawyers. It was also to these black
farmers that Reverend Green looked for the development
of a school at Qutubeni.21
During the dry seasons the Qwathi peasants engaged in
extensive irrigation. It was not a difficult work for
them to lead water to the fields since Qwathiland is a
mountainous country from which big rivers, like the
Mbashe, Xuka, Mgwali and Qumanco, come.	There were
also numerous fountains from which water could be led
to the fields. The following valleys were notable for
the water furrows to the fields which were usually on
the flats below the mountains:- Mntuntloni, Qutubeni,
Sitoleni, Gqaga and Mnyolo valleys. 22
In his annual report for 1877, Stanford wrote23
The water supply in this country is in
abundance. Some of the people had taken out
water courses and seem to appreciate the
benefit derived therefrom.
21. Ibid.
22. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 4/11/1903.
23. G17-78, W. Stanford to Elliot, 29/1/1878.
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As a result of this extensive irrigation, agricultural
production increased and Qwathi farmers could sell
without any danger of running short of supplies the
following year. In his report for August 1893, A.H.
Stanford commented,24
The people with the exception of individuals
have a sufficient supply of food to last them
until the next harvest. They are selling
their grain freely.
It is no exageration to say that these Qwathi peasant
farmers even produced in some seasons more than the
European farmers even in grains that were foreign to
the Africans in these territories. This is clear from
the 1885 report where A.H. Stanford recorded.25
The growing of crops, maize, millet and
pumpkins are in the most promising conditions
and should the season continue as favourable
as hitherto, one of the best harvests can be
anticipated.	Those who sowed oats and wheat
have a fair yield. But the return has not
been so good in the European Section.
It should also not be assumed that these peasant
farmers were drawn only from the ranks of the loyals.
They were also found amongst the supporters of their
24. N.A.41, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 26/8/1893.
25. BC 293: ES6, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 8/1/86.
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chief, Dalasile, who rebelled in 1880.	Hence Stanford
reported26
When the rebel gardens were reaped in May,
hundreds of bags of corn were procured.
These are over and above those now appor-
tioned to the use of the surrendered people.
The surplus can be used when needed in the
district and also in the colony.
This shows that the new peasant class were not siding
with the colonists, but despite their wealth and
progressiveness were supporting their chief. That the
Qwathi peasants took much interest in improving their
lot was evidenced when, in Marh 1885, a meeting of the
Qwathi of Manzana, All Saints and Mntuntloni locations
was held to consider the advisability of forming an
agricultural association with the object of improving
the system of farming.	Over eighty blacks joined the
association readily. The following were the office-
bearers:- Resident Magistrate as President, Phillip
D.Poswayo,	secretary	and L. Farrant, clerk, as
treasurer. Reverend Green and Messrs Clarke and
Davis, traders, assisted the magistrate by advising the
people and encouraging them in carrying	out the
project.27
26. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82.
27. CMT 1/30, W. Stanford to Elliot, 25/3/85.
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The influence of the Qwathi peasant farmers spread to
the neighbouring communities, such as the Hala and
Mfengu, as a result of which in 1898 an agricultural
society for the district was formed and by March 1898
membership was well over a hundred.	The members of
the society were anxious to grow wheat. They
requested the magistrate to ascertain if the government
could not fence their lands using poles from the
undermacated forests set aside for use by Africans, on
condition that only poles of unreserved timber be
taken."
By the year 1903 the following were the principal crops
raised in the districts:- maize, kaffir corn, beans,
pumpkins, wheat, oat-hay and potatoes.	The ap-
proximate yield was as follows:	maize 50 000 bags,
kaffircorn 30 000, beans 500 bags, pumpkins 100 000,
wheat 200, oathay 60 000 bundles, potatoes 400 bags.
As Engcobo was purely an African district not much
wheat and hay were cultivated.29
The changes taking place in the Qwathi system of
production were becoming entrenched and irreversible.
In order to maintain access to goods, which were
28. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to ELLIOT, 21/3/1898.
29. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 4/11/1903.
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becoming essential for productive activities and which
they could not make themselves, the Qwathi had to
exchange their produce.	Therefore, their productive
activities became more oriented	towards supplying
external markets. The expansion of cultivation in
addition to stock farming which had now comprised of
not only cattle but sheep, goats and pigs, provided a
more varied range of produce for exchange by the
beginning of the twentieth century both pastoral and
agricultural products found its way to the traders and
through them to the colonial markets.30
(ii) Decline of Qwathi Peasantry 
The picture pointed above should not mislead readers to
think that no difficulties were experienced by the
Qwathi peasant farmers. On the contrary, there were
many serious setbacks which drove most of the Qwathi
peasant farmers onto the labour markets and into the
colony and mines of the interior.	Some of these
setbacks were natural and others were man-made.	The
natural were those over which men had no control. The
man-made referred to those caused by men, in particular
the colonial government and its officials and traders.
30. Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-
1930, p.28.
Xundu, 24/10/87.
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(a) Natural Setbacks 
Drought is one of the evils that drove agricultural and
to a lesser extent pastoral farmers away from the rural
areas to seek new opportunities in the cities and
colonial farms.	At such times they preferred the
uncertainties of the cities to poverty at home. So
threatening was the drought in 1877 that W.G. Cumming,
the acting magistrate, reported,31
The prospects of the people as far as food is
concerned are far from being hopeful.
It was perhaps this that forced some of the budding
peasant farmers, in order to fight drought, to take out
water leads into their fields.32
The 1885 drought was so outstanding for its rages that
it forced these farmers to seek work in the labour
markets.	It did not only affect the Qwathi peasant
farmers but also the white farmers.	It is estimated
that the European section of the population of Engcobo
lost about 10 000 cattle and 30 000 sheep.	The
31. G17-78, W.G. Cumming to Elliot, 21/1/79, p.115.
32. G13-80, W. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/79.
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drought of 1885 is referred to by the Xhosa as Isitwayi 
- an incurable horse disease.33
Locusts also contributed to some of the Qwathi farmers
giving up farming and to the exodus of 1896-97 to the
labour markets. C.J. Warner in his letter dated 17th
February 1896 reported.34
The young mealie crops throughout have been
destroyed by locusts and that no harvest can
be looked for this year.
In his annual report for 1896 he again reported35
Towards the close of the year, scarcity of
food was manifested by a greater number of
men than usual going to work and by an
increase in the number of stock theft.
C.A. King, in his letter to the chief magistrate, made
a request that he should, on behalf of the district of
Engcobo, contact the government Bacteriologist on the
subject of a species of locust which was becoming an
increasing pest in the district and which did not
appear to be amenable to the ordinary methods of
treatment.36
33. BC 293: E 56, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 18/1/86.
34. CMT 3/88, J.C. Warner to Elliot, 17/ /96.
35. CMT 3/89, J.C. Warner to Elliot, 1/12/1902.
36. CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 1/12/1902.
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Cattle diseases also fall amongst the natural setbacks
that conributed to the fall of Qwathi peasantry.
Redwater, Lungsickness and Rinderpest were the most
common of the cattle diseases in Qwathiland.
Redwater belongs to a group of diseases caused by
"Babesia" in cattle, sheep, pigs and horses. these
include Texas fever, Redwater Fever and Tick Fever.
They are all characterised by fever and intra-vascular
hymolysis causing a syndrome of anaemia, hymoglobinamia
and hymoglobinuria and are transmitted by blood sucking
ticks. The medical term for the disease is "Babesia-
sis."37
From an economic point of view, Redwater is disastrous
because of direct losses and the	restriction of
movement by quarantine laws.	Death of cattle and a
long period of convalescence entail loss of meat and
milk production. Incidental costs of immunisation and
treatment add to the economic burden created by the
disease.38
37. D.C. Blood and J.A. Henderson, Veterinary Medicine 
(London, 1968), p.562.
38. Ibid.
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In cattle infections symptoms are characterised by an
acute onset of high	fever, anorexia, depression,
weakness, cessation of rumination and a fall in milk
yield.	Respiratory and heart rates are increased and
brick red conjuctival and mucous membranes soon change
to extreme pallor of severe anaemia.	In the terminal
stage there is severe jaundice and the urine is dark
red to brown in colour and produces a very stable
froth.	The febrile stage usually lasts for about a
week and the total course about three weeks.	Pregnant
animals often abort.	Animals that survive recover
gradually from severe emaciation.39
This disease contributed to a considerable reduction of
cattle in Qwathiland in the second	half of the
nineteenth century.	When it was reported in 1880, the
Secretary for Native Affairs suggested that the
infected cattle should be shot and that those which had
not yet been affected should be removed until all
danger had passed.40 It broke out in Qwathiland at
Bojane location and the beasts at the government kraal
died.41
39. Ibid.
40. N.A. 56, W. Ayliff, Secretary for Native Affairs
to Elliot, 22/1/80.
41. CMT 1/30, Stanford to Elliot, 20/4/85.
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In his report for 1892, A.H. Stanford reported that
Redwater no	longer affected cattle bred in this
district. It was only in 1903 that it made its
appearance at Zadungeni location in Qwathiland but once
this location and adjacent locations were quarantined,
its spread was arrested. 42	It appears that, although
redwater was harmful, it was amenable to treatment like
croton oil, quarantine measures and African herbs.
The mortality rate could be put at five percent of the
treated cattle.43
Lungsickness also largely contributed to many farmers
losing hope.	Hence many decided to leave for labour
markets. When it appeared in Vetu's homestead, in
Manzana location, in 1883, quarantine measures were
adopted and in 1895 notices appeared from the office,
prohibiting the removal of the cattle from certain
infected areas.	This meant that, during the period of
quarantine, trade was at a standstill, as cattle could
not be removed.	This not only affected stock farming,
as exchange for agricultural implements depended on
42. N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.
CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 14/5/1903.
43. CMT 3/87, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 20/5/1895.
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pastoral products and the very agriculture depended on
cattle.44
On the 14th of July 1899, C.J. Warner reported that the
infected herds were always grazing together with cattle
not yet infected because two to three locations shared
the same grazing land. This necessitated that, in
terms of Section 11 of the Animal disease Act No.27 of
1893, all the locations with common grazing grounds be
quarantined and the cattle	prohibited from being
removed to another area.45
Another outbreak was reported at Gqobonco in Yawa's
ward on the 16th of November 1899 and between this date
and the 19th of February 1900 eight head of cattle had
died but after eight weeks of quarantine it appeared to
have subsided and quarantine restrictions werewithdrawn.46
From the above, it is clear that in order to fight
lungsickness effectively, eight weeks of quarantine had
to elapse.	This was a period of inactivity in which
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. CMT 3/90, C.E.	Warner to Elliot, 27/11/99 &
11/6/1900.
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cattle could not be removed. When lungsickness broke
out in summer or during the ploughing season the
farmers of the affected locations would be sure to
suffer the following year from starvation since no
cultivation could be done if the gardens fell outside
the quarantined zone. Not having been able to
cultivate their lands, the peasant farmers had no
alternative but to look for jobs outside the country.
When the outbreak of lungsickness occured in 1907,
innoculators were appointed to innoculate the infected
cattle and to induce the owners of cattle liable to be
infected to innoculate.	The cattle so innoculated had
first to be isolated. An Animal Disease Board was
also set up with a view to define the boundaries of
quarantine. The head of this board was to be a
headman, who would see to it that there was cooperation
between the board and the innoculators and between the
people and the Board. By July 1907 there already were
seventeen innoculators in the district of Engcobo as
the disease was rapidly spreading.47
On the 27th of January 1908, lungsickness broke out at
Qutubeni in Hlakula's ward and Poswayo's. From there
it spread to Ntantiso's and on the 14th of September it
47.	I/ECO 5/1/1/1, Norton to Elliot, 31/12/1907.
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had reached Nqwenani's ward, which is a big area, and
by June 1910 it had spread as far as Ngqokoto.
Innoculation and quarantine measures were brought about
in cases where reports were made." The spread was due
to the reluctance of the Qwathi to report cases
observed because of fear of quarantine measures and
suspicion that innoculation was responsible for the
death of their cattle.
Of all diseases of the Nineteenth Century, Rinderpest
is the one that has most preoccupied the minds not only
of the farmers and veterinary surgeons, but also of the
writers of the Twentieth Century. That, this is so,
is because the rinderpest of 1896-1897 was widespread
and its impact on farmers of all races from Central
Africa to the Cape was heavy. The disease led many
well to do farmers both black and white to give up
farming and flock into the labour markets in search for
work.	Rinderpest was sometimes referred to as
"Masilingane" -let us be equal.49
Rinderpest was an acute, highly contagious disease
caused by a virus and characterised by high fever and
48. Ibid.
49. C. Van Onselen, "Reaction to Rinderpest in South
Africa 1896-97" in the Journal of African History,
vol.13, 1972.
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focal, erosive lesions confined largely to the mucosa
of the alimentary tract. The disease occured in
plague form and was highly fatal.50
Historically, rinderpest has been	among the most
devastating of all cattle diseases. From Somaliland
in 1889, where it first took root in Africa, it moved
rapidly south, infecting game and cattle.	By 1890, it
was in Uganda.	By 1892, it had already reached
Zambia.	In 1896, it made its appearance in Southern
Rhodesia and, then, to Bechuanaland.51
Despite the campaign against the disease in Southern
Africa, Rinderpest moved relentlessly southwards, and
by November 1897, it was killing game at Rhodes Estate
in Cape Town. Despite a warning issued, as early as
1892, the Cape government had taken few if any precau-
tions against the spread of rinderpest.52
Local	and	National	rinderpest	commissions were
established to coordinate attempts to prevent the
spread of the disease.	Rinderpest necessitated a
series of interstate conferences and even an interna-
50. Blood and Henderson, Veterinary Medicine, p.474.
51. Van Onselen, "Reaction", p.473.
52. Ibid. p.474.
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tional one. With fencing at a cost of 90 per mile and
compensation to be paid to owners of infected cattle
that had been shot, it eventually cost the Cape
government over million pounds.53
Africans believed that rinderpest was the product of
the white man's activities.	Similarly whites, someof
them in officials positions, believed that it was
spread by Africans. In practice, this highly
contagious disease was very frequently spread by white
farmers who were mobile, active in trade and apt to
control their rinderpest stricken neighbours with
little regard for the risks of contagion this involved.
Whilst mistrust between black and white were mutual,
the regulations to control the spread of the disease
were applied with great vigour to Africans.54
Authorities resorted to widespread use of disinfectants
which were used on all travelling cattle. Only cattle
belonging to the Africans were required to undergo
complete dipping.	The African travellers themselves
were also dipped. This is clear from the explanation
of the Transvaal Veterinary surgeon. He said55
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p.480.
55. Ibid.
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... every African from an infected area is
dipped by us and everything he wears is
washed and guards have strict orders to burn
any milk, meat or cattle products found in
his possession. After being washed he has
to remain there until he is dry, when he gets
a pass and he may go on.
The dipping	procedure did not meet with African
approval. Many africans objected to being dipped.
The enforcement of these regulations, coupled with the
suspicions already present, must have strained race
relations and it is not surprising that whites made
observations, such as, that "the usual friendly
politeness of the native was changed to an attitude of
semi contemptuous insolence ".56
Before the full impact of rinderpest made itself felt
in Transkei and Mpondoland, the chief magistrate for
the region reported57
a spate of wild rumours and prophecies about
the resurrection cases which pointed to the
white man as being responsible for rinder-
pest.
Qwathiland as part of Southern Africa could not escape
the disastrous effect of the outbreak of rinderpest.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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At first,	the Qwathi	cooperated with government
officials. C.J. Warner, reported,58
The people appear to be much impressed by the
gravity of the situation. They have desired
me to thank the government for the efforts
which are being made to check the rinderpest
and recognise the necessity for stringent
measures being taken to cope with the plague.
In Qwathiland, rinderpest first made its appearance at
Sentubi. From there it appeared in the Manzana
location and then within two days, it was discovered at
Zadungeni and Xuka but the authorities could not trace
the origin of the infection.59
On the 23rd of July 1897 the culture camp was made
ready to receive cattle for furnishing bile for
innoculation and one hundred and twenty two cattle were
offered as cutlure animals. Twelve thousand one
hundred and seven cattle were brought forward for
innoculation and later three thousand nine hundred and
eighty five were also innoculated by the same bile
system." According to the report, the mortality rate
amongst the cattle innoculated for the first time was
about twenty five percent.	The reason put forward for
58. CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 19/9/96.
59. CMT 3/89, Warner to Elliot, 23/12/97.
60. Ibid.
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this was that these cattle were innoculated after
instead of before the outbreak of the disease.'"
The number of cattle innoculated with blood was two
thousand two hundred and eighty seven. This innocula-
tion with blood was not attended with good results and
of cattle treated in this manner an average of between
30 to 40 percent were lost.62
According to Warner's report no cattle treated with
serum died until after the 30th of October 1897 when
all innoculators had been discharged. Although
innoculation, especially with bile, was relatively
successful, the majority of cattle were not innoculated
at all. Although the total number of cattle in,
Engcobo district, was not given in Warner's report,
Warner puts the overall mortality rate at between
eighty five and ninety percent of the cattle in Engcobo
district.63
In addition to innoculation, quarantine measures were
adopted at every infected centre but it became clear
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
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that "the disease had obtained such a hold as to render
any further quarantine useless."64
That measures to fight rinderpest in Qwathiland had
failed, cannot be disputed. The white officials
ascribed this failure to the reluctance of the Qwathi
to bring forward their cattle for innoculation. Of
course many Qwathi after the second innoculation became
reluctant as they came to realise that some of the
innoculated cattle were dying. They became suspicious
of the white innoculators. But this could not have
been the sole cause of the death of so many cattle
because even cattle belonging to the whites were dying
in big numbers.	Blood and Henderson, in their book
"Veterinary Medicine", write that complete eradication
of rinderpest would need sufficient veterinary
personnel, suitable facilities and control of free
moving animals. Such conditions were completely out of
reach." Ignorance of the officials as to the cause
and best methods of curing the disease contributed to
the disaster. Warner admitted"
The efforts to trace the origin or infection
in each case were fruitless.
64. Ibid.
65. Blood and Henderson, Veterinary Medicine, p.477.
66. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 23/12/97.
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Rinderpest left the Qwathi peasant farmers completely
paralysed. According to van Onselen, African losses
should not be measured simply in terms of numbers, for
amongst the cattle keeping this was far more than an
economic blow. He wrote67
For Africans, cattle formed not only a soure
of wealth but the pivotal point of a complex
and interwoven social, political and economic
system ... they constituted the real wealth
of the people but the devastation of
rinderpest also brought repercussions which
stretched beyond that dimension.
(b) Man-Made Setbacks 
The way the colonial officials treated the Qwathi
during and after the war led many of the rebels to
poverty. "War meant a sure road to pauperdom", on the
part of the Qwathi. During and after the rebellion
about 16 000 cattle and 5 000 sheep and goats were
captured, leaving the Qwathi to start from scratch.
This was a severe and serious setback which led many
farmers to give up stock farming." After the
rebellion Qwathiland was sliced up in favour of the
Dutch squatters with the result that those promising
farmers, who had been dispossessed of land abandoned
67. Van Onselen, "	", p.484.
68. BC 293: A3-A5, Stanford to Elliot, 5/12/80.
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farming and decided to look for work elsewhere in order
to build new homesteads and buy some cattle to replace
those that had been captured.'"
This resettlement also led to overcrowding since the
people whose land had been taken had to be squeezed in
other people's locations.	The gardens and grazing
lands became smaller and smaller. Many young men had
to leave their country for work.70 Ngangelizwe's view,
when pressurised by his own people before the 1880
Rebellion to make a decision, was correct.	He said71
... but before I join them they must show me
a chief who after fighting the English has
been able to build his kraal peacefully in
his own country.
One of the systems by which the blacks were exploited
by the traders was by the system of giving credit
facilities to customers.	Some of these customers
could not even read and write.	No receipts were
issued when the customers had made some part payment.
The customers were at the mercy of the creditors who
easily raised the debt without the knowledge of the
customer who would not be in a position to account for
69. BC 293: A5, Stanford to Elliot, 19/3/81.
70. Ibid.
71. BC 293:A1, Stanford to Elliot, 25/8/79.
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the debt.	If unable to pay the account, the debtor
was taken to court where he would be forced to pay the
whole amount in cash or in kind with interests. In
many instances all the cattle or stock of the debtor
were attached by the messengers of the court with a
view to settle the account which in most cases had been
raised to double or treble the original account. 72	Of
this exploitation, M.Xundu says73
One would	pay the instalments endlessly
without finishing the account and the
creditor would keep on adding what he called
interest which was unintelligible to the
customer.
The customers' stock and/or implements having been
confiscated, the budding peasant farmers were rendered
unable to perform their agricultural activities.
Those owing cash had to accept recruitment, under the
trader himself as a labour agent to enable the trader
to get the amount so owed.	This state of affairs led
72. N.A.58, Elliot to Resident Magistrate of Thembu-
land, April 1880.
Xundu, 2/7/87.
73. Xundu, 2/7/87.
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the farmers who were in debt to abandon farming and
sell their labour outside the country.74
Many of the victims were saved, albeit too late, in
1880 by an unnumbered government notice issued by the
chief magistrate. This notice put an end to the
system of recovering book debts from Africans in the
courts of law. This displeased many of the traders
who felt that the chief magistrate was interfering with
their trade and petitioned him to withdraw this notice.
These protests were a proof that the traders saw this
circular as protection to the Africans and that they
would lose the money they normally got from the
customers when brought to the courts of law.75
The spoor system also contributed to the poverty of the
Qwathi and as a result contributed to the decline of
the Qwathi peasantry. The spoor system was a system
of tracing stray or stolen stock into another country
by means of spoors or trails.	The location in which
the spoors of lost or stolen stock disappeared was
collectively held responsible for compensation.	The
Qwathi pastoral farmers on the borders of the colony
74. N.A.58, Elliot	to Resident Magistrate, April
1880.
75. Ibid.
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were victims of this unfair and one sided law because
when the colonial farmers on the borders, accompanied
by colonial police, got into Qwathiland on the pretext
of tracing stolen stock, they would drive away all the
stock they could find in that particular location, thus
enriching themselves at the expense of the Qwathi.
What was unfair about this spoor law was that it was
one sided.	It favoured the white farmers more than
the blacks. The blacks were not allowed to trace lost
or stolen stock into the white areas. Only white
farmers could trace the stock into black locations to
the extent of even taking away the stock that did not
belong to them.	Much discontent was shown by the
Qwathi on the subject.76
Headman Ntozini of Gqutyini location, in Qwathiland,
complained to Mr Griffiths who had called all the
chiefs and headmen of Engcobo to ask them to vote for
him, during the coming Cape elections, that the spoor
law was not the same in Transkei territories as in the
colony. He pointed out that if the stock was stolen
or got astray from the Transkeian territories and
traced across the border no one was held responsible
and in fact no black was allowed to trace his stock
76.	Ibid.
Xundu, 2/7/87.
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across the border, whereas if the spoor was traced into
the territories from the colony, the people were
collectively held responsible - excluding the white
traders. He suggested that one uniform law should be
applied.77
It was because of such complaints that Elliot, the
chief magistrate issued another unnumbered circular in
1880 on the spoor subject. This circular shattered
the privileges of the whites in regard to the spoor
system. Elliot stated78
If to allow an European all advantages of
Spoor law and be exempt from its liabilities
was not class legislation.
Elliot observed that when the white man had sustained a
loss at the hands of an African he would "demand the
pound of flesh" to the last grain but when the reverse,
would "resist to the utmost".
Elliot informed the magistrates and whites that the
Spoor law would thereafter be obligatory upon all
residents of the territory irrespective of colour. He
further explained that it was undesirable that Africans
77. An article from Umtata Herald of 13/12/1887,
South African Library, Cape Town.
78. N.A.58, Elliot	to the	Secretary for Native
Affairs, 5/4/80.
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should be allowed to suppose that the laws in force in
this territory were intended to benefit Europeans
only. 79 Although the circular saved many of the Qwathi
from exploitation of this nature, many others had been
robbed and had given up pastoral farming and left the
country to look for jobs in the labour markets.
(b). Origins of Migratory Labour from Qwathiland 
Minerals having been discovered in the interior of
South Africa in the second half of the Nineteenth
Century, the seeds for future South African Labour
problems were sown. With the mineral discoveries
there was a corresponding demand for labourers. The
white governments began to look at the "reserves",
that is, territories inhabited by the blacks as
reservoirs for labourers, from where they could be
drawn to work in the mines.
Earlier attempts at recruiting labourers did not meet
with much success because the blacks were mostly
economically self-sufficient. There was no urgent
need for them to supplement their properties with cash
incomes. That the Qwathi were not interested in going
to work outside the country for cash was evident in
79.	Ibid.
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1879 when major Elliot, the chief magistrate, made
enquiries from Stanford about the possibility of some
blacks volunteering to go and work with the railways.
In reply Stanford commented.80
Very few natives if any would be available
for service in the colony.
If by 1879 the Qwathi, by reason of their economic
self-sufficiency, were reluctant to go to far off
areas, what is it that made them to leave their homes
later on in search of work outside their country?
There were quite a number of factors that contributed
to this exodus from Qwathiland to the Colony and mines.
Some of these factors were natural such as drought,
locusts and animal diseases already discussed above but
for others the colonial government was responsible.
The introduction of the hut tax in Qwathiland in 1879
had a tendency to drive people out of the country to
look for jobs in order to be able to pay it. This tax
was a burden for those people who did not have property
and whose means of subsistence were meagre. The
Qwathi were informed that they would start paying this
tax in 1879 in cash or in kind.'"
80. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 18/9/79.
81. N.A.60, Stanford to Elliot, 28/4/80.
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Those families without stock of any kind but still had
to pay the hut tax in cash, had now to find an annual
income which could only be earned in the labour markets
outside Qwathiland. They had to become regular
workers in the farms of the colony or in the mines.
In accordance with Section 49 of Proclamation 40 of
1885, those who were unable to pay this tax faced
ejection from the land. Rather than being ejected
from their land of birth, they chose to go out and work
for this hut tax which was of not benefit to them."
Tremendous	economic	distress	among	the Qwathi,
following the war, made them an easily procurable
labour supply. All Qwathi were reduced to a state of
"utter destitution, possessing literally nothing".
The previous season had been an abundant one despite
the war and the rebel lands had been reaped for the
benefit of the surrendered rebels and the colonial
subjects who had no land like the Dutch squatters in
the upper parts of Qwathiland, at the instruction of
the magistrate."
82. N.A.153, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 25/6/94.
83. N.A.66, Elliot to Secretay for Native Affairs,
8/3/81, p.42.
G8-83 Elliot's Report for 1882, p.79.
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During the war the colonial forces captured all the
cattle belonging to the rebels as part of the booty.
These were sold in the colony and helped increase the
revenue of the colonial government. With their
gardens having been reaped, their cattle having been
captured, some of their land having been apportioned to
the Dutch squatters and in some cases their homesteads
having been burnt down, the Qwathi rebels had no
alternative but to go out and work for a cash income on
the mines and railways in order to pay hut tax, to
replace their cattle and to build new homesteads.84
Stanford also encouraged the Qwathi to proceed to the
colony for the purpose of benefiting themselves and
supplying a want that was seriously felt by the
colonists. This was of course the wish of the
government that the Africans in the territories be
encouraged to go to the colony and sell their labour.
The war, therefore, offered the government an oppor-
tunity to	bring about	the realisation of their
dreams.85
Reverend T.W. Green, the Anglican Missionary at All
Saints, in Qwathiland, thought that advantage could be
taken of the state of despair of the Qwathi after the
84. BC 293: A5, Stanford to Elliot, 19/3/81.
85. Ibid.
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failure of the rebellion to employ them on road works
and tree planting in their own country."
When Rhodes took over as Cape Prime Minister, he did
not hesitate to reveal that he saw the future of the
majority of African population as labourers. 87 The
main essence of his policy was to divide the African
population into two. On the one hand, he wanted a
majority of landless labourers and on the other hand a
minority of peasant title holders living in four acre
plots, electing district councils. This he did by the
introduction of the Glen Grey Act in August 1894, which
at the beginning was widely welcomed by the African
educated elite.	The majority of the "Red Africans,
were not as enthusiastic about the prospects of survey
as the more educated class.	They appeared far more
concerned over the question of security of traditional
communal tenure.	The headmen throughout the ter-
ritories expressed themselves in favour of certificates
of occupation rather than survey.	Nearly all were
emphatic that any survey had to be on the basis of land
currently ploughed.	The fear of removal from land
86. G8-83, Green's Report to Stanford, January 1883.
87. T.J. Keegan "African Responses to the Implementa-
tion of the Glen Grey Policy", B.A.(Honours)
Research Essay, (UCT, 1975), p.9.
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already	cultivated	was strong and suspicion of
individual title was wide spread."
Although the Glen Grey Act did not apply to Qwathiland
at the beginning, it posed a threat to the Qwathi.
There were two clauses that were most threatening.
The first was the labour tax clause which in the
district in which it had been enforced was levied on
those who could not show that they had been out to
work.	To the whites the idea of a labour tax was a
most appealing one and was seen as a means of "proleta-
rianising" the African peasants. Rhodes defended
himself that the bill had been introduced because the
Africans "live about in sloth and laziness and never go
to work".	He said it was necessary to provide the
Africans with "something to occupy their minds".	This
cynical attitude aroused heated feelings. It was
vociferously denied that the Africans were idle."
The Qwathi saw it as a threat to their way of life.
There were rumours that the heads of homesteads and
widows were not exempted from the payment of labour
tax.	Having experienced hard times for the past three
years as a result of crop failures and heavy losses of
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p.11.
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stock, the Qwathi feared that an additional taxation
would press hard on them. This additional tax of ten
shillings besides the hut tax brought about uneasi-
ness.90
Like other Africans the Qwathi condemned the tax as a
"Black man's tax" which was tantamount to slavery.
African objections to this clause were not unfounded.
They pointed out that a good number of men "are too old
to do rough work, a few are physically unfit for it and
a very considerable number are very well off and quite
able to save money from the income they have from
sheep, cattle and lands". Then a good many more were
young men who had worked long and who had no one to
take charge of what stock they had and who therefore
could not be away from home without loss in stock, a
loss which would be greater than their pay, expenses
deducted.91
Against the allegation of indolence, 92 the Africans
argued93
90. CMT 3/86, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 1/3/95.
91. Unnamed informants quoted by J.B. Ross in F.
Wilson and D. Perrot, Outlook of a Century 1870-
1970, p.96.
92. CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/6/99.
93. Wilson and Perrot, Outlook, p.96.
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We are not idle, and every year we are
becoming more and more industrious.	This
law cannot be meant for our good. It is a
labour law, it aims at increasing the white
man's power over the black.	For we are now
to be driven to work even if we do not
consider the pay good enough. In addition
to this our masters' powers will be increased
for we must stay with them in order to get a
certificate that will exempt us from this
law.	Why does this law not apply to the
whites as well as to us?
Conclusive or inconclusive as this argument may be, the
labour tax certainly did more than anything else
during this period to make Africans dread and distrust
the government. Feelings against the labour tax had
helped to stimulate opposition to the other parts of
the act including land tenure and council system.94
The second most threatening clause was the land tenure
clause. This clause provided for a system of in-
dividual tenure under which title would be given to
plots of land which could neither be alienated nor
accumulated. This meant that only one son would have
to inherit the land, others would be forced to go and
look for work.	The less attractive motive for the
introduction of individual tenure was the desire for
labour.	It was felt that by permanently restricting
94. CMT 3/90, Warner to Elliot, 3/6/99.
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the number of plots excess population would be forced
into labour markets.	The discovery of mineral wealth
and upsurge in commercial farming led to the demand of
cheap labour.	This system of individual title would
therefore bring about the realisation of this dream.95
The Qwathi like other communities felt threatened by
these two clauses. Hence in rejecting them, they
rejected the whole act including the clause on District
Council. In fact the District Council itself was an
attempt to deprive the people of Transkeian territories
of the Cape Franchise and to force them to accept an
inferior body which would be under the leadership of
headmen. The district council system could be said to
have laid the foundations for the policy of separate
development whose architects decided on the establish-
ment of homelands, the first of which was Transkei.
The District councils were accepted only after the two
most disastrous clauses had been cancelled.96
The District Council having been accepted and es-
tablished in 1902, Langa Dalasile, the senior headman
in Qwathiland, was selected to represent the district
95. Keegan, "African Responses", p.3.
96. Saunders, "Annexation", p.141.
CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/6/99.
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in the General Council. As a member of the delegation
selected from the General Council to go to Johannesburg
to investigate the treatment of the blacks in the
mines, he did a good job, as thorough investigation was
done. This investigation report by Langa revealed
three things, namely that labour agents were untrust-
worthy, second, that the treatment of the blacks in the
labour markets was worse than what it was before the
country was taken over by the British Government; and
lastly, that the labourers were no longer getting
satisfaction from the magistrates.97
Employers and contractors used local agents to mobilise
labour. These were, in most cases established
traders, who provided a network of recruiting points
throughout the territories and were keen to augment
their incomes with capitation fees.	They visited
chiefs and headmen and asked them to recruit people for
them.	A trader, therefore, in order to get as many
labourers as possible had to endear himself to the
chiefs and headmen. It was, however, possible for the
prospective labourers to leave the local recruiter and
go and enter into contract with another agent in a far
off location if that agent was in good terms with the
headman or	chief, or if he was trustworthy and
97.	CMT 3/91, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.
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considerate in his prices for advances. The most
important labour agents who were traders in Engcobo
were J.W. Clarke, who owned a shop at Qumanco, in
Mgudlwa's country and a hotel in the village, both of
which were labour recruiting centres, P. Coghlan at
Cefane in Neti's location, O.C. Lang and H.C. Lang,
company store, at Ngxogi, in Mhlontlo's location, W.W.
Phillips at Mjanyana in Mgqunyana's location and J.M.
Taylor at Ntibane Drift in Bilikana's location.98
The private recruiters based in Engcobo village
employed runners, often African or coloured men, who
actually went from homestead to homestead persuading
people to accept recruitment for labour markets. They
also tempted them with advances.	The runners received
a commission for each worker that they channelled to an
agent. It was not only the capitation fee, usually
twenty to thirty shillings a worker but sometimes more,
that led the traders to take to recruiting, but also
the fact that the labourers would be forced to ask for
advances in the form of cattle or groceries at inflated
prices.99
98. Xundu, 23/10/87.
99. Beinart, Political Economy, pp.56-57.
Xundu, 23/10/87.
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(c) Migrant Labour System in Operation 
As a result of the above factors people began to flock
into the magistrate's offices to ask for passes that
would allow them to go to the labour markets. But
their way was made difficult by circular no.107B from
the Secretary for Native Affairs that instructed all
the magistrates, granting passes to Transkeian blacks,
proceeding to the colony, to be careful to grant them
permission to proceed only as far as the nearest seat
of magistracy within the colony. loo
This made things difficult for the blacks who would
spend a lot of time in such magistracies without being
attended to, and some of them being sent back for
technical errors in the pass, the difficulty being
experienced	in communicating	with these foreign
magistrates. They also could not negotiate for the
best wages.	These hardships tended to discourage
these work seekers. They were not at all getting fair
treatment from the magistrates hence the complaint by
the labourers in Johannesburg in 1903, as reported by
Langa. He reported, 101
100. CMT 3/91, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.
101. CMT 3/91, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.
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In my conversation with some of the la-
bourers, I ascertained that the treatment now
is worse that what it was before the country
was under British rule and that they do not
get satisfaction from the magistrates.
The pernicious system, whereby blacks were tempted into
contracts by the inducement of an advance of cattle,
representing sometimes as much as two-thirds or more of
their whole contract wages was one of the evils of the
system. The practice of making so large an advance
was bad for the Africans and it led to endless
abuses.102
The system, by which the mines themselves took no
responsibility for paying labourers more than ten
shillings a month or so and the whole balance was paid
by labour agencies, led to the creation of syndicates
of labour agents. These syndicates of Labour agents
purchased cattle to supply the workers with advances.
This grew into a most lucrative business, for the
syndicates bought cattle cheap and put them into
contracts at exhorbitant prices.103 This in
Qwathiland was not different from "Joyini Inkomo" as
described by Beinart for the Mpondo. 104
102. Xundu, 23/10/87.
103. Ibid.
104. Beinart, Political Economy, p.56. 
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The cattle so advanced were a source of danger in the
way of possible introduction of animal diseases into
the Transkeian borders. Some of the unscrupulous
cattle dealers would connive with the labour agents and
deliberately sell them infected cattle cheaply to give
over to the African as an advance.105
The tragedy of the labourers lay in the fact that they
loved cattle.	They would accept a pre-arranged scheme
if cattle were involved in the arrangements.	The
recruiters would therefore make recruitment attractive
by offering cattle. Because of this love for cattle,
it was difficult for them to realise that they were
being exploited.106
Another evil no better than the cattle advances was the
credit system. Some of the prospective labourers did
not take cattle advances but took groceries and clothes
for the family, promising to pay either at the end of
the contract or to pay in instalments whilst at work.
In other cases if a customer had a big debt the trader
would induce him to accept recruitment to enable him to
105. Xundu, 23/10/87.
106. Ibid.
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recover the debt and would make arrangements for him.
M. Xundu says of these difficulties.107
These were difficult times when one would pay
endless instalments and the creditor would
keep on adding what he called "interest"
which was quite unintelligible to the Qwathi.
The Qwathi labourers were opposed to being recruited by
the labour agents to certain labour markets. They
preferred to make their own arrangements so that they
could change unsuitable jobs for suitable ones. But
if they left the territory under a previously arranged
engagement it was not possible for them to break the
contract or else they would be liable to some punish-
ment.	This is evident in a letter written by the
Chief Magistrate to the Under Secretary for Native
Affairs.	He wrote108
... and although the natives are willing to
go to Johannesburg on their own account and
make their own arrangements upon arrival
there, they object to leave the territory
under a previously arranged engagement,
stating that in all cases where they have
done so, on arrival at the mines, they are
disposed as sheep, apparently for the benefit
of the people who took them up.
107. Ibid.
108. N.A.113, Elliot to Under Secretary for Native
Affairs, 27/3/90.
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In reply to telegram no.273 of the 22nd December 1902,
C.A. King stated109
Large numbers go out to work and they are
prepared to go on their account rather than
through the medium of a labour agent.
This was also touched upon by Langa in his report as a
member of the commission selected to investigate the
complaints of the labourers.	He reported110
... I learned that the natives have a strong
objection to labour agents on the ground that
they are forced to enter into contracts and
that they do not receive the wages promised.
The Qwathi, in opting for their own arrangements,
wanted only those jobs that paid high wages.	They
would not just go anywhere.	For example they were
aware that the mines and railways were paying high
wages and farmers low wages. They argued that if they
went on their own, they were at liberty to choose their
own locality and make their own terms whereas there was
no guarantee that the conditions and terms promised by
the agent would be carried out. Hence C.A. King
recommended that "the field be thrown open to all and
that there should be no licensed agents."111
109. CMT 3/92, C.A.	King to Elliot,	27/12/1902.
110. CMT 3/91, Langa's Report,	17/11/1903.
111. CMT 3/92, C.A.	King	to Elliot,	17/1/1903.
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Only those Qwathi who wanted to work nearer home opted
for work in the farms. In many instances the farmers
employed the whole family and at the end of the month
they would be given a sheep which was equivalent to
five shillings.	When they had accumulated many sheep
they were induced to sell them back to the employer at
two shillings and six pence. It was because of this
that there was reluctance on the part of the Qwathi to
look for jobs on the farms unless one wanted to work
nearer home. 112
A.H. Stanford in his report on Native labour in 1892
remarked.113
I have been unable to obtain any natives in
this district [Engcobo] for service at a
distance except to the railways and mines to
which places they are tempted by the high
rate of wages. As long as the natives can
obtain high wages on the railway works and at
the mining centres they will not be induced
to accept service amongst the farmers at any
great distance from their homes at the rate
of wages farmers can offer.
At the beginning of	the Twentieth	Century some
difficulties were experienced in regard to obtaining
passes.	Stern measures began to be adopted in the
112. Xundu, 23/10/87.
113. CMT 3/86, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 28/3/1892.
N.A.121, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 28/3/1892.
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cities and other labour markets if a prospective
labourer was found without a pass or not working. This
was due to the number of blacks looking for work and
their apparent competition with the "poor whites" in
the labour	markets especially	in the semi- and
unskilled jobs. This meant that many of the young men
in 1903 and in 1904 had to remain at home for several
months or even a year without getting a pass to allow
him to go.	This hardship was unbearable both to one
who could not get a pass and the other who had managed
to get it.	What friends, who had passes did, was to
send passes to their friends at home. But of those
who had sent passes to friends, two men, Madopi and
Blakfesi were arrested and each fined five pounds one
shilling or one month imprisonment with hard labour.114
The following is a summary of passes issued in Engcobo
between 1892 and 1901.
DATE	NO OF PASSES	DESTINATION
1892 879
1892 349
1892	338
1892 2 078
1892 42
TOTAL 3 676
Transvaal Gold fields
Diamond fields
Railway works
Amongst Farmers
To other Labour Markets
1893	48	Railways & Works
1893 1 281 Gold fields
114. CMT 3/93, King to Elliot, 21/7/1903.
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1893 177 Road works
1893 2	175 Farming
1893 207 General Service
TOTAL 3 888
1894 68 Kimberly
1894 2 647 Johannesburg
1894 2 554 Cape Town
TOTAL 5 269
1896 1	109 Cape Colony
1896 29 Kimberly
1896 485 Railways
1896 52 Orange Free State
1896 4 230 Transvaal
TOTAL 5 905
1898 4	111 Cape Colony
1898 114 Kimberly
1898 3 283 Johannesburg
1898 15 Bechuanaland
1898 7 Rhodesia
TOTAL 7 530
1899 60 Orange Free State
1899 1	610 Transvaal
1899 6 Kimberly
1899 3 026 Cape Colony
TOTAL 4 702
1900 0 Transvaal
1900 0 Orange Free State
1900 0 Natal
1900 4 742 Cape Colony
TOTAL 4 742
1901 3 394 Cape Colony
1901 162 Orange Free State
1901 2 000 Military
TOTAL 5 556
From the statistics	given above	it is clear that a
large number	of labourers from Engcobo	served	as
labourers in the Cape Colony. This was not because
the Cape was paying higher wages but because the people
wanted to work nearer home in the neighbouring farms of
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Barkly East,	Aliwal North, Queenstown, Tarkastad,
Dordrecht, Albert, Wodehouse and Elliot. In some
cases the number of passes issued was increased by the
members of the family joining the breadwinner in that
particular farm.	With the farms both men and women
were employed hence the number that went to the Cape
Colony was higher.	The high enrollment in Cape Farms
could also be attributed to the difficulties with the
magistrates and labour agents discussed above.	The
second place with higher numbers was Johannesburg.
This was because of higher wages offered.
It will be noticed that in 1900 none went to the
Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal, because of the
state of war which existed between the British and the
Boers.	This meant that the only way open was the Cape
Colony. The schedule for 1901 shows a large number of
people from Engcobo in the military.	This was so
because high wages were being offered. Hence after
the war the Qwathi were reluctant to go in search of
work outside because they knew they would get low wages
as compared to the wages paid in the military. But
the scarcity of food towards the end of 1902 drove the
Qwathi into the labour markets.115
115. N.A.130, A.H. Stanfrod to Elliot, 31/12/92.
N.A.145, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 3/1/94.
CMT 3/87, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 8/12/94.
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Another difficulty experienced by the labourers was the
distance to the train terminus.	For the Qwathi the
nearest was at Indwe.	They had to plod along, sore-
footed, carrying their bundles on a blazing hot day,
both to and from.	C.A. King, the magistrate remark-
ed. 116
What a blessing then would a railway be to
the native labourer and the country also.
They also complained against labour agents for
promising them high wages which were not offered at the
labour markets and their apparent connivance with the
employers. They also complained of the ill-treatment
from the Sotho and Tshangana Police in the labour
markets of the interior.
The labourers also complained of the unsympathetic
attitude of their employers who forced them to work
even when they were ill and were not given proper care
and treatment.	Their friends were not even allowed to
CMT 3/89, Warner to Elliot, 4/1/97.
CMT 3/90, Warner to Elliot, 20/1/99.
CMT 3/90, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 1/9/99.
CMT 3/91, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 17/1/1900.
CMT 3/91, G. Leary to Elliot, 13/12/1900.
CMT 3/92, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 22/1/1902.
CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 19/1/1903.
116. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 21/7/1903.
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take those ill to their homes. Consequently quite a
number of them died at the Rand for want of proper care
and treatment.'''
The following are just a few examples of the Qwathi who
fell ill in the Rand and did not get proper care:
Ntuluba who was working at the Langlaagte Deep was
reported ill on the 18th of March 1909; Hokwana who
was working for G.M. Company Aurorer West in Maraisburg
was also reported ill on the 6th of April 1909; Josiah
Ngcwayi, son of headman Ntozini of Gqutyini had his leg
broken at Kimberly mines and had to be amputated;
Sixenxe was injured by a fall of stone at Luipards Vlei
mine on the 15th May 1909.	The relatives of these
wanted them to be released at once in order to receive
better treatment.	Some of these were not even
compensated. This is evident from the letter of
Norton, the Resident	Magistrate	to the unnamed
"Protector of Natives" in Kimberly in connection with
the position of Josiah Ngcwayi.	He wrote 118
Ntozini has been here today in connection
with the matter and requests me to ascertain
the intentions of the Company in whose
service Josiah was injured, with respect to
compensation.
117. CMT 3/93, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.
118. 1/ECO 5/1/1/26-27, Norton to Protector of Natives,
15/2/1909 and 15/5/1909.
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The migrant labourers often became carriers of certain
diseases such as tuberculosis and other infectious
diseases.	These were also linked intimately with
labour. The labourer who had contracted tuberculosis
in the labour markets, on his return home owing to the
mode of life of the Africans according to which five or
more persons would sleep head to head in a hut with
little or no ventilation would spread it. When he
went back to the Rand where they slept in compounds
arranged on the ship's bunk principle, tier over tier
in closest contact and of course their companions were
liable to infection.119
Several problems arose as a result	of death to
labourers in the labour markets. One of the most
important related to the question of deceased estates.
The first problem was to trace the deceased's home.
This was so because of the scarcity of information in
regard to the particulars of the deceased. To solve
this, C.E. Warner, the acting magistrate, suggested to
the Native Commissioner that when taking particulars of
the labourers, the employers should take the name of
the headman not the name of the chief.	With regard to
119. PR 14603, A.W. Burton Notebooks Volume 1-7:
"British Kaffaria, Keiskama and Transkei", in
A.W. Burton Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University.
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residence such descriptions as Mbashe, Xuka, Mgwali,
Qumanco were not sufficient as a number of headmen were
located along these rivers. They should take the name
of the ward. 120
The second problem was that of inheritance.	The
Africans were not making wills and this resulted in
problems at death.	Employers did not know to whom to
send the money due to the deceased. At times there
was a problem of locating the next of kin who sometimes
was reported to have died or to have gone to work and
his address unkown. 121 The use of nicknames also cause
some problems.	It would become difficult to trace
him. Also wrong spelling and use of assumed names to
avoid using the real name for fear of not receiving a
pass due to his not having paid taxes such as required
by the magistrate, created problems. 122
Some blacks also complained that they were ill-treated
by the "Poor whites" against whom they competed in the
labour markets. These "Poor whites" hated the blacks
who were proving to be their rivals in labour markets.
The reason for this is that mine owners preferred to
120. 1/ECO 5/1/1/25, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 20/7/1907.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
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employ a black man to a white in unskilled labour
since, because of the low standard of living, the
blacks were prepared to accept the low wages offer-
ed.123
Graded pay was also a source of complaint for the
labourers. At times contracts provided for payment by
the number of inches drilled in a day and the ordinary
minimum amount insisted upon was thrity six inches per
working day for which the labour was paid two shillings
- little enough in terms of the work involved. In
some contracts there was a very unfair provision
whereby if a labourer did not perform the minimum he
got nothing at all.	Even if he had drilled 35,99
inches there was no pro-rata wage at all.	This
arrangement seemed to be a most unjust one. 124
Another evil of the migratory labour system was that it
led to some labourers remaining in the labour markets
until death or until forced by his relatives and "home
boys" to go home. One reason for this was that when
this labourer from the rural areas got to the cities he
found the way of life so attractive and easy that he
felt it wise to remain there and enjoy himself without
123. CMT 3/93, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.
124. H. Burton, "Glimpses".
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even sending money home.	This happiness and reluc-
tance was sometimes caused by a labourer being
attracted to one of the women living in the slums
around the cities who would use up his money and would
not allow him to go home.125
Another reason for this reluctance to go home was fear
of witchcraft at home. Many believed that they were
being bewitched, and to remain in the labour markets
was a safe way of escaping this. The demands of the
magistrates and headmen at times so frustrated these
labourers that they thought it best to remain in the
labour markets.	Thus they were escaping direct
colonial control. Amongst the Qwathi there were a
number of cases of the labourers who remained in the
labour markets without ever thinking about going home
and sending money. According to D.B. Mxutu, the first
Qwathi to remain in the labour market until death was
Mabunzi, Mncancashe's son.126
The rise of the Qwathi peasantry during the second half
of the Nineteenth Century	transformed the Qwathi
economy from subsistence farming to peasant farming.
The wooden hoes and stone implements were gradually
125. Xundu, 23/10/87.
126. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
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replaced by ploughs which led to scientific farming
with prospects of surplus production.	This surplus
produce was now used for the purpose of profit as it
was sold to the traders and markets.	As a result of
this, trade in Qwathiland developed. Surplus produce,
skins and hides from domestic animals were now used as
means of exchange for foreign goods.	The hides and
karols were replaced by blankets and clothes.	But
this peasant phase did not last long.
Artificial and natural disasters began to set in, thus
contributing to the decline of Qwathi peasantry.
These sectbacks were responsible for the notorious and
less attractive system known as migratory labour which
contributed to further deterioration of the Qwathi both
economically and physically. This made the Qwathi to
slip from a position of an independent farmer to a
position of a servant in the South African labour
markets where he suffered the pangs of exploitation and
disease.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
The origin of the Qwathi has been traced to EmaXesibe-
ni.	Their arrival in Thembuland was most welcomed by
the Thembu kings from Mnguti to Dlomo. Whilst
maintaining their separate identity and autonomy they
agreed to give to the Thembu kings one hundred head of
cattle as thanks for allowing them to settle in
Thembuland.	This was a voluntary gesture of
friendship which was not obligatory. 1	But as time
went on this became more obligatory than voluntary
which led the Qwathi under Fubu to resent it.	The
only way to be rid of this obligation was by provoking
war against the Thembu.	This worked well despite
their defeat. 2	From then, on, they remained auto-
nomous until the second enemy came. This second
enemy, which the Qwathi faced, was the colonial
government.3
The colonial administration asserted control because
Mxutu, 13/6/87.
2. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu".
3. Xundu, 16/7/87.
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they wanted to destroy the customs of the Qwathi which
they regarded as repugnant to more humane standards.4
This was resisted by the Qwathi from 1875 to 1880.
During this five year period, the Qwathi resisted and
challenged the	colonial plans	to destroy their
traditional way of life replacing it by western
civilisation. Amongst other things, the Qwathi
challenged the attempts by the magistrate to "usurp"
the judicial authority of the chief, the introduction
of western ways of administration such as census
taking, hut tax and spoor system.5
The assertion of colonial control over Qwathiland was
due to Ngangelizwe's blunders and his subsequent
loyalty to the government. It was not possible to
leave Qwathiland as an independent island. 6 Dala-
sile's passive resistence to this control culminated
in his rebellion of 1880 to 1881.	So determined and
motivated were the Qwathi and their allies in this
rebellion that they won victory after victory.	Had
they had enough of modern weapons the war scales could
4. G4-83, Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/82, pp.163-
168.
5. CMT 1/27, W.E. Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.
6. Master, "Resistence", p.5.
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have been tipped in their favour. But due to lack of
modern war equipment and starvation which resulted
from their cattle having been captured and their
gardens reaped, they lost.?
Despite the existence of loyals, the administrators
were unable to break the traditional way of life of
the Qwathi. No amount of magisterial influence
prevented the Qwathi rebellion and even the involve-
ment in it by those who professed loyalty such as
Mangele, Sitonga and Sandile. Discussing what
punishment was to be given to Dalasile, Stanford, the
magistrate admitted8
I see nothing wrong in his joining the
insurrectionary chiefs as he was from the
onset opposed to colonial control.
The African uprisings between 1877 to 1880 scared the
colonial government. But withdrawal was impossible
since it would mean abandoning the Europeans and the
"advancing native class". It would also mean the
loss of Thembuland as the centre point between the Kei
river and Natal, whence influence and conrol could be
asserted over the rest of the communities.	Chief
7. BC 293; A5, Stanford's Notes, 17/12/81-
19/12/81.
8. Macquire, Reminiscences, p.185.
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magistrate Elliot having experienced the Qwathi-Thembu
resistence to alien control with armed force and by a
rational expression of their grievances encouraged
ventilation of grievances at public meetings so that
the need to find expression with armed force would be
minimised.9
The Qwathi having surrendered, part of their land
above the Gulandoda ranges was confiscated and was
given to white squatters from the colony despite
suggestions by Stanford, who was unsympathetic to the
squatters, that it should be given to the loyal
Mfengu. This led to a shortage of land and over-
crowding in the wards which led to many land disputes
in Qwathiland.10
The ward system and headmanship helped to bring about
a measure of control after the rebellion although some
popular rural protests could be observed, such as
Qwathi refusing to destroy thistle thorn and burweed
in order to get the headmen in trouble."
9. G2-85, Elliot's Report, 31/12/1884.
10. CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner, 17/1/99.
11. CMT 3/88, Warner to Elliot, 9/4/97.
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In as far as social conditions were concerned there is
no convincing evidence of the success of missionary
endeavours in Qwathiland.	Besides enumerating the
number of schools established there seems to be no
discernible influence of the missionaries on the
Qwathi towards social change especially the acceptance
of Christianity.	Even today the Qwathi could not be
said to be a Christian nation.	Health services were
also lacking.	Continued absence of a medical doctor
made it impossible for the Qwathi to abandon their
belief in traditional healing by the use of herbs.
A.H. Stanford confirmed this in his Annual Report of
1892.12
Very few cases of contagious diseases had
been reported, where they occur are usually
treated successfully by native doctors.
The Qwathi economy was promising at the beginning of
the nineteenth Century. But during the last thirty
years of the Century it was marred by both natural and
man made setbacks as discussed in Chapter Seven.
These setbacks resulted in the fall of the Qwathi
peasantry. The fall of the Qwathi peasantry changed
the self-sufficient rural areas into labour reservoirs
from which the colonial farmers of the Cape, railways
and mines drew labourers.	The Qwathi peasant
12.	N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.
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farmers, all of a sudden, found themselves the "men of
the two worlds". This contributed to their moral and
physical degeneration.
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APPENDIX IA: LIST OF PRINCIPAL INFORMANTS 
It was in conversation with the following men that my
own ideas on Qwathi	political organisation were
developed and clarified. Birth dates were given
although in some cases not in full.
1. DAWETHI MAZWEMBE (b. 1-1-1910) (clan: Sidindi)
acquired his knowledge of some of the amabali from
Mxutu's father with whom he had an opportunity to
live.	He is resident in the heart of Qwathiland at
Tshapile's location in Gqobonco.	He is also a member
of the Nkondlo Tribal Authority council.
2. DINGILE B. MXUTU (b. 18-1-1912) (Sidindi clan) is
the son of Boma Mxutu whose father was Mtshangala,
headman of Tsalabo + 1910. His father died in 1936
by which time D.B. Mxutu was 24 years fully grown up
to be able to acquire full information about the past
of his people. His inquisitive attitude was
sharpened by his having trained as a teacher (L.P.)
and subsequent matriculation by correspondence. He is
a retired Post Office clerk.	He is locally con-
sidered as the greatest oral authority.	Mrs Joan
Broster, the author of The Red Blanket Valley ack-
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nowledges Mxutu as a local historian without whose
assistance her work could not have been successful.
See p.193 of The Red Blanket Valley.
3. TARUNI SOMDAKA	(b.1911) (clan: Dikela), in his
early manhood, has been active in the Tribal authority
work.	He acquired knowledge of amabali from his
Grandmother (paternal) and from his mother.	As his
home is near the road it was the resting place for the
travellers especially	chiefs from	whom he also
acquired the knowledge about the history of the
various Transkeian chiefdoms. In about 1978 he was
offered the headship of the Gqutyini Tribal authority
but due to his age he declined the offer and recom-
mended K. Gwarubana, also a Dikela, who accepted it.
He is no longer active in the Tribal authority
affairs even locally because "there is no truth
there".
4. REVEREND A.M. TITUS (b. 22/9/1895) (clan: Dikela)
trained first as a teacher and later as minister of
religion for the Anglican church. He is the son of
Klaas Titus who was closely associated with the St
Marks Mission under Arch Deacon Waters, and subse-
quently came to All Saints as a catechist and a
shoemaker in the Training school opened at All Saints.
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A.M. Titus acquired most of his knowledge about the
spread of christianity and education in Qwathiland
from him and his experience as a teacher and a
minister of religion in Qwathiland.
5.	CRONJE MLAHLENI XUNDU (b. July 1902) (clan:
Khombela of the house of Mxhiya) was born in Manzana
location in Qwathiland.	His father, as a councillor,
inspired in him love for the history of his people.
Although not educated, like Mxutu, he could be counted
as one of the greatest authorities in Qwathi and
Thembu history. In 1910 he was sent to Qumanco to
stay in the homestead of Falo Mgudlwa, the righthand
brother of Langa Mgudlwa the great son of Mgudlwa who
died during the Rebellion of 1880-1881. He got most
of his knowledge about the history of the Qwathi and
the Thembu from the stories he heard whilst at
Qumanco. When he came back he frequented the Tribal
authority	meetings	whence	later	knowledge was
acquired. He is the consultant in Qwathi history and
still plays an important role in Tribal authority
affairs as a prosecutor in the	Luhewini Tribal
Authority court.
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APPENDIX IB: LIST OF BASIC AMABALI 
Every well informed Qwathi knows something about the
following amabali because they are common. This
means that they have an idea about the past of their
people.
1. The arrival of the Qwathi in Thembuland.
2. Ntswayibana's lack of interest in traditional
cases which led to his losing chieftainship.
3. Conflict between Noni and Mphosiwe Sebeni.
4. Qwathi - Rharhabe war.
5. Qwathi - Bhaca war.
6. Qwathi - Mpondomise war (Matiwane).
7. Qwathi Rebellion.
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APPENDIX IC: TWO SAMPLE TRADITIONS 
1.	ORIGIN OF THE QWATHI: INTERVIEW WITH D.B. MXUTU, 
ALL SAINTS MISSION, ENGCOBO DISTRICT, 13 JUNE 1987 
The amaQwathi are the Xesibe.	They originated from
Xesibeland in the present district of Mt Ayliff.
They are the descendants of Njanye whose great house
sons were Mpondo and Mpondomise.	The son of iQadi 
house was Xesibe whose son was Ntozabantu.	Ntozaban-
tu' s son was Ndzuza and Ndzuza's son was Miyana.
From Miyana came Bimbi and Nondzaba.	From iQadi
house of Nondzaba came Hlabe whose son was Mthetho.
It was from this house that the Qwathi originated,
through Mthetho's son Mtshutshumbe.
"Qwathi" is the name of the ox which was given to
Mtshutshumbe after initiation school. As it was
customary in those days, he called himself by the name
of this ox.	Mtshutshumbe broke away from his father
with the intention of removing to Gcalekaland despite
his father's opposition.	He took with him his ox and
his followers. They left Mzintlava and moved into
the direction of Mthatha Mouth and they came to rest
at Nomadolo in the present district of Ngqeleni along
the coast.	When asked to which chiefdom they
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belonged they replied that they belonged to the Qwathi
chiefdom naming themselves after Mtshutshumbe's ox.
It is for this reason that the praise-singer used to
say in praise of the Qwathi
Iinkomo zika Mtshutshumbe oggaz'indlel'eb-
hek'ebuNguni. (Cattle of Mtshutshumbe who
led the way to Nguniland).
From Nomadolo they moved into the	direction of
Mqanduli with	the intention of crossing through
Bomvanaland to Gcalekaland.	They must have been
prevented from doing so by wars and they changed their
direction.	They now moved along the Mthatha river
and crossed Baziya mountains to Mgudu.	From Mgudu
they descended the Tshebengwana Valley up to Ndlunkulu
and crossed	Mbashe river and camped on a hill
overlooking Clarkebury.	This hill is known as Noni,
named after Noni the right hand son of Nkovane.
They sent a word to Mnguti the king of the Thembu at
the time to report their presence and to ask permis-
sion to occupy the area. The king was reluctant to
allow them to occupy the area because of fear of the
San raids and dangerous wild animals. But the
Qwathi, impressed by the beauty of the land with
beautiful valleys and forests told the chief that
they could not leave that beautiful land to people
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like the San who live in the caves and that wild
animals were no source of fear to them but were source
of meat. The king, thereupon, asked chief Sebeni who
was living at Sigubudwini between Baziya and Tabase to
go and live with the Qwathi, hence there are many
Thembu of Ngxongo clan in Qwathiland. That is how
the Qwathi came to occupy the land between Mbashe
river in the east and Qumanco river in the west but
later in about 1860 the Qumanco valley was given to
Mgudlwa by Dalasile.
2. CHIEFLY TRADITION: INTERVIEW WITH T. SOMDAKA, 
SILO LOCATION ENGCOBO 13/6/87.
Mtshutshumbe's son was Mndwane whose son was Ncobe.
Ncobe's son was Nkovane. Nkovane's sons were
Ntswayibana from the Great House, Noni from the Right
hand house after whom the hill overlooking Clarkebury
as named and Mfusi from a minor house (note that right
hand house was not in existence then, the informant
has been influenced by later events).
As the great son, of Ntswayibana was supposed to
become the chief of the Qwathi after his father but he
lost chieftainship to Noni. Tradition says that when
cases were brought before Ntswayibana he would refer
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them to Noni saying "Thetha mninawa, mna ndisaya
endimeni" (Attend to them my younger brother I am
still attending to the gardens). For this reason
this house of Ntswayibana whose son was Dikela is
called amaNdima.	He never presided over a single
case.	It was always Noni who did so on his behalf.
Even when Noni had	established himself	in his
homestead, he referred those who brought cases to him
back to Ntswayibana who in reply said "wathethe
mninawa, usengowam nalowo mzi". (Preside over them my
younger brother, your homestead is still mine).
In this way Noni got experience in the responsibilit-
ies of a chief and many people looked upon him as the
real chief.
The second reason for the reins of the government
passing over to Noni was the failure of Ntswayibana to
come to the assistane of Noni against Mphosiwe Sebeni,
the grand son of Mnguti whose son had married Noni's
daughter. All arrangements having been made, Noni
instructred the bridal party leader not to give any
gifts or presents should the bride price fall short.
When indeed the bride price fell short the bridal
party refused to give gifts and as a result Mphosiwe
274
insulted Noni.	The insult was a mocking allusion to
Noni's squint.
When Noni received this news he sent to Ntswayibana
his brother, but Ntswayibana replied that it not he
who had been insulted but Noni.	Noni mobilised his
forces without the assistance of his brother. In the
meantime he informed the Thembu king (He calls him
Mnguti) who allowed him to do as he liked about
redressing his grievance. One hundred head of cattle
were sent to the king to thank him for not having
interfered and the rest filled Noni's kraals and those
of his sons. Ntswayibana protested and demanded that
the booty be brought to him as the chief of the Qwathi
but Noni replied it not he (Ntswayibana) but him
(Noni) who had been insulted. Ntswayibana made no
attempts to assert himself as the chief of the Qwathi.
Many of his councillors began to look upon Noni as
their chief hoping to benefit from their support of
him.
Up to now it is still in the hands of Noni's descen-
dants. Noni's great house son was Mtshaba, Mtshaba's
son was Lutshaba but Lutshaba did not have a male
issue in the great house.	Fubu the right hand son
was transferred to the great house.	His great son
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was Dalasile and Dalasile's son was Langa.	Langa's
great son was Mlilo	and Mlilo's was Sakhela.
Sakhela's son was Mzikayise. Zanengqele Dalasile is
now regent for Mzikayise's son who is now pursuing his
studies at the University of Transkei.
276 APPENDIX II
MAP OF ENGCOBO DISTRICT
LOCATIONS:
Qwathi	cont.Hala
1. Clarkebury 61. Zabasa
2. Mhlophekazi 62. Si nqumeni
3. Didi 63. Sitoleni
4. Nkwenkwana 64. Upper Gqaka
5. Mbanga
6. Quluqu
7. Mjanyana
8. Tora
9. Mqonci
10. Ngqutura
11. Caba
12. Nxamagele
13. Cwecweni
14. Xonye
15. Debera
16. Mgwali
17. Egoso
18. Ngqaba
Jumba
19. Beyele
20. Qumanco
21. Elucwecwe
22. Lahlangubo
23. Gubenxa
24. Nkwenkwana
Qwathi
25. Mtuntloni
26. Gqutyini
27. Zadungeni
28. Mkanzi
29. Esikobeni
30. Manzana
31. Qutubeni
32. Kanye
33. Qebe
34. Tsalaba
35. All Saints
36. Xuka Drift
37. Eluhewini
38. Nggokoto
40. Ngcacu
41.Maqanda
42. Xuka
43. Cefane
44. Engxogi
45. Caca
46. Msintsana
47. Madotyeni
48. Sentube
49. Lower Sitoleni
50. Upper Gqobonco
51. Lower Gqaka
52. Gqobonco Junction
53. Gqobonco
54. Nkondlo
55. Ntibane
56.Lower Bashee
56A. Bashee
57. Lower Mnyolo
58. Mnyolo
59. Mkonkoto
60. Mgudu
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APPENDIX III: QWATHI PROPOSALS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF 
BRITISH CONTROL 
The following were the proposals drafted by Reverend
John Gordon on behalf of the Qwathi.
1. Dalasile wishes it to be understood that he is not
taken over by Government on account of misconducting
himself and trusts that his good behaviour will be
taken into consideration.
2. Dalasile hopes the Government will consent to
grant a separate magistrate for his tribe.
3. Dalasile hopes the government will allow histribe
the country they have hitherto occupied without being
mixed with other tribes.
4. Dalasile hopes that the hut tax will not come into
force in his tribe for two years.
5. Dalasile hopes that the government will make him
an allowance of not less than one hundred pounds per
annum.
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6. Dalasile hopes that the government will be pleased
to make an annual allowance to his son and heir,
Langa, and his brother Danti and to the five of the
following leading men in Qwathi political affairs,
namely, Singama, Sitonga, Sandile, Mangele and
Matyobeni.
7. Dalasile hopes the government will confirm the
grants of land made in his country (four in number)
for the church of England missions.
8. Dalasile also begs that the government will
strenuously prohibit the sale of brandy	in his
country.
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APPENDIX IV: DUTIES OF HEADMEN 
1. To distribute gardens
2. To settle small land disputes.
3. To arbitrate in civil cases arising in their
wards.
4. To help in the collection of hut tax.
5. To suppress rioting and thieving.
6. To recover stolen property.
7. To report irregularities.
8. To maintain order in his ward.
9. To exercise general supervision over his ward and
be at all times ready to assist the magistrate and
carry out instructions.
10. To help in the birth and death registration.
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11. To be the mouth piece of the government through
whom the magistrate would disseminate information - to
act as an unbroken link between the government and the
people of the ward.
12. They were also required to attend at the office to
assist in the hearing of more important cases and in
civil cases to assist as assessors only when there was
no attorney as it would be hard for them to understand
what was meant by "objection", "point of procedure",
"point of correction" and so on.
Footnote:- G3-84, W.E. Stanford to Elliot, p.76.
N.A.95, Elliot to Secretary for Native
Affairs, 17/6/84.
J. Rose-Innes (USNA) to Resident
Magistrates: Circular No.1 of 1890
18/4/1890.
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APPENDIX V:	CHIEFS AND SUBSIDY
NUMBER OF
ARMED MEN REMARKNAME OF A CHIEF SUBSIDY
Dalasile	(Head Chief) 100 880 Not drawn
Danti (brother of Dalasile) 25 100 Not drawn
Langa	(son of Dalasile) 20 - Not drawn
Matyobeni	(Senior Councillor) 12 Not drawn
Sitonga (sub-chief) 12 330 Not drawn
Sandile	(sub-chief) 12 300 Not drawn
Singama (sub-chief) 12 390 Not drawn
Mangele	(sub-chief) 12 130 Not drawn
Ntwangu (sub-chief) 280 No subsidy
Venu	(sub-chief) - 375 No subsidy
Ntabankulu	(sub-chief) - 160 No subsidy
Sigidi	Fubu (sub-chief) 35 No subsidy
Vananda (sub-chief) - 45 No subsidy
Yekiso	(sub-chief) - 100 No subsidy
Ngcengane (sub-chief) 40 No subsidy
Sigidi	Ndlela	(sub-chief) - 80 No subsidy
Mzolisa (sub-chief) - 50 No subsidy
Ndyande	(sub-chief) - 15 No subsidy
Mendela (Mfengu) - 75 No subsidy
Mcobololo	(Mfengu) - 50 No subsidy
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APPENDIX VI:	LIST OF HEADMEN IN QWATHILAND AS IN JUNE	1910
NO NAME TRIBE LOCATION NO TRIBE OF PEOPLE
1 Bilikana	(Headman) Qwathi Bashee 56 Qwathi
2 Dolophini (Headman) Thembu Sinqumeni 64 Gcina & Qwathi
3 Sigidi	Fubu Qwathi Ngcacu 41 Qwathi
4 Gemani Rasmeni Thembu Gqobonco 48 Qwathi
5 Gwadiso Qwathi Bashee 59 Qwathi
6 Hlakula Thembu Qutubeni 33 Qwathi,	Thembu
& Mfengu
7 Langa	(Chief) Qwathi Nkondlo 55 Qwathi
8 Lumkwana (Headman) Qwathi Mnyolo 61 Qwathi
9 Magugwana Mfengu Sikhobeni 30 Mfengu
10 Matumbu Qwathi Gqobonco 58 Qwathi
11 Gwama Mfengu Cefane 44 Mfengu
12 Mgunundu Qwathi Sitoleni 65 Thembu &
Qwathi
13 Miti Mpondomise Bashee 57 Qwathi &
Mpondomise
14 Mkhohliwe Qwathi Mgudu 62 Qwathi
15 Mkutwana Qwathi Gqaga 66 Qwathi
16 Mqotyana Qwathi Gqaga 52 Qwathi
17 Mtshangala Qwathi Tsalabo 35 Qwathi
18 Mzolisa Qwathi Zabasa 63 Qwathi
19 Sigidi	Ndlela Thembu Sentubi 49 Qwathi
20 Ngxukumashe & Qwathi Qebe 34 Qwathi
Manxiwa
21 Njikiza Qwathi Luhewini 40 Qwathi
22 Nobatana Baca Mkanzi 29 Mfengu
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NO NAME TRIBE LOCATION NO TRIBE OF
23 Nonyusa Qwathi Gqobonco 54 Qwathi
24 Nqwiliso Qwathi Qutubeni 32 Qwathi
25 Nqwenani Qwathi Luhewini 38 Qwathi & Gcina
26 Ntaka Qwathi Ngxogi 45 Qwathi
27 Ntantiso Thembu Zadungeni 28 Qwathi &
Thembu
28 Ntengo Qwathi Maganda 92 Maganda
29 Mntonintshi Thembu Sitobeni 50 Qwathi
30 Ntozini Mfengu Gqutyini 26 Mfengu
31 Poswayo T. Mfengu All Saints 36 Qwathi &
Mfengu
32 Raleigh or Lali Ngqika Mntuntloni 25 Qwathi,	Thembu
& Mfengu
33 Sikundla Qwathi Caca 47 Qwathi
34 Silo Thembu Xuka 37 Qwathi
35 Sipango Qwathi Caca 46 Qwathi
36 Sitelo Qwathi Xuka 43 Qwathi
37 Sitoza Qwathi Bashee 51 Qwathi
38 Sondlo Thembu Gqutyini 27 Thembu &
Mfengu
39 Tayiboso Qwathi Mnyolo 60 Qwathi
40 Vetu Mpondomise Manzana 31 Qwathi,
Thembu,	Mfengu
& Mpondomise
41 Vetyu Qwathi Xuka 39 Qwathi
42 Yawa Thembu Gqobonco 53 Qwathi
A.G. MCLOUGHLIN
Confirmed by T. Somdaka of Silo's ward, Xuka Engcobo.
PEOPLE
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